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ABSTRACT 
Aerial Strategies and their Effect on Conflict Characteristics 
by 
Carla Mercedes Martinez 
This project asks the question of how different aerial strategies can affect the 
characteristics of aerial campaigns in conflict.  It begins be developing a new 
categorization of aerial strategies that distinguishes aerial strategies by how targeted they 
are.  Data is collected on the type of strategies that were used in aerial campaigns from 
1914 to 2003.  A preliminary analysis of aerial strategy choice is conducted, studying the 
effect of military doctrines on strategy choice.  The project also takes into consideration 
the role that ground forces, both those of the state carrying out the aerial attack and of its 
opponent, will play in determining the effect of aerial strategies on campaign duration 
and outcome.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In October of 1911, during the Italo-Turkish War, Italian pilot Giolio Gavotti flew 
an early model of the Etrich Taube aircraft (a small monoplane that, was used as a 
bomber, fighter, trainer, and surveillance aircraft) over present-day Libya.  From it he 
dropped four bombs on Turkish bases (Italy and Turkey were fighting over control of this 
territory).  Gavotti’s mission, though likely not key to the outcome of the war, is claimed 
by some to have been the first aerial bombardment mission in history (Gropman n.d.).    
 Despite the limits of early bombing campaigns, air power strategists and scholars 
immediately recognized the potential that air power had for expanding the range of 
targets in conflict.  Suddenly it was no longer necessary to defeat ground defenses in 
order to attack key population and industrial centers.  Whereas before these key targets 
were only available to states that had militarily defeated the opponent’s ground troops, air 
power expanded the possibilities that states had available to them in conflict.  States were 
of course not completely defenseless and exposed to aerial attacks (as some, such as 
Douhet [1922], might have originally predicted).  With the development of combat 
aircraft came air defenses as well, and fighter tactics against bombers.  Still, there is no 
denying that since then, states (and particularly major powers with the capabilities to 
build air forces) have made the achievement of air superiority a key part of their military 
doctrines.   
 Besides expanding the range of targets, air power provides for the possibility of 
“clean” victories.  In other words, it offers leaders a tempting possibility of achieving a 
low cost (both in terms of casualties and the magnitude of the resources devoted to the 
attack) victory in conflict.  Air power is thus often thought of as a low-risk and low-cost 
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alternative to committing grounds troops to a conflict (Byman, Waxman and Larson 
1999).   
Interestingly, almost exactly one-hundred years after the Italians carried out that 
first aerial bombardment in Libya, another Libya campaign captured the world’s 
attention.  After the U.N. approved the creation of a no-fly zone in Libya, in March of 
2011 NATO began an air campaign that was intended to support the rebel Libyan groups 
fighting on the ground against the regime of Muanmar Qaddafi.  Within less than a year, 
the rebels had succeeded in toppling the Qaddafi regime, NATO had had no formal large-
scale presence on the ground
1
, and no NATO military personnel had been killed in the 
campaign.  Also importantly, the leaders of these states, such as the United States’ 
Barack Obama, had engaged in the military intervention without strong political 
opposition from their constituents
2
.  While there is no way of knowing this for certain, it 
is likely that opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops to a third war would have been 
much greater than it was for the Libya bombing campaign.   
Air-only military campaigns, such as the one in Libya, come with a low-level of 
commitment, making it much less risky for a state to get involved in a conflict.  In other 
words, withdrawing from a conflict, if the state chooses to do so, is much easier than if 
ground troops are involved.  Of course, as critics of the Libya NATO operation remarked, 
it is precisely this lack of commitment that has been speculated to make such operations 
ineffective.  Critics argue that air power on its own cannot coerce an adversary into 
                                                             
1
 While there was no formal NATO ground presence, the alliance did employ forward air control teams on 
the ground to help guide aircraft to its targetsInvalid source specified.. 
2 It should be noted that Obama did face some criticism from his political opposition, but much of it 
focused on the length of the campaign and whether he should attempt to repeal the War Power Act.  The 
opposition was nowhere near as strong as it was for the Afghanistan or Iraq wars.   
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changing its behavior in the way that a ground intervention (which can include post-
conflict nation-building) would (Bosco 2011, S. M. Walt 2012).   
 
Politics and Air Power 
 Military strategies can be designed to disarm the enemy completely, making it 
impossible for the opponent to continue fighting.  More relevant to the study of politics, 
military strategies can also be designed to influence the expectations of the opponent on 
what the outcome of an absolute war would be, if it were to be fought.  Besides 
destroying the resources of the opponent, and altering the balance of power, military 
strategies can be used to reveal information about military capabilities.  Thus, in most 
wars the decision to end a war is a political one, made by leaders, rather than a military 
one made when one side is completely defeated by the other (Blainey 1973, von 
Clausewitz 1976, Wagner 2000).   
Air power in particular can serve both to destroy the resources of the opponent 
and to signal the potential cost of continuing to fight.  This depends, of course, on how air 
power is being used.  In this dissertation I will study not just whether air power is being 
used in conflict, but rather how it is being used.  In other words, I will study different 
aerial strategies and how the choice of strategy can affect how a conflict plays out, as 
well as how it ends.   
Before further introducing this work, I will discuss what I am referring to by 
military strategy.  Military strategy has been defined in a variety of ways, even within the 
international relations literature.  In general, though, when we speak of military strategy 
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we are referring to the way in which states use the resources they have to achieve their 
aims.   
Military strategy has been studied at a variety of levels.  For example, we can 
study grand strategy, which refers to the ultimate ends and means of war and relates the 
political, diplomatic and economic realms with the military (Luttwak 2001).  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is the study of tactics, which refers to the actual combat 
taking place, including the positioning of weapons and exploitation of the terrain.  In this 
dissertation I will be studying military strategy at the operational level, which is the 
following: 
 
The overall methods of war, the level of battle as a whole and the style of war (Luttwak 
2001). 
 
The level “concerned with how to achieve the strategic ends of the war with the forces 
allotted.” (Warden 2000, 2) 
 
In this dissertation I will adopt a definition of military strategy similar to that used 
by Reiter and Meek (1999), which is in turn taken from Liddell Hart (1962).  For this 
dissertation, I will refer to military strategy as:  
 
The way in which military forces are employed in order to achieve a policy objective 
(Liddell Hart 1962, Reiter and Meek 1999). 
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The Project’s Structure 
I begin to think about the influence of military strategies on outcomes by thinking 
that a state has a set of aerial strategies available to it.  Given this range of options, the 
state will select the strategy that provides it with the highest number of benefits, taking 
the costs of using the strategy into account.  In other words, the state will choose the 
strategy that maximizes its utility.  Given that a state has made this choice, the question I 
then ask is how this choice of strategy will affect the development and outcome of the 
bombing campaign. 
The first question that I address is how to categorize aerial strategies.  Previous 
work on air power has drawn a distinction between military and non-military targets.  As 
the case of another NATO campaign, the one in Kosovo, shows us, though, more subtle 
distinctions can be made between different strategies of aerial bombing if we want to 
understand which ones are more likely to lead to victory.   When NATO allies engaged in 
an aerial campaign to stop Slobodan Milosevic’s violence against the Kosovars, NATO 
explicitly made it clear that no ground forces would be committed to the effort.  Less than 
three months after the air campaign began, Milosevic capitulated, making the air 
campaign successful.  Though some would argue that the reason Milosevic was coerced 
was because of the threat of a NATO ground invasion (despite their statements, 
Milosevic could have had reason to believe that NATO troops were ready to invade), it is 
also true that NATO’s particular choice of targets may have led to Milosevic stepping 
down.  Besides bombing military targets that made it difficult for Milosevic to continue 
the war effort, NATO also chose targets that were of financial importance to Milosevic 
(NATO chose to bomb industrial targets that were specifically owned by either Milosevic 
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himself or by his family).  Thus, this choice of targets made it costlier for Milosevic to 
continue the war effort (Stoll 2011).  In the case of the bombing campaign in Kosovo, it 
wasn’t only the fact that industrial targets were being bombed, but that the particular 
targets that were chosen were important to Milosevic. 
This dissertation will attempt to fill a gap in the literature by providing a new 
categorization of air power that goes beyond choosing civilian or military targets and 
instead focuses on the choice of targets within each of the two categories.  I will also 
make a distinction between air power used for close air support, interdiction, and 
strategic attack.  This will enable the application of the same sort of theories that one 
would use for studying ground strategies to air power, while at the same time recognizing 
the different nature of air power. 
The main question asked in this project is how these different choices of aerial 
strategy can affect the characteristics of a military campaign. Of course, when 
considering the effect of military strategies on conflict outcomes, one potential caveat is 
that the choice of military strategy is endogenous to the conflict at hand.  In other words, 
when states are faced with a choice of strategies, they will choose the one that will make 
them more likely to win the conflict. This leads to results that will therefore not be 
generalizable.  The argument that I will make in the first analytical chapter of this 
dissertation is that all possible strategies are actually not available to states when they are 
making a decision of which strategy to use.  I argue that states will be either unable or 
unwilling to use certain military strategies, being bound by their military doctrines.    
Having provided some evidence for this argument, I move on to explore how 
aerial strategies interact with forces on the ground to affect the duration of aerial 
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campaigns, both in the cases of success and defeat.  While there are certainly cases of air-
only campaigns, most uses of air power in conflict are carried out either in support of or 
in coordination with ground forces.  As Horowitz and Reiter (2001) state, air power often 
works best when coupled with ground forces (perhaps this is why air-only operations are 
such a rarity).  While much of the previous international relations work on the use of air 
power has focused on it independently of ground power, I argue that we should not be 
thinking of air power in isolation, but in conjunction with what is happening on the 
ground.   
At the same time, the opponent’s strategy may also influence the effectiveness of 
air power, regardless of the type of air power being used.  Susan Hannah Allen, in her 
2007 piece on bombing campaigns, concludes that guerrilla tactics used by the target 
make bombing less successful, suggesting that there is a need for an increased focus on 
the actions of the target, along with those of the attacking state.  I thus devote my third 
analytical chapter to exploring how both the characteristics of the opponent and its 
military strategy can affect the outcome of aerial campaigns. 
The following chapter discusses selected literature on conflict outcomes, military 
strategy, and the use of air power in conflict.  It will identify where in the literature this 
dissertation will fit, as well as the gaps that it will attempt to fill.  Chapter 3 will set up a 
general theory of military strategies in the air, as well as develop the classification of air 
power that will be used in this dissertation.  Chapter 4 further develops the theory and 
lays out the research design that will be used in further chapters to test a variety of 
hypotheses.  Chapter 5 discusses how it is that states select their aerial strategies, 
focusing on the role that military doctrine plays in this choice.  Chapters 6 and 7 will in 
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turn be devoted to the analysis of the effect of different air strategies on aerial campaign 
duration and outcome, considered (respectively) relative to grounds strategies, and 
relative to the strategy and characteristics of the opponent.  Chapter 8 is the conclusion.  
The general aim of the project as a whole will be to explain how different uses of 
air power can affect the outcome of an aerial campaign, as well as how the campaign 
plays out.   I will do this by distinguishing between more and less targeted aerial 
campaigns, as well as by taking into account the role that ground power (both that of the 
state conducting the aerial campaign and of its opponent) can play in influencing the 
duration and outcomes of aerial campaigns.   
 
 .   
  
   
 
 
  
9 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
When we think about the most effective way of using air power in conflict we 
have to think about placing it in the context of the study of conflict.  One of the main 
questions to answer in this dissertation will be what the effect of different forms of air 
power is on outcomes during conflict (under various circumstances)
 3
.  This means that 
one of the questions that we must consider is how war outcomes are determined.     
 
War and the Revelation of Information 
 Recently, much of the International Relations literature has studied war initiation 
from a bargaining point of view.  From this point of view, being involved in a war at all 
is an inefficient outcome, as the same outcome could always be reached by both states 
through bargaining, without having to incur the costs of fighting the war (during which 
resources are inevitably destroyed) (J. Fearon 1995).  Yet, in this framework we can 
explain war between two rationalist states when there are issue indivisibilities (though 
this explanation can mostly be argued away through the use of side-payments and issue 
linkage), incentives to keep information private, or commitment problems (J. Fearon 
1995).  In these cases, war may still happen even though during the bargaining process 
there was a non-empty bargaining range that was mutually preferred to war.  As Powell 
(2004) explains, fully-informed states may find themselves in war when states use war to 
“lock in” a certain payoff that they may no longer be able to obtain in the future.  If the 
sum of both players’ lock-in values is greater than the amount that can be divided through 
                                                             
3 Note that I will also be discussing the duration of aerial campaigns, but, as will become evident later on in 
this project, this will be done in an attempt to also understand the outcomes of aerial campaigns.   
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negotiation, then there will be no agreement.  Thus, large shifts in the relative bargaining 
power of the players may make the player that expects to be weaker in the future take its 
lock-in payoff now, since the other player cannot commit to give him something better in 
the future.  This approach to bargaining and war views war as a costly lottery, where the 
outcome of it is predetermined through a given probability that is known to both actors. 
 
The Ending of Wars 
If we think of war as a costly lottery, then we know that it will end at some point, 
as well as the probability with which each state will win the war.  What this approach 
does not tell us much about is the process that will lead to the end of the war.  If we 
follow the war-as-bargaining framework, we can think of war as ending when the issues 
that led to the initiation of war are resolved.  This means that wars will end either when 
enough credible information is shared that there is an agreement between the two states 
as to what a settlement will be, or when the commitment problems that led to the 
initiation of the war are resolved (J. Fearon 1995).   
There is another current in the bargaining and war literature that specifically 
models how wars serve to reveal information about the two states in conflict, thus 
allowing states to reach a settlement that wouldn’t have been possible without first 
fighting the war.  Generally, this work moves away from the war-as-a-costly-lottery 
assumption and instead models war as a continuation of bargaining.  Wagner (2000) 
specifically seeks to answer the question of why in some cases agreement is possible after 
fighting but not before.  His reasoning is that states might expect to get a better bargained 
settlement if they fight, even if this would not improve their military position.  Wagner 
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(2000) explains this logic through a bargaining model in which he draws a distinction 
between absolute wars (ones in which the aim is to entirely disarm the opponent) and real 
ones (in which the main aim is to influence the terms of the agreement that will be 
accepted).  Military operations serve the functions of revealing information about 
capabilities and also of destroying the capabilities of the adversary.  In real war, 
according to Wagner (2000), states can have similar military capabilities, but one state 
may believe that superior war-fighting capabilities (morale, tactics, training, etc) will give 
it an advantage in fighting battles.  The other state, though, is unsure as to whether this 
belief is true or not.  If the two states fight a battle and the first state wins, then the 
probability of the belief being true, as perceived by the second state, increases.  Thus, a 
state that wins a battle can expect a more favorable offer from its opponent (Wagner 
2000).    
 Another work that models the end of war happening as more information is 
shared is that of Smith and Stam (2004).  Smith and Stam share Wagner’s (2000) 
viewpoint that very few wars are actually fought until one or both sides are completely 
disarmed.  They instead model war as a random walk model of conflict, in which states 
capture “forts” from each other and continue until one side has lost all of its forts or until 
a negotiated settlement is reached.  A key feature of this model is that Smith and Stam 
relax the assumption of common priors.  That is, even absent private information, actors 
have heterogeneous beliefs that lead to disagreement.  As more information is revealed 
through battles and the acquisition and loss of forts, beliefs converge.  In a way, Smith 
and Stam (2004) are revisiting Blainey’s 1973 argument, which argues that state leaders 
use war to assess their ability to impose their will on their rival.  Wars thus begin when 
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two nations disagree on their relative strength.  When the war has helped the states assess 
their ability to impose their will on their rival, and they now agree on their relative 
strength, the war comes to an end.   
 One major point behind these works is that if wars begin because of information 
asymmetries, then fighting the war serves to provide information and thus resolve the 
war.  Beyond information asymmetries, though, the rationalist theories of war also state 
that wars begin because of commitment problems.  Because states cannot credibly 
commit to a settlement that they would both prefer to war, they fight.  Thus, according to 
Reiter (2009), wars can also end once the commitment problem is resolved.  One way in 
which the commitment problem can be resolved is by defeating the adversary in an 
absolute war.  If a state is able to impose on its opponent an outcome such as the 
annihilation of the population, the annexation of its territory or a regime change, then it 
will prevent the adversary from attacking it in the future, and thus remove the possibility 
of the opponent reneging on the agreed settlement (Reiter 2009).  Reiter (2009) makes 
the point that when commitment problems are very severe, not even negative information 
from the battlefield will keep states from continuing to fight and to seek an absolute 
victory.  
 The question that then comes to mind is why all wars are not absolute ones.  After 
all, we can observe several cases in which states are able to reach a settlement without 
either side necessarily achieving an absolute victory.  Under this rationalist framework of 
war settlements, sometimes the information dynamics will dominate, such that the states 
are able to exchange enough information through battle that a new balance of power is 
agreed upon and a settlement can be reached.  Of course, this agreement can always 
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break down if one side believes that by restarting the fight it can achieve a more 
favorable settlement.  Reiter (2009) identifies three cases in which this breakdown is 
most likely to happen: 1) under a post-war shift in the balance of power, 2) if there is a 
first-mover advantage that would give one side an incentive to launch a surprise attack, 
and 3) when new leadership comes to power.   
 Commitment problems may also be overcome if one of the belligerents finds that 
its prospects of achieving absolute victory are so low that it is willing to accept a 
settlement, even if it is not credible.  Also, Reiter (2009) argues that fighting an absolute 
war is a luxury that not all states can afford.  If fighting becomes too costly, states may be 
willing to accept partial settlements.  Commitment problems may also be ameliorated by 
the presence of peacekeeping troops, or by capturing goods that may be helpful in 
maintaining the credibility of the settlement (such as strategically valuable territory that 
facilitates defense) (Reiter 2009). 
 
The Determinants of Conflict Outcomes 
 This previous framework allows us to understand the mechanism through which 
wars can both begin and end between rationalist states.  Still, if we want to understand 
why a particular war outcome happened, we should also be thinking about how states 
were able to credibly reveal information and/or overcome their commitment problems.  
In other words, we know that wars will end when one state convinces the other that it is 
more powerful or when one state defeats the other absolutely or manages to solve the 
commitment problem in another way that allows for a partial settlement, but what we still 
need to better understand is how states are able to transmit this information to convince 
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their opponents of their superior capabilities, or how they manage to overcome the 
commitment problem.   
 When considering how states can credibly assert their superiority, both from a 
policy as well as a scholarly perspective, we first and foremost think about the material 
capabilities of the combatants involved in the conflict.  Starting from a realist point of 
view, material resources will determine the power balance between two states, and thus 
the outcome of a conflict (Mearsheimer 2001, Waltz 1979).   It is an easy (and 
uncontroversial) statement to make that all else being equal, the state with the greater 
capabilities will be more likely to prevail in a conflict.  Just about every single study that 
considers the outcome of a conflict, from the formal theory (Morgan (1994), to name one 
example) to empirical studies (Sullivan (2007), to name another), considers the military 
capabilities of the states involved in a conflict.  Still, while military capabilities may be 
our most obvious and necessary variable to study war outcomes, it is also true that if it 
were the only variable at play in determining the outcome of a war, there would be no 
uncertainty involved in conflict, and hence no need to actually fight wars, only a need to 
compare military capabilities.  Thus, in the international relations literature, the effect of 
a large number of variables (many of them intangibles that are likely to lead to 
uncertainty) on war outcomes has been considered.   
 Military alliances are a major factor that can determine the balance of power and 
thus the outcome of conflicts.  Traditionally, the process through which alliances were 
considered to affect the outcome of a conflict was very similar to that of capabilities.  
This is because the most basic way in which alliances were considered to affect war 
outcomes was by aggregating (and hence increasing) capabilities.  In traditional work on 
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alliances, the alliance represents the aggregation of the capabilities of the individual 
member, and it is joined in order to balance against aggressors, by making it more likely 
that the members of the alliance would prevail in a conflict with an aggressor (Waltz 
1979, S. M. Walt 1987).  More recently, the basic aggregation point of view has been 
called into question.  For example, Powell (1999) has suggested that the aggregation of 
military capabilities in alliances may result in increasing, constant or decreasing returns 
to scale.  Bensahel (2007) argues that alliances will actually decrease military 
effectiveness by imposing transaction costs that are the result of integrating different 
troops.  Still, countries engage in war-fighting through alliances because of the political 
benefits of fighting a multilateral war that in the end make success and the achievement 
of their aims more likely (Bensahel 2007).  This implies that if the effect of an alliance on 
the outcome of a conflict is more uncertain, a war will have to be fought in order for 
states to know what the effect of the alliance will be on the outcome of the war.  Reiter 
(2009) also discusses how the expectation of having an ally join a war may convince a 
state to keep fighting even after military defeats, or how a potential ally joining the 
opposing side can decrease the hopes for victory enough that states are willing to accept 
even non-credible settlements.    
Moving beyond a focus on the capabilities of the opposing sides, we can also 
think about how the different institutional set-ups of the two opposing sides may affect 
the outcome of a conflict.  One theory in the quantitative study of international relations 
discusses how the type of government of a state may affect how well it performs in battle, 
and thus how it can persuade the opponent of its superior capabilities (Reiter and Stam 
2002, Lake 1992).  Though it used to be the conventional wisdom that democracies could 
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not handle casualties and therefore could be defeated in war if the enemy was only able to 
inflict enough casualties upon them
4
, there is now an opposing belief that democracies 
may actually be more likely to win the wars they fight.  Part of the reason for this may be 
that, due to their nature, democracies possess greater natural wealth and devote more 
resources to national security, as well as coming to each other’s aid when one is attacked 
by another state (Lake 1992).   
According to Reiter and Stam (2002), the effectiveness of democracies at winning 
wars comes from two different mechanisms, a selection and a war-fighting effect.  The 
selection effect follows from the fact that democracies will become involved only in the 
wars that they feel confident of winning.  Because democratic leaders have to rely on the 
support of the population to stay in power, if they are not able to provide the public good 
of victory they will most likely be removed from power (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 
Reiter and Stam 2002).  Though the outcome for the deposed autocrat may be worse than 
for the democratic leader (one obvious example being the fate of Benito Mussolini after 
the Axis powers lost WWII), it is also the case that autocratic leaders may be able to “buy 
off” those supporters that matter and be able to stay in power even after losing a war 
(Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003).  Democratic leaders, knowing this logic, will thus fight 
only the wars that they are likely to be victorious in (Reiter and Stam 2002). In particular, 
democratic leaders will also be more likely to select the wars that are likely to be short 
and low-cost (Bennett and Stam 1996).   
Beyond democracies selecting themselves into the conflicts that they are most 
likely to win, it is also a possibility that, once democracies find themselves in war, they 
                                                             
4 This is the logic that Ho Chi Minh seems to have followed when he stated to the French that while they 
could kill ten of his men for every one he killed, he would still win. 
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may fight more effectively, through what Reiter and Stam (2002) term the “war-fighting 
effect.”  The argument is essentially that democratic troops are likely to come from more 
meritocratic and efficient militaries (much of this efficiency stemming from the free flow 
of information that is available in democracies) that in turn perform better in the field 
(even when capabilities and technology are controlled for).  Enemy troops are also more 
likely to surrender to a democratic enemy (as opposed to fighting to the last soldier), as 
they expect to be treated better by democratic captors who are more likely to observe 
international norms when it comes to the treatment of prisoners of war.   
Research has also explored what particular characteristics of democracies are the 
ones that are leading to this advantage in the effectiveness of fighting.  According to 
Biddle and Long (2004), who study the effect of democracy on battle outcomes, once 
human capital, positive civil-military relations and Western culture (all factors that 
contribute positively to victory in battle) are controlled for, the effect of democracy 
actually switches.  Of course, positive civil-military relations, high degrees of human 
capital and Western culture are all correlated with democracy.  If democracy indeed 
causes these factors, then the idea that democracy leads to effective war-fighting would 
still hold, and Biddle and Long’s (2004) ideas would merely be explaining the 
mechanism through which it does so.  If these factors cause democracy, though, it may be 
more important to study these unit-level traits of states (as opposed to their political 
systems) when evaluating their effectiveness in war.   
Also, it may not be the case that initial assessments of democracies’ aversion to 
casualties were completely wrong.  Bennett and Stam (1998) argue that democracies are 
by nature more sensitive to public opinion.  As public support will decrease as the war 
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progresses, they argue that democracies select themselves not only into wars that they can 
win, but into wars that they can win easily.  The longer a democracy fights, the more its 
support erodes, such that by the second year of the war, an autocracy is more likely to 
win the war.  Seeing as most wars are short, though, democracies are able to retain their 
advantage at war (Bennett and Stam 1998).   
 Similarly, other work has examined the effect of a variety of other domestic 
factors (several of them correlated with democracy, but not all) on military effectiveness, 
and by extension on the probability of a positive outcome in conflict (military 
effectiveness can lead to both an absolute victory or to enough information being shared 
to convince the opponent that it will not be able to prevail in the conflict).  The 
assumption behind these works (which is similar to that of those which study the effect of 
military strategy on conflict outcomes), is that the way in which a conflict is fought 
matters, and that domestic factors may have an influence on how militaries conduct their 
fighting on the field.  For example, Reiter (2007) argues that a nationalistic culture, while 
it may open the possibility of using a greater variety of tactics (such as suicide attacks, 
for example) by making soldiers more willing to kill and be killed for their country, also 
decreases the probability of victory, by making enemy combatants less likely to surrender 
(nationalistic troops are more likely to demonize the enemy, giving their opponents an 
expectation of not being treated well if they are captured).   
 As mentioned before, particular domestic institutions and social structures may 
also have an effect on the outcome of a conflict.  Hoyt (2007), for example, argues that 
states in which discrimination is institutionalized and are plagued by discriminatory 
policies against certain sectors of the population may still be able to mobilize large 
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numbers of forces, but that the discriminatory structure of society will translate into low 
skill and less integration of military units.  This in turn leads to a decreased effectiveness 
in combat.  Similarly, competition for military control between military and civilian 
leaders may lead to a lack of information-sharing and honest assessment of the military, 
again resulting in poor military performance (Brooks 2007).  Even factors such as 
constitutional arrangements, often not even studied in International Relations, have been 
suggested as contributing to the outcomes of conflict (often through their influence on the 
effectiveness of troops).  For example, Avant (2007) suggests that parliamentary versus 
presidential democracies face a trade-off when it comes to the military effectiveness of 
their troops.  The institutions of a presidential system emphasize individuals, thus leading 
to militaries that are allowed more autonomy and thus have higher skill levels.  In 
parliamentary systems, where unity and coordination are key to maintaining power, the 
militaries may lack autonomy, but have higher levels of integration and responsiveness 
(Avant 2007).   
 
Military Strategies and Conflict Outcomes 
All of these previous works can be integrated generally into a theory of rationalist 
war termination, as all of the mentioned independent variables can serve to increase the 
military effectiveness of a state.  A more militarily effective state will in turn be more 
likely to both easily provide credible information about its ability to prevail in a conflict 
and to be able to impose an absolute victory on its opponent. 
One particular independent variable that affects military effectiveness, and that I 
am interested in studying the effect of on war outcomes, is military strategy.   As stated in 
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the introductory chapter of this dissertation, when I refer to military strategy I am 
referring to the way in which military forces are employed in order to achieve a 
policy objective (Reiter and Meek 1999).  Military strategy is a key, non-capability 
factor that may affect both a state’s decision to go to war, even when the military balance 
may be stacked against it, as well as its decision to continue fighting or agree to a 
settlement.  As both Blainey (1973) and Fearon (1995) argue, states go into war with 
mutual optimism in victory.  Often this optimism is based on the idea that even though 
the opponent may have an advantage in capabilities, one’s troops are better trained, more 
motivated, or can achieve a swift victory through the use of surprise that will negate the 
opponent’s advantage.  Thus, even states with the same information may have different 
priors as far as the war’s outcome goes, because they believe that they are able to fight 
more effectively (Smith & Stam 2004).     
At the tactical
5
 level of war the focus is on the capabilities of the two opposing 
armed forces, as well as the terrain and the circumstances that the armed forces find 
themselves in during combat (Luttwak 2001).  Once we move on to the operational
6
 level 
of war, though, the methods of war begin to have more influence.  As Luttwak (2001) 
states, the operational level goes beyond being a sum of the different parts.  It is rather 
about the style of war that is being fought.  Studying military strategy and how it can 
influence war outcomes, even independently of material capabilities, may go a long way 
in helping to clarify the rationalist framework of war.   
                                                             
5 The tactical level of war refers the level in which “battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces” (emphasis added) and which focuses 
on the arrangement of forces relative to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives (Luttwak 
2001).      
6 The operational level of war refers to “the overall methods of war, the level of battle as a whole and the 
style of war” (Luttwak 2001). 
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One earlier, and influential, piece that asks the question of how state leaders’ 
decisions to go to war can be affected by the projected outcomes of the conflict is 
Mearsheimer’s  “Conventional Deterrence” (1983).  In this book Mearsheimer studies 
what factors would lead one side to believe that it could be victorious in battle.  One such 
factor that he considered was military strategy (in Mearsheimer’s case he differentiates 
between attrition and blitzkrieg strategies).  Mearsheimer (1983) argues that the effective 
use of a blitzkrieg strategy can lead to a higher probability of victory in war, by allowing 
states to overcome disadvantages in material capabilities. 
 Military strategies affect the cost benefit analysis of the two sides engaged in 
conflict.  A particular choice of military strategy can affect the costs incurred by the 
opposing side, and thus their willingness to continue fighting the war (as Reiter (2009) 
states, if costs of fighting are high enough, states may even be willing to accept non-
credible settlements).  The choice of strategy may also affect the rate at which costs are 
being imposed on the opponent (Bennett and Stam 1998, Stam 1996).  For example, a 
punishment strategy depends on inflicting high-enough costs on an opponent that lead to 
decreased support for the conflict before the opponent can adapt to these costs, thus 
leading the opponent to surrender, while a maneuver strategy depends on inflicting costs 
on the opponent at a very fast rate (Bennett and Stam 1998, Stam 1996).  Of course, the 
effect of strategy on the cost-benefit analysis of each side involved in a war depends also 
on what the opponent is doing.  The effectiveness of a particular military strategy may be 
heavily dependent on the strategy of the opponent (Stam 1996, Bennett and Stam 1996, 
Bennett and Stam 1998).     For example, according to Stam (1996), the most desired 
outcome for a state that is on the offensive is to use a maneuver strategy against an 
22 
 
attrition strategy, while a state on the defensive would prefer to use a punishment strategy 
against an attrition strategy.   
 In 2004’s Military Power, Stephen Biddle also suggests that the particular military 
strategy that is chosen by the warring nations will affect the outcomes of military 
conflicts.  He begins by asking what causes victory and defeat in modern battle.  Biddle 
(2004) expresses dissatisfaction with the way in which International Relations scholars 
measure the concept of military power. He seeks to explain the outcome of wars while 
focusing on one particular non-material independent variable—what he terms “force 
employment” (“the doctrine and tactics by which armies use their material on the field” 
(S. Biddle 2004, 2)).  Biddle (2004) asserts that an approach based solely on material 
capabilities will underestimate the performance of what he refers to as the “modern 
system” while overestimating the performance of well-equipped armies that nonetheless 
are ineffective in using their equipment.  More specifically, Biddle defines the modern 
system as “a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, 
small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, 
reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war” (S. Biddle 2004).  
Biddle’s distinction between the modern and non-modern systems will be particularly 
important to this dissertation, as I will derive a categorization of air power that is largely 
based off of Biddle’s distinction between the modern and non-modern systems.  This will 
be further explained in the theory chapter.  
Biddle tests hypotheses derived from his theory through indirect statistical tests, 
using case studies, statistical analysis and computer simulation (using a Defense 
Department combat simulation program).  A problem with using case studies is that they 
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can lead to biased results, as researchers (sometimes even unintentionally) will tend to 
choose cases that are more likely to be supportive of their theories.  Also, often the best-
known cases, the ones that there is the most information available for, are atypical ones 
that may not represent the universe of cases.  To address this problem, Biddle selects his 
case studies on the basis of them being critical cases.  By critical cases he is referring to 
cases that have extreme values for the independent values under consideration.  In 
particular, Biddle (2004) chooses two cases (Operation Michael, the German offensive of 
the Second Battle of the Somme in WWI and Operation Goodwood, the Allied attempt to 
break out of Normandy in July 1944) that represent most-likely cases for orthodox 
theories of capability and least-likely cases for his theory of modern force employment.  
In other words, in these particular cases the orthodox theory of capability should be on its 
strongest ground and the theory of modern force employment on its weakest ground.  
In the spring of 1918, during WWI, in what became known as the Second Battle 
of the Somme, the Germans changed their approach from a defensive one to an offensive 
one.   In what was known as Operation Michael, the Germans planned to lead an assault 
against the southern wing of the British Expeditionary Force, relying on an artillery 
attack and then an infantry assault led by German storm troopers.  In the case of 
Operation Michael, weapon technology marginally favored the British and the force-to-
force (attacker forces: defender forces) and force-to-space (defender’s troop density) 
ratios favored the defense (in this case, the British).  This means that we should have 
expected an easy victory for the British.  Rather, the operation was a German success.  
Biddle explains this victory by the fact that the Germans were using the modern system 
in their force employment, while the British failed to effectively implement the modern 
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system.  He similarly explains the case of Operation Goodwood in World War II.  After 
the D-Day landings of 1944, the Allies had managed to penetrate the European continent, 
but they were finding it difficult to break out of Normandy.  Operation Goodwood was 
one of the British attempts to break through the German defenses and advance towards 
Paris.  According to orthodox theory, the circumstances surrounding Operation 
Goodwood favored the offensive, which means that this should have been an 
overwhelming British success.  What ended up happening was that the British, employing 
a traditional strategy, were defeated by the modern-system-employing Germans.  Biddle 
also includes the case of Operation Desert Storm in the First Gulf War.  While this is not 
a critical case (the Americans enjoyed superiority in both capabilities and force 
employment), Biddle uses it to support his theory by focusing on how and why the 
Coalition was able to break through Iraqi defenses with such a low loss rate (according to 
Biddle, this was because of their force employment).   
Biddle’s (2004) next stage of testing his theory is through statistical analysis.  As 
stated before, the largest problem in conducting this analysis is the lack of direct 
measures of force employment in the standard political science datasets.  Biddle gets 
around this problem by using indirect statistical tests.  He derives hypotheses by deducing 
the effects of force employment on other variables.  Biddle predicts that the use of the 
modern system will have effects on observed variables that are the opposite of what the 
traditional capability theory would predict.  This means that the predicted relationships 
between his key variables will be different than what the orthodox theory would predict.  
Thus, the two theories can be evaluated against each other using this indirect method.  
Biddle’s dependent variables are loss-exchange ratios (attacker casualties: defender 
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casualties), territorial gain, and combat duration.  His main independent variables are 
force-to-force ratios, force-to-space ratios, systematic technological sophistication 
(referring to the advances in military technology in the system as a whole), and the 
dyadic technological imbalance (expected to reflect one side having better military 
technology than the other).  Using these variables, Biddle derives, and tests, a variety of 
hypotheses.    For example, he states that the traditional theory predicts that the loss-
exchange ratio (LER, attacker casualties per defender casualties) will be inversely 
proportional to the force-to-force ratio (FFR, the ratio of attacker forces to defender 
forces).  Biddle’s theory predicts instead that the LER will increase with respect to the 
FFR, a hypothesis that is supported by the empirical tests.  Across the various tests, the 
hypotheses derived from Biddle’s (2004) are more strongly supported than those derived 
from the traditional capability-based theory.   
Finally, Biddle (2004) uses computer simulation experimentation for one more 
test of his theory.   The advantage that this method has over the other two is that it 
addresses the problem of selection on wars (as the cases can be generated with any 
chosen values for the key variables) and allows for the testing of predictions for which 
there are no cases (Biddle cites the example of modern, late 20
th
 century weapons being 
used against an enemy that has fully embraced the modern system of warfighting).  
Biddle (2004) compares his theory to the orthodox theory by, in the simulation, 
manipulating both the strategies and the differential in the level of weapon technologies 
between both sides.  Biddle finds support for his theory by showing that, like he would 
predict, the interaction between advanced weapons and the use of the modern system 
leads to a low loss-exchange ratio.   
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Classification of Military Strategy 
 If we are to use military strategy as an independent variable to study conflict 
outcomes, it is first important to determine how to classify the different forms of military 
strategies.  The classification that is chosen is important because it can affect the entire 
approach of a study.  For example, a classification that is based on the political aims of 
the attack (offense/defense, for example) will lead to a study that is best approached at 
the grand strategy level,  whereas a classification that focuses on tactics and maneuvers 
(maneuver/attrition) may lend itself to an operational-level study that uses battles as its 
unit of analysis.  In the section that follows I will review various well-known 
classifications that have been used in the political science literature.  
The first classification of military strategies (or “doctrines,” as Posen (1984) 
prefers to refer to them) that I will consider is that between offensive and defensive 
strategies (Posen 1984, Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1984).   This classification of military 
strategies focuses on what the aims of a particular military operation are, and is often 
linked with the political strategy of a state.  The main distinction is between offensive 
strategies, under which states seek to conquer other territories or somehow alter the status 
quo, and defensive strategies, in which a state seeks to maintain the status quo or deny 
another state its expansive objectives (Snyder 1984, Posen 1984).
7
  The German use of 
blitzkrieg during the Second World War, as well as the strategy adopted by most 
participants of World War I, are suggested as examples of offensive strategies (Snyder 
                                                             
7 Posen (1984) includes a third category, deterrent strategies.  Deterrent strategies aim to punish an 
aggressor by raising its costs without raising one’s own costs.   
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1984, Posen 1984).  Posen (1984) suggests the French strategy during the Second World 
War (illustrated by the Maginot Line) as an example of a defensive strategy.   
 One of the better known classifications of military strategy is John Mearsheimer’s 
(1983) differentiation between attrition and blitzkrieg strategies
8
.   According to 
Mearsheimer’s (1983) classification, an attrition strategy is one in which the aim is to 
destroy the enemy militarily.  This is done through a series of direct confrontations 
during which the forces attempt to wear down the enemy until defense is no longer 
possible.  Thus, the armed forces must rely on superior firepower in order to be able to 
outlast the enemy in battle.  In an attrition form of fighting, the forces do not avoid the 
strong points of the enemy’s defense.  Rather, they confront them directly through a 
broad attack, penetrating the enemy’s front line only shallowly (this is done so that the 
integrity of the attack can be maintained as the enemy is pushed back through a broad 
front) (Mearsheimer 1983).   
 Mearsheimer’s (1983) second military strategy, the foil to attrition, is that of 
blitzkrieg.  Its principal aim is strategic penetration, which should in turn lead to a 
decisive victory without having to fight the series of battles that one would have to under 
an attrition strategy.  A blitzkrieg strategy does not attempt to confront the defenses 
directly.  Rather, it targets the weak points in the enemy’s front, aiming for a 
breakthrough and then deep penetration.  Once the forces have penetrated the enemy’s 
line, they must maintain their speed before the enemy’s forces are able to regroup and 
move the front further back.  This fast-moving, penetrating column aims to target the 
“nodal points” of the enemy that are situated deep inside its defenses.  By “nodal points” 
                                                             
8 Mearsheimer (1983) also has a third category, limited strategy, which can mainly be differentiated from 
the other two by its aims, rather than by the actual conduct of the fighting.   
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Mearsheimer (1983) is referring to the points at which communication, transportation, 
and supply lines intersect.  Thus, even if the enemy is not completely defeated militarily, 
the isolated military units are incapacitated by the fact that they can no longer 
communicate or coordinate.  Thus, these isolated forces may be defeated by an enemy 
that is actually weaker than the aggregate of them (Mearsheimer 1983).  Though useful, 
Mearsheimer’s categorization fails to account for more unconventional forms of fighting.  
For example, it is difficult to place guerrilla fighting under either category.  The same 
problem arises when we try to categorize attacks on non-traditional targets, such as 
population centers or the economic infrastructure of the opponent.     
 Recently, one of the more prevalent classifications of military strategy that has 
been used in International Relations is that of attrition, maneuver and punishment (Reiter 
and Meek 1999, Stam 1996).  This classification can be traced back to Mearsheimer’s 
(1983) distinction between attrition and blitzkrieg, but also addresses some of its 
shortcomings.  Those who use it cite as one of its advantages the fact that it is apolitical 
and separates military strategy from war aims, which is something that is not always the 
case when using the offense/defense categorization (Stam 1996, Reiter and Meek 1999).  
The military strategies of attrition, maneuver or punishment can be used by both the 
offense and the defense, and are close to how militaries themselves classify military 
strategies (Reiter and Meek 1999).  It has also been cited as appropriate for studying 20
th
 
century conflict, as most of the military strategies used in that time period can be 
classified into one of the three categories (Reiter and Meek 1999).   
 An attrition strategy is generally defined as one in which firepower is emphasized 
over mobility.  The forces employing an attrition strategy will attempt to destroy or 
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capture as many of the enemy’s troops through a war of annihilation, focusing on 
inflicting high casualties (Reiter and Meek 1999).  Its aim is to destroy or capture enough 
of the enemy’s forces that they will be unable to continue fighting.  In order to do this, 
large-scale confrontations are sought (Stam 1996).   
 A maneuver strategy is analogous to Mearsheimer’s (1983) “blitzkrieg” strategy, 
but is somewhat broader.  It is one that emphasizes mobility over firepower, focusing on 
the speed of the attack.  Its main aim is to, through a narrow point of attack, create a 
breach in the enemy’s line through which one’s forces can be inserted behind enemy 
lines, thus disrupting communications, command and control.  In order to be able to 
achieve this, highly mobile forces are needed (Reiter and Meek 1999).  Maneuver 
strategies avoid large-scale battles in which the aim is the annihilation of the enemy.  
Rather, they focus on capturing territory, but not for its intrinsic value.  Territory is useful 
only as a means to disrupt the operations of the enemy, as it allows one’s troops to be 
inserted behind enemy lines.    Maneuver is different from attrition in that it does not 
focus on destroying the enemy’s troops, but rather on disrupting their organization 
enough to lead to a quick victory.  In fact, the seeking of quick outcomes and few 
casualties are another characteristic of maneuver strategies (Stam 1996).   
 The third category, punishment, encompasses the widest range of strategies.  It is 
different from both attrition and maneuver strategies in that it does not seek to defeat the 
enemy militarily.  Rather, punishment strategies will seek to impose high-enough costs 
on the opponent that it will lose its will to fight, through the loss of morale or public or 
political support.  In other words, punishment strategies seek to break the resolve of the 
opponent and force them to concessions even if they actually still have the capabilities to 
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continue fighting (Reiter and Meek 1999, Stam 1996).  It relies on the opponent not being 
able to adapt to the costs that are being inflicted on it in a way that will allow it to 
maintain its political and public support (Stam 1996).  This category can include 
strategies such as counter-civilian aerial bombardment and guerrilla warfare.   
Another categorization of military strategies that has been used recently is 
Stephen Biddle’s (2004) distinction between traditional warfare and what he calls the 
modern system of war-fighting.  The modern system, as defined by Biddle (2004), relies 
on concealment, surprise, mobility and maneuver.  To put it in Biddle’s exact words, it is 
“a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit 
independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves and 
differential concentration at the operational level of war” (Biddle 2004, 3).  According to 
Biddle (2004), the effective use of the modern system can overcome even a technological 
or numerical disadvantage at war. 
One aspect of modern operations is that they have limited aims and are not 
necessarily designed to break through themselves.  Instead, they exploit temporary 
advantage conveyed by differential concentration to seize important terrain or major 
sections of the defender’s prepared positions (Biddle, 2004).  In other words, the modern 
system stresses creating temporary advantages that disrupt the system and allow forces to 
achieve a swift victory.   
One element that Biddle emphasizes as modern is inducing the systemic collapse 
of a defense while fighting only a fraction of it directly.  Destroying the support 
infrastructure (supply lines) and concentrating forces disproportionately at a given point 
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in order to deny the enemy the ability to move resources behind the front line is 
considered modern.   
At first glance, we might think that the modern/non-modern distinction is the 
same as the maneuver/attrition distinction.  A closer look, though, reveals some key 
differences between the two.  One is that Biddle’s (2004) non-modern category is not a 
perfect equivalent of attrition.  In fact, it encompasses aspects of punishment, as punitive 
attacks fall under the category of non-modern.  For example, counter-civilian aerial 
bombardment (considered punishment in the previous categorization) would not be 
considered modern, as its aim is not really to create a temporary advantage that can be 
exploited, but to apply pressure to the enemy by increasing costs.   
A key aspect of the modern strategy is that its aim is to attack key decisive targets 
that will have repercussions on other aspects of the enemy’s forces.  While this is similar 
to maneuver’s emphasis on mobility, speed and inserting forces behind enemy lines, it 
could also encompass certain forms of guerrilla warfare.   
Mearsheimer (1983) also makes the point that his distinction between attrition and 
blitzkrieg (which is essentially maneuver) is specifically meant to apply to ground war.  
In particular, it’s a distinction that applies only to the modern (post-WWI) battlefield in 
which the armored tank plays a key role.  Thus, applying a classification which 
specifically refers to ground warfare may be problematic when dealing with air power.  
For example, one of the key characteristics of Mearsheimer’s (1983) definition of 
blitzkrieg is that the penetrating column must move as fast as possible to get to the rear of 
the enemy’s defenses.  This point is irrelevant when dealing with air power, as any 
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aircraft could quickly reach the rear of the enemy’s line.  Thus, the question becomes not 
how fast to get there, but rather whether to get there and what targets to choose. 
 
Table 2.1: Categorization of Strategies 
Authors 
associated with 
the strategy 
Posen 1984, 
Snyder 1984, 
Van Evera 1984 
Mearsheimer 
1983 
Stam 1996, 
Reiter & Meek 
Biddle 2004 
Strategy 1 Offensive 
-Conquer other 
territories 
-Alter status quo 
Attrition 
-Aims to destroy 
enemy militarily 
-Series of direct 
confrontations 
-Wear down 
enemy until 
defense no longer 
possible 
-Shallow 
penetration 
Attrition 
-Firepower 
emphasized over 
mobility 
-Focus on inflicting 
high casualties 
-Destroy or 
capture enough of 
enemy’s forces to 
keep them from 
fighting 
-Large-scale 
confrontations are 
sought out 
Orthodox/Non-
modern 
-Emphasis on 
destructive 
firepower 
-Destroy or capture 
enough of enemy’s 
forces to keep 
them from fighting. 
-Includes punitive 
attacks 
-General aims 
Strategy 2 Defensive 
-Deny another 
state its 
expansive 
objectives 
-Maintain status 
quo 
Blitzkrieg 
-Aims for decisive 
victory without 
series of battles 
-Targets weak 
points in enemy’s 
front. 
-Penetrating 
columns use speed 
to target “nodal 
points” 
-Strategic, deep 
penetration 
Maneuver 
-Emphasize 
mobility over 
firepower. 
-Focus on the 
speed of the attack 
-Narrow point of 
attack, create 
breach in enemy’s 
line, insert forces 
-Disrupt enemy’s 
operations 
Modern 
-Limited aims, not 
designed to break 
through 
themselves 
-Stresses 
temporary 
advantages 
-Disrupt system, 
swift victory 
Strategy 3 ---  Punishment 
-Does not seek to 
defeat enemy 
militarily 
-Impose high costs 
on enemy to make 
it lose will to fight 
-Break opponent’s 
resolve 
-Includes counter-
civilian bombing 
and guerrilla 
warfare. 
 
33 
 
Notes -Focus on aims of 
military operation 
-Linked with 
political strategy 
-A blitzkrieg 
strategy may allow 
for the victory of 
the weaker side. 
-Separates military 
strategy from war 
aims 
-Apolitical 
-Key  aspect of 
modern system is 
attacking targets 
that will have 
repercussions on 
other aspects of 
enemy’s forces. 
 
 
 
The Use of Air Power in Conflict 
 So far, much of the reviewed work focuses on strategy as it applies to ground 
power.  As stated before, most of the definitions that are used to classify the different 
strategies are based off of the actions of ground troops.  Also, most of these pieces do not 
actually address the point of whether the strategies on the ground are the same as those in 
the air.   Recently, though, the scholarship has begun to focus on distinguishing between 
the different ways in which air power can be used.   
Italian General Giulio Douhet’s writings in 1922 were some of the first on the use 
of air power.  Douhet was a strong advocate of air power, and particularly emphasized 
the importance of being able to hit targets (such as population centers) that were 
previously inaccessible without first defeating the enemy’s defenses.  Despite Douhet 
overestimating the vulnerability of targets to air power, he is considered a leading air 
theorist and his writing (for example, his emphasis on strategic bombing) has influenced 
the doctrines of many modern air forces, including the United States Air Force.  Since, 
much has been written in the International Relations literature about how air power has 
changed the way in which war is fought.  Air power, though perhaps not as much as 
Douhet would have predicted, exposes previously invulnerable targets (such as 
population centers or leadership headquarters) to enemy attacks (Douhet 1922).  While 
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air defenses have certainly developed throughout the years, it is also true that it is no 
longer necessary to defeat the enemy’s ground forces in order to reach its population 
centers, leadership, and industrial zones.  The use of air power expands the range of 
targets, making these previously protected targets options for attack.   
In the rationalist framework of war initiation and termination, air power can be 
viewed as an important tool that can be used to transmit information about a state’s 
ability to impose its will on another and can also facilitate the achievement of absolute 
war outcomes (or at least can impose high-enough cost on the opponent to make it 
willing to accept a settlement and stop trying for an absolute victory).  As stated before, 
the use of air power greatly widens the range of targets that are available to a state.  This 
means that the choice of targets in air campaigns can also become a highly political 
process.  While the tactics to be used in carrying out an aerial attack are usually decided 
by military leaders, the choice of what types of targets to hit is most often a careful and 
deliberate decision by a state’s leadership, meant to signal the state’s strength and the 
costs of continuing to fight (we can think of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as 
an extreme example of this) and/or to cripple the opponent to the point where it is no 
longer able to fight (this appears to have been the aim in many of the early uses of air 
power by European powers against colonial rebels). 
 One of the more influential recent works on the use of air power in conflict has 
been John Warden’s9 (2000) The Air Campaign, originally published in 1988.  His ideas 
have since continued to hold much weight in the doctrine of the USAF.  Though not an 
empirical piece, Warden’s work puts forward a theory on how to effectively execute an 
                                                             
9 Under the George H.W. Bush administration, Warden was tasked with creating the plan for the air 
campaign that was used in the First Gulf War against Iraq.   
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air campaign at the operational level.  Warden (2000) stresses the importance of air 
superiority, noting that in the history of modern warfare no country that had established 
air superiority has ever lost a war.  Key to achieving air superiority, in Warden’s view, is 
successfully identifying and targeting what he refers to as “centers of gravity.”  By 
“centers of gravity” Warden (2000) is referring to the points where the enemy is the most 
vulnerable, and therefore where an attack has the highest probability of being decisive. 
 The centers of gravity can include equipment (such as the actual aircraft), 
logistics (petroleum, spare parts, munitions), personnel (air crews, pilot training facilities) 
and the enemy’s command and control (command posts, communications) (Warden 
2000).  Centers of gravity will not be the same across the range of potential rivals.  Key 
to a center of gravity is the fact that it is a vulnerable point for the opponent, and 
therefore an attack on it will have the highest chance of being decisive.   According to 
Warden (2000), the political and military objectives will establish the nature of the 
conflict, and once this is known the fastest and least costly way to win a war will be to 
identify and target these centers of gravity.  Part of the challenge that states will face will 
lie in being able to correctly identify the center of gravity of an opponent.  Centers of 
gravity have special meaning for the target in that they are highly dependent on them.  
This means that the states conducting the attack will often have to shift their doctrines, 
attacking not necessarily the targets that their doctrine dictates, but the ones that are of 
key importance to the opponent.   
 Given that one of the basic attributes of air power is the fact that it expands the 
range of targets available to the attacker, it is no surprise that one of the basic 
categorizations of the use of air power is based on its targets and their strategic 
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importance to the opponent.  Robert Pape, in his 1996 book Bombing to Win, makes the 
point that it is difficult to categorize air power by its targets alone, as the same target may 
be considered both military and civilian.  While Pape (1996) keeps the focus on the 
target, his categorization is not based on the target itself, but rather on the process 
through which the destruction of the particular target is expected to alter the behavior of 
the state being attacked. 
 Pape’s (1996) first (out of four) category is punishment.  The aim of a punishment 
air strategy is to inflict enough damage on a population (to raise its costs of continuing to 
fight enough) to convince them to capitulate.  This may include the bombing of 
population centers and other targets that can damage the civilian economy.  The logic 
behind this sort of attack (which is similar to Douhet’s arguments) is that if enough harm 
is inflicted on the population, it will pressure its government to stop the war.  An example 
that Pape (1996) gives of this sort of air strategy is the British bombing of Germany 
during World War II, following the ideas of Hugh Trenchard, the British Marshal who is 
considered to be the father of the Royal Air Force, as well as one of the early advocates 
of strategic bombing.   
 The second category, risk, is similar to the punishment strategy, but rather than 
expecting the enemy to capitulate because of costs incurred, it aims to force the enemy to 
capitulate through the threat of future costs (this is a case in which states would be 
expecting the information dynamics to dominate in the resolution of conflict).  Similarly 
to Schelling’s (1966), the logic behind this sort of attack is to gradually increase the risk 
of civilian damage.  Thus, the enemy capitulates to avoid suffering future costs.  
Similarly to the punishment strategy, this strategy focuses on population and economic 
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targets.  Pape (1996) gives the US bombing of North Vietnam as an example of a risk air 
strategy. 
 The third category, denial, seeks capitulation through the weakening of the enemy 
forces to the point where they are no longer able to take or hold territory (this strategy is 
somewhat reminiscent of Reiter’s (2009) argument that defeating the opponent to the 
point where it can no longer fight back will lead to the conclusion of a war).  This 
strategy is based on destroying the actual armed forces or the arms manufacturing 
capability of the enemy.  Thus, both interdiction
10
 and close air support
11
 would fall 
under the category of denial.  Some forms of air-to-air combat may also fall under this 
category, as air to air combat is one way of destroying the actual armed forces of the 
enemy.  According to Pape (1996), all major combatants in World War I used denial 
strategies, and this type of strategy is more likely to succeed against conventional forces, 
rather than guerrilla forces.   
 Finally, decapitation strategies focus on destabilizing the enemy by disabling its 
leadership.  As advocated by Warden (2000) decapitation strategies target key leadership 
and telecommunications facilities.  An example suggested by Pape (1996) is the 
precision-guided munitions used in Iraq during the First Gulf War that attacked Saddam 
Hussein’s palaces and command centers.  Another example would be the U.S. attempts at 
                                                             
10 Air interdiction refers to air operations conducted to divert (divert enemy forces from the places where 
they are most needed, or to more vulnerable areas), disrupt (disrupt command and control, intelligence, 
transportation, supply lines and psychological will), delay (delay to gain time for friendly forces, to 
pressure the opponent to attempt urgent movement, or to maintain the initiative), or destroy (destroy enemy 
forces and supplies, or create the perception of imminent destruction) the enemy’s military potential before 
it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives (Air Force 
Basic Doctrine 2003).    
11 To define close air support I use the Department of Defense Dictionary’s definition: Air action by fixed 
and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require 
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.  The proximity of close 
air support to friendly forces is not defined by actual distances, but rather by a “range within which some 
form of terminal attack control is required for fratricide prevention” (Counterland Operations 2006).   
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the beginning of the 2003 Iraq War to kill Saddam Hussein through targeted air strikes.  
In this case a statement by the Pentagon explicitly referred to the attack as a “decapitation 
attempt.”  This was done before the actual invasion of Iraq, with hopes of destabilizing 
the regime by killing Saddam and his top officials (Borger and Meek 2003).     
 Pape (1996), in his empirical analysis and case studies, focuses only on denial and 
punishment strategies.  This is because he views risk strategies as being very similar to 
punishment strategies, with the main difference between them being only the rate at 
which targets are bombed.  Both punishment and risk strategies aim for population and 
economic targets, with the difference being that risk strategies start bombing them at a 
slower rate, with the aim of coercing the opponent through the threat of further attacks in 
the future.  Also, Pape (1996) argues that decapitation strategies will not be effective, as 
states’ militaries can continue to fight even if the state’s leader is killed or incapacitated.  
Further works that use Pape’s (1996) categorization have also focused on denial and 
punishment (Horowitz and Reiter 2001, Allen 2007, Allen 2009).   
Having settled on denial and punishment as the two major classifications of air 
power usage, Pape (1996) studies the use of air power in the context of coercion.  In other 
words, he asks how air power can “change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs 
and benefits” (Pape 1996, 4). Pape (1996) defines successful coercion as changing the 
behavior of states that are still militarily capable of fighting.  This essentially means that 
cases in which the opponent’s behavior was changed after a complete military victory 
would not count as successful coercion, as it was necessary to completely incapacitate the 
opponent (and incur the costs of doing so) in order to alter its behavior.  Cases in which 
coercive actions are stopped before the opponent makes any concessions, or cases in 
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which attacks on the opponent continue without it making concessions also count as 
coercive failures (Pape 1996).   
 Pape (1996) hypothesizes that denial will lead to more successful coercion than 
all of the other military strategies.  In the empirical portion of his book, he uses all cases 
of uses of strategic air power in war from 1917 to 1991.  Pape (1996) focuses exclusively 
on strategic uses of air power because he finds that strategic air power can involve both 
denial and punishment strategies, whereas interdiction and close air support involved 
exclusively denial.  Because Pape (1996) has no direct measures of the use of air power 
as denial or punishment, he tests his hypotheses indirectly.  His main independent 
variables are civilian and military vulnerability (coded as nil, low, medium, high and very 
high).  The logic behind this measure is that civilian vulnerability will mean that a 
punishment strategy will be used, whereas military vulnerability means that a denial 
strategy will be used.  Using this measure, Pape (1996) finds support for his hypothesis 
that denial strategies lead to more effective coercion than do punishment strategies. 
 Following Pape (1996), various other studies have evaluated the coercive success 
of air power strategies, often finding support for his finding that denial strategies are 
more successful for coercion than are punishment strategies (Horowitz & Reiter 2001, to 
cite one example).  More recent studies have also included a variety of independent 
variables that are expected to also affect the effectiveness of coercive uses of air power.  
Horowitz and Reiter (2001), expanding Pape’s (1996) dataset to include cases of strategic 
bombing through 1999 and using a probit regression analysis (but keeping Pape’s coding 
of civilian and military vulnerability as the measure of strategy) find that the coercive 
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success of air power is diminished if the attacking country is making a demand for 
regime change. 
 While Horowitz and Reiter (2001) find no support for their hypotheses about the 
effect of regime type on the effectiveness of coercive aerial bombing, Allen (2007), finds 
that when the dependent variable is switched to include not only the effectiveness of 
bombing campaigns, but also their duration, regime type can indeed have an influence on 
coercive success.  Further expanding Horowitz and Reiter’s (2001) data to 2003 and 
using duration analysis to estimate the length of bombing campaigns, Allen (2007) finds 
that democratic attackers concede more quickly (ending bombing campaigns) than do 
autocratic attackers.  This is the case even when this concession means accepting failure, 
as democratic leaders fear long conflicts in which they may lose the support of their 
publics (Allen 2007, Bennett and Stam 1998).  Allen (2007) finds even stronger support 
for her hypothesis that bombing campaigns against democratic targets are also shorter, 
ending with the attacker conceding.  The reason behind this is that democracies are able 
to send stronger signals of resolve, as they are able to convey more credible information 
than autocracies (Schultz 1998, Allen 2007).   Thus, a democracy that holds out during a 
bombing campaign against it is sending a stronger signal of resolve than would an 
autocracy in a similar position, leading its adversary to concede sooner (Allen 2007).   
 Following on this same theoretical approach, Allen and Vincent (2011), suggest 
that aerial bombing may serve not only as a coercive tool, but also as a mechanism to 
provide information about the intentions and resolve of the attacker.  Taking a war-as-
bargaining approach, Allen and Vincent (2011) suggest air strikes are a source of 
information during war.  Thus, not only will we expect that more sorties and more attacks 
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on military targets (Pape’s approach) should lead to an increased chance of conciliation, 
but also that as time passes (and air strikes continue, thus providing more information), 
conciliation should become more likely.  Using the particular case of the air war in 
Kosovo (with each day of the campaign counting as a separate observation), Allen and 
Vincent (2011) measure the effect of their independent variables on the official 
statements made from Belgrade (which are coded as either defiant or conciliatory in 
tone).  Allen and Vincent (2011) find no support for the hypothesis (in line with Pape 
(1996)) that bombing military targets is more likely to lead to conciliatory statements.  
Rather, they find support for their bombing-as-information hypotheses, finding that as 
days pass (in which bombing continues), the Belgrade government is more likely to make 
concessions).   
 A more recent paper by Allen (2009)
12
, introduces a new dataset that addresses 
some of the shortcomings of Pape’s (1996) previous data and analysis.  One of the 
potential weaknesses of Pape’s dataset is the fact that its main independent variable (the 
type of aerial strategy being used) remains an indirect measure.  Allen, in the new dataset, 
recodes the different strategies that were used, including a new category that allows for 
mixed strategy.  This new coding is based off of the statements made by state leaders on 
the aims of a particular bombing campaign.  As Allen (2009) herself notes, this new 
coding does not always match up with Pape’s (1996) coding of the different strategies 
used
13
. 
                                                             
12 The date “2009” refers the date on a working version of this paper, which is at the time unpublished.   
13 This difference stems from the fact that Pape (1996) coded strategies based on the vulnerability of states 
to different targets, whereas Allen (2009) uses statements made by leaders, either from primary and 
secondary sources.  In her paper, Allen (2009) includes a correlation matrix in which her denial strategy 
variable and Pape’s denial vulnerability variable have a correlation coefficient of -0.100.  Her punishment 
strategy variable and Pape’s punishment vulnerability have a correlation coefficient of .218. 
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 Besides coding the aim of each campaign as denial or punishment (or both), Allen 
(2009), also includes variables that capture the means through which coercion is 
attempted.  These variables include breaking civilian morale, damaging the homeland 
economy of the target state, interdiction, decapitation, and targeting fielded forces.  This 
variable gives a clearer impression of how strategic bombing is expected by the attacker 
to lead to coercion.  Allen’s (2009) analysis also includes measures of regime type, of the 
use of guerrilla warfare (by the target state), of the demands being made (similarly to 
Horowitz and Reiter (2001)), and of the military strength of the attacker state.   
 In this new dataset Allen (2009) also makes some changes to Pape’s (1996) 
dependent variable that aims to measure the effectiveness of coercion.  In her new 
dataset, Allen (2009) identifies the political and military goals of the attacker and whether 
they were met.  The variable is then coded zero if neither goals was met, one if one of the 
two was met, and two if both the military and political goals of the attacking state were 
met through coercion.  In this new analysis, decapitation and attacks on civilian morale 
are found to be negatively correlated with successful coercion, as are guerrilla tactics 
used by the target state (Allen 2009). 
 This finding by Allen (2009) suggests that it may be important, not only when 
studying air power but when studying military strategies in general, to consider also 
focusing on the target’s actions.  Stam (1996) states that the best choice of military 
strategy depends on what strategy the opponent is using, with some strategies being more 
effective against other particular strategies.  Thus, it appears to be the case that the 
natural progression in the study of air power is to take into account what the opponent is 
doing.   
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This is true as far as the opponent’s air strategy goes, but also as far as what is 
happening on the ground.  Reiter and Horowitz (2001) find that troops on the ground 
make coercive bombing more effective, but this may depend on what exactly those troops 
on the ground are doing, as well as on the strategy of the enemy’s troops on the ground.  
This means that while the body of work on air power may provide us with an advance in 
our understanding of the uses of strategy in war, we still need to be able to distinguish 
between strategies on the ground and in the air, and understand how they can interact to 
affect conflict outcomes. This inter-level comparison (between air and ground power) 
will require a categorization of strategy that can be applied to both ground and air actions.  
This means that we will have to move away from the denial/punishment categorization 
and also include non-strategic uses of air power that will be analogous to ground actions.   
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter began with a discussion of the rationalist explanations for war 
initiation and termination, under a bargaining framework.  As wars begin because of 
asymmetric information and commitment problems, they will thus end when enough 
information is shared to agree on a settlement or when the commitment problems have 
been resolved (J. Fearon 1995, Reiter 2009).    If we believe this to be true, then it is 
important to also understand the process through which information can be shared in 
conflict or the commitment problems resolved.  In one way or another, we can say that 
many of the works that study the effect of different variables on war outcomes are 
attempting to do just this.  In this dissertation I will focus on military strategies, 
specifically aerial strategies, because military strategies are particular in the sense that 
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they can lead to mutual optimism between two different states as they go into war, and 
only by actually testing the military strategies in the field will states be able to resolve 
their different prior beliefs as to their own superiority (Smith and Stam 2004).  Air power 
strategies in particular, besides being understudied relative to ground strategies, provide 
states with the opportunity to effectively provide information about the potential costs of 
continuing to fight.  The choice of aerial strategies is also a strongly political one that can 
be part not only of a state’s military strategy, but also of its political and diplomatic 
strategy.  Previous classifications of military strategy have mostly distinguished only 
between military and civilian targets, and have tended to discuss air power in isolation.  
This dissertation will attempt to fill this void by providing a new classification of aerial 
strategies and discussing their interaction with ground strategies, both those of the 
attacker and the target state.   
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
 
Air Power and Understanding Conflict Outcomes 
 Geoffrey Blainey, writing in 1973, argued that in order to understand why wars 
begin, one must understand why they ended.  This implies that if we want to truly 
understand wars as a phenomenon, we must also widen our understanding of conflict 
outcomes.  Conflict outcomes in international relations have often been treated as a costly 
lottery.  As Wagner (2000) argues, the problem with this approach is that we often have 
no realistic basis to determine what the expectations of such a lottery would be.  As most 
wars are not fought to the finish, but rather terminated through some negotiated 
settlement, using capabilities to determine the outcome of such a lottery may be 
inaccurate (Wagner 2000).    
 If we cannot predict conflict outcomes basing ourselves solely on capabilities, we 
must think about other aspects that may determine the outcome of a conflict.  Blainey 
(1973) argued that wars start because of mutual optimism.  More recently, Wagner’s 
(2000) model shows two states with roughly equal material capabilities going to war 
against each other because one of them is confident that it has an advantage due to the 
superior training and intelligence of its military.  Similarly, Slantchev (2003) and Smith 
and Stam (2004) highlight how actual battlefield behavior can provide information 
beyond what can be shared in negotiations.  All of these different works seem to point to 
the conclusion that the way in which a war is fought, beyond the capabilities of the 
involved parties, can affect its outcome.   
 If we stop and think about how states can win or lose military campaigns, it can 
be boiled down to stating that states succeed in military campaigns when they are able to 
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impose costs on their opponent while minimizing the costs that are imposed on them.  A 
military campaign is won when states are able to effectively convince the opponent (by 
imposing costs or threatening to impose further costs), that it is preferable to make 
concessions rather than to continue fighting.  Military strategy, the way in which military 
forces are used to achieve a particular objective, is one way in which states can affect the 
outcome of a conflict.  Choosing the “right” military strategy for a given conflict can 
allow a state to impose high costs on its opponent, while shielding itself from costs.  
Going into a conflict, states will have a given set of material capabilities.  Much of the 
uncertainty of the outcome, though, will depend on how those capabilities are used.    
Thus, understanding military strategy and how it can help states to achieve both their 
military and political outcomes will allow us to better understand conflict outcomes. 
 In particular, I will focus on strategy in the air.  Often, when we study conflict 
outcomes in political science, the question arises as to whether this really is a political 
matter, as we can easily cross into the realm of military strategizing when dealing with 
states’ behavior during war.  The key to maintaining our work in the realm of political 
science is to focus not on the military tactics themselves, but in the variables that can 
affect whether a state is able to get the outcome it wants from a war.  Aerial bombing, as 
I mentioned earlier, is a variable that affects conflict outcomes and has strong political 
motivations and implications that go beyond the military realm.  The types of targets that 
are chosen, or even whether aerial bombing is used at all can strongly affect the 
willingness of the opponent to continue fighting, and thus the likelihood of the state that 
is doing the bombing getting its preferred outcome from the conflict.  Beyond being a 
military tactic, aerial bombing is a foreign policy choice that states make when 
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attempting to achieve their aims in the international system.  It can also be argued that the 
general strategy of aerial bombing, in particular the choice of targets, often comes more 
from political rather than military leadership.  Aerial bombing becomes especially 
political in the sense that it is often thought of by both leaders and populations as a less 
“messy” way to fight.  Particularly in Western states, the perception has been that 
avoiding ground combat will make for a “cleaner” war that is less likely to harm the 
political fate of the leaders. 
 In this chapter I will develop the theory that will guide the analysis in the chapters 
that are to follow.   I will begin by discussing what coercion means for the sake of this 
dissertation, as well as why battlefield success can be operationalized as coercion.  As 
coercion depends largely on convincing an adversary that continuing to fight will be 
costly, I will then discuss how states can use non-capability elements (such as military 
strategies) to persuade the adversary to stop fighting, without necessarily having to 
destroy the enemy’s forces to the point where it can no longer keep fighting.  Having 
done this, I will discuss the choice of classification for military strategy in the air (the 
modern vs. the non-modern system of strategy).  I will then develop a theoretical model 
to explain how states choose their military strategies, and how using the modern system 
in the air may lead to coercion being successful or not. 
 
Success and Coercion in Conflict 
As stated before, the main dependent variable that I will be studying in this 
dissertation will be success in conflict.  Though my first analytical chapter will focus on 
the choice of military strategy and the second one on the duration of aerial campaigns, the 
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ultimate goal of the project as a whole is to understand how different aerial strategies can 
affect the outcome of aerial campaigns (which by extension should affect the outcome of 
a conflict).   
When I talk about successful outcomes I am referring to whether the state was 
able to achieve its political and military goals in conflict.  If we think purely about 
military success, then the question becomes a military, not political one.  While I will be 
considering whether states achieve military success as part of the measure of success in 
conflict, military success is not an end in itself.  Rather, military success is a tool that is 
used by the states in question to achieve the political goal of making the opponent change 
its behavior.  Thus, military victories serve as a tool to allow a state to achieve its 
political goals.  They either transmit information about how much the attacker can harm 
its opponent (causing it to be more willing to agree to a settlement) or inflict enough 
harm on the opponent to keep it from being able to fight back when the attacker attempts 
to impose its will on it.     
When we think of war, we can classify it as either total war or limited war.  A 
total (absolute) war is one in which the aim is to destroy the opponent to the point where 
it is no longer able to fight back, and in which there is little or no limit in what can be 
considered an acceptable target.  A limited (real) war, in contrast, is one in which the aim 
is not necessarily to make the enemy unable to fight, but to achieve some concessions 
from it, often by using only limited forces or a restricted range of targets (von Clausewitz 
1976).   Though there have been in history a few examples of wars that can be considered 
total war (An often-used example of total war is the Athenian campaign against the island 
of Melos in the Peloponnesian War, in which after Melos was defeated the Athenians 
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killed all adult men and sold all women and children into slavery, repopulating the island 
with Athenian colonists (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War Ch 17)), it is 
generally the case that most conflicts are not fought until the opponent is completely 
unable to fight, but rather until it becomes too costly to do so and they then choose to 
capitulate.   This means that, while the dependent variable of interest for this dissertation 
is success in military campaigns, from a practical point of view we can think of it as 
coercive success.  Coercion is different from brute force in that it aims to change the 
behavior of a target without necessarily having to destroy it or its capability to keep 
fighting. Rather, the threat of incurring costs should cause the target to change its actions 
(Horowitz and Reiter 2001, Schelling 1966).  
 When we speak of coercion, its success can depend largely on convincing the 
enemy that the costs of continuing to fight are greater than the benefits involved.  In other 
words, it involves the use of a threat that will be carried out if the adversary resists 
(Byman, Waxman and Larson 1999). Military strategy can be used as a tool to alter the 
other side’s perception of conflict outcomes.  It can be a form of persuading the adversary 
that it is likely to face defeat by continuing to fight, without necessarily having to destroy 
the enemy’s forces.   
 
Categorization of Strategies 
 In studying air power in relation to ground power, the choice of how to categorize 
it will be an important one, as it will have an effect on the research design of this 
dissertation.  In chapter 2 I have reviewed a variety of different classifications of military 
strategy, and discussed why a most of them would be inappropriate for the study of air 
power strategies.  In particular, the most commonly used categorization in current work 
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on military strategy, that of maneuver, attrition and punishment strategies (Stam 1996, 
Reiter and Meek 1999) will not be appropriate for this study.  This is because this 
categorization is in large part based on the work of Mearsheimer (1983), which 
distinguishes between attrition and blitzkrieg (which is analogous to maneuver) warfare.  
Mearsheimer (1983) makes the point that this categorization is meant to apply 
specifically to ground (in particular, mechanized tank) warfare.  Thus, it would be 
inappropriate to categorize air strategies using a scheme that is meant to apply only to 
ground warfare.  Stephen Biddle’s (2004) modern/non-modern categorization does not 
explicitly refer only to ground strategies and instead focuses more broadly on the type of 
targets chosen and on how those objectives are achieved.  Thus, I find it to be more 
appropriate for studying air power and its relationship to ground strategies.   
 
The Modern System 
The modern system of war-fighting that I am referring to is that defined by 
Stephen Biddle in his 2004 book Military Power.  I use Biddle’s (2004)definition of 
modern warfare, which is as follows, “a tightly interrelated complex of cover, 
concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined 
arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the 
operational level of war.” 
According to Biddle (2004), the modern system emerged in the early twentieth 
century as a response to increased firepower that came about as a consequence of 
industrialization.  As militaries were suddenly faced with the prospect of radical 
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firepower
14
, they had to develop new military doctrines in order to be able to conduct 
“meaningful military operations” (S. Biddle 2004, 30).  The answer first appeared to be 
entrenchment, as it seemed that forces in trenches would be much less vulnerable to this 
increased firepower.  Mutually entrenched forces would naturally lead to a stalemate, and 
the new technology of the tank was seen as a way to break that stalemate.  In the end, 
entrenched forces were not as safe from firepower as it had been thought, and the tank 
was neither “necessary not sufficient to break through entrenched defenses” (S. Biddle 
2004, 30).  States soon found that the best way to overcome the barrage of firepower was 
through force employment.   
No single part of the “modern” system was necessarily new, but it was rather the 
combination of tactics and operations that was adapted to overcome new challenges.  In 
fact, the modern system incorporated the pre-WWI emphasis on infantry with the early 
war emphasis on artillery to create a combined arms approach that allowed for 
cooperation between the two.  At the tactical level the modern system emphasizes cover, 
concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression and combined 
arms integration.  As stated before, though, this dissertation will focus on the operational 
level of war, and thus I will emphasize the definition of the modern system at that level.   
Modern-system offensive operations emphasize breakthrough and exploitation of 
the enemy’s defenses.  The aim of breakthrough and exploitation is to “induce systemic 
collapse of a defense while fighting through only a fraction of it directly” (S. Biddle 
2004, 40).  This is done by targeting the supply lines and communications of the 
opposing side.  Armies rely heavily on their established corridors that not only provide 
                                                             
14 Biddle illustrates the change by discussing how during the Napoleonic wars an infantry battalion of 1,000 
soldiers could expect to absorb approximately 2 shots per soldier before reaching a target 100 yards away.  
By 1916, that number had increased to 200 shots per soldier.     
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them with food, supplies, armaments, reserves, but also keep the in communication with 
command and control and with other forces.  This infrastructure is usually set up in the 
rear of the defenses, where it can be protected by the troops from potential attackers.  The 
modern system aims to gain access to this infrastructure and attack it directly, hoping to 
disturb the operations of the opponent enough to weaken them through the collapse of 
their organization (and thus be able to defeat them without necessarily having to 
overwhelm them in force) (S. Biddle 2004). 
Access to the rear, under the modern system, is obtained through force 
concentration at a particular point in the enemy’s defenses.  This means that a greater 
advantage (a “local preponderance”) will be had at that particular point, though the 
tradeoff will be that troops will be at a much larger disadvantage at other points in the 
front line.  If performing effectively, these troops will be able to puncture the opponent’s 
defenses by overwhelming them at a particular point and then advance deeper into the 
enemy’s defenses.  Once inside, they can engage in “deep battle,” targeting the support 
and communications infrastructure of the opponent, limiting their effectiveness and 
hoping for an early collapse of the system. 
The modern system emphasizes having limited aims.  This means that forces will 
aim to exploit the temporary advantage given to them by force concentrations and seize 
strategically important positions that can then be used in offensives designed to bring 
about the collapse of the enemy before they can recover from the original attack.  Force 
concentrations are able to only gain a temporary advantage.  Soon enough reserves will 
be moved to that point, which will neutralize the advantage (and possibly even lead to a 
disadvantage) gained by attacking forces.  Modern-system attackers are in a race against 
53 
 
reserves, seeking to terminate their attacks early before the opponents have an 
opportunity to regroup (S. Biddle 2004). 
Modern-style defensive operations are designed to counter modern-style attacks.  
Static defenses are very vulnerable to modern attacks.  In order to effectively counter 
modern attacks, defenses must be fluid and able to adapt.  In particular, they need to be 
able to buy themselves time in order to respond to differential force concentration and be 
able to move their reserves to the point that is being attacked.  The answer to this problem 
is to have greater depth in the defenses.  The more a modern-style attacker progresses 
into the rear of the opponent, the more vulnerable and less coordinated it becomes, and 
thus less able to effectively execute the complex modern-system operations.  Thus, a 
modern-system defense will be flexible and may even concede some initial territory to 
the advancing attackers before counterattacking them deeper into the rear, once they have 
lost some of their coordination.   
Basing itself on Biddle’s (2004) definition and John Warden’s (2000)The Air 
Campaign, the aim of this dissertation will be to produce a definition of modern air 
power.  The first step in this process will be to distinguish between different uses of air 
power.  Having done this, it will then determine how each type of use can be modern or 
not.   
 
Strategic Attack 
Strategic attack can be defined using the United States Air Force’s Basic 
Doctrine, which states that strategic attack is “offensive action conducted by command 
authorities aimed at generating effects that most directly achieve […] national security 
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objectives by affecting the adversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and 
strategy” (200340).  We can also refer to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which states 
that  "”strategic bombing […] is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources 
which will most weaken the enemy by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to 
prosecute the war” (US Strategic Bombing Survey, Jan 1947, p.2, pt. 2). Essentially, what 
strategic attack attempts to do is target the enemy’s sources of strength without first 
having to engage their military forces (200340).  Strategic attack seeks to strike directly 
at the centers of gravity (economic, military and diplomatic) of the enemy, thus denying 
it the resources to sustain its forces in the field.  The USAF Basic Doctrine best sums up 
strategic attack in noting that it is about attacking the enemy as a system, not just on the 
field.   
 
Interdiction 
Air interdiction refers to air operations conducted to divert (divert enemy forces 
from the places where they are most needed, or to more vulnerable areas), disrupt (disrupt 
command and control, intelligence, transportation, supply lines and psychological will), 
delay (delay to gain time for friendly forces, to pressure the opponent to attempt urgent 
movement, or to maintain the initiative), or destroy (destroy enemy forces and supplies, 
or create the perception of imminent destruction) the enemy’s military potential before it 
can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve 
objectives (Air Force Basic Doctrine 2003).   The USAF Basic Doctrine also adds that 
interdiction is directed against targets that are contributing to reinforcing the land battle.  
It aims to cut off ground forces from command and supply lines in order to make them 
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more vulnerable to attack.  Air interdiction is conducted at such distances from friendly 
forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly 
forces is not required.   Part of its aim is to create opportunities for friendly commanders 
to exploit (20066). 
 
Close Air Support (CAS) 
To define close air support we can use the Department of Defense Dictionary’s 
definition:” Air action by fixed and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in 
close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission 
with the fire and movement of those forces”.  The proximity of close air support to 
friendly forces is not defined by actual distances, but rather by a “range within which 
some form of terminal attack control is required for fratricide prevention” (Counterland 
Operations 2006).  The USAF Basic Doctrine states that CAS provides direct support to 
friendly forces that are already in contact with enemy forces, and aids them in achieving 
their objectives.  Close air support can be used in preparation for battle or as 
reinforcement of attacks on the ground.  Some examples of the use of CAS can include 
halting attacks, covering forces in retreat and guarding flanks (200345).  
The following simplified diagram can be used make the difference between these 
three different uses of air power clearer. 
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Figure 3.1: The Uses of Air Power 
 
 
In this diagram there are two generic states, A and B, which are facing off against 
each other in a conflict.  There is a frontline where armed engagements take place, in 
between the fielded troops of both states.  Beyond the battlefield there are the homelands 
of both states, which would include population centers and the general infrastructure of 
the state.  We assume that there is an established supply line (there could of course be 
many; the diagram includes only one for simplicity’s sake) that takes supplies to the 
battlefields from the homeland and maintains communication to and from the battlefield 
(we can imagine that this is where troops would also be transported along when switched 
out with reserves).  In the diagram we can see (in an extremely simplified manner), that 
attacks along the frontline, or of the enemy’s troops that are close to friendly troops can 
be considered close air support.  Attacks deeper into the homeland can be considered 
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strategic attacks.  Finally, attacks along the supply line fall under the category of 
interdiction.     
 
Modern Air Power 
At this point I will apply Biddle’s definition of modern war-fighting to air power, 
and determine how each one of the different uses of air power could be categorized as 
modern.   When categorizing uses of air power as modern, I will refer to cases that can be 
analogous to Biddle’s (2004) definition of the modern system of warfare.   
Biddle does not use the term “modern” to refer to campaigns that happened after a 
particular period in time, but rather a type of fighting which can be observed at different 
periods in time.  At the same time, it is important to also keep in mind that the modern 
system is not completely unrelated to time.  As technology increases, engaging in 
precision bombing becomes much easier.  In older wars it may have been the case that 
stands had the intention of engaging in precision bombing that was consistent with the 
modern system, but their lack of technology made the campaigns virtually 
indistinguishable from non-modern ones.  The same idea applies to states with less 
resources available to them.  It may be the case that they are not able to engage in the 
modern system to the extent to which they would desire, because they have old, outdate 
equipment that does not allow them to work with the precision required for an effective 
modern campaign.  This means that in conducting the analysis it will be important to 
consider temporal effects, as well as the capabilities of states involved.   
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Modern Strategic Attack 
One aspect of modern operations is that they have limited aims and are not 
necessarily designed to break through themselves.  Instead, they exploit temporary 
advantage conveyed by differential concentration to seize important terrain or major 
sections of the defender’s prepared positions (S. Biddle 2004).  When dealing with the 
use of air power, we can consider strategic bombing intended to harm the enemy's 
economic ability to wage war as a way to create this type of temporary advantage (since 
it takes time to get factories and plant back in working conditions after they have been 
targeted) and put the enemy in a more vulnerable position.  What we must also consider 
when determining that a particular use of strategic air attack is modern, is that it not cause 
a large amount of indirect collateral damage, and that it not have a long-term impact on 
the civilian economy of the target country, as this would make the attack punitive in 
nature and thus non-modern.  For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. attacks on 
Iraq’s electrical system were considered to be strategic attacks on military targets 
(Warden 2000).  What makes these attacks non-modern, though, was the indirect 
collateral damage caused by them.  Repair of electrical facilities took longer than 
expected, meaning that a large number of civilians were harmed by the attack, and there 
was long-term damage to Iraq’s infrastructure.   
There is a very large variety of targets that can be the focus of strategic bombing 
campaigns.  For example, during World War II the United States targeted German 
aircraft plants.  This sort of attack, which destroys military materiel at the source and 
impairs the enemy’s ability to engage in battle, would certainly fall under the category of 
modern.  Another target of the United States were German oil plants.  The extensive 
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bombing of oil plants, intended to deny Germany aviation and tank fuel also had effects 
on non-military aspects of German production.  For example, the attacks on the German 
synthetic oil plants also cut down the production of nitrogen, which was heavily used in 
German agriculture (USSBS).  One could see how an attack on such a non-specific 
resource such as oil could have negative effects in non-military life, and thus could be 
considered punitive in nature.  When classifying strategic bombing as modern or not, we 
have to think about whether the attacks are intended to impair the target’s ability to wage 
war (but allow it to continue non-military production without much disturbance), which 
would make the attack modern, as it would allow the attacker to exploit this window of 
opportunity in which they have a temporary advantage over the opponent.  The other 
possibility would be that the strategic bombing is meant to impair entire sectors of the 
economy that do not relate exclusively to military production.   
 
Non-Modern Strategic Attack 
One way in which strategic attack can be modern is by creating temporary 
advantages that disrupt the system and allow forces to achieve a swift victory.  Strategic 
bombing that is punitive in character (for example, targeting civilians or non-industrial 
areas), does not create this type of advantage and would therefore not be considered 
modern.   
When considering strategic bombing and whether it is a modern use of air power, 
we also have to consider that without the proper technology, the outcome of a selective 
bombing campaign may end up looking the same as one of a punitive nature.  In this 
case, a decision must be made as to whether we would categorize such a campaign based 
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on intent or on the outcome.  This decision would largely depend on the theoretical 
framework in which the concept of modern air power was used.  In the case of this 
particular project, which is seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of a modern style of air 
warfare, I would suggest coding according to outcomes.  After all, it is outcomes, and not 
intent, that are observed both by the target state and by third party.  Also, states may have 
an incentive to misrepresent their intent and claim that a particular bombing campaign 
was meant to be selective, even when it was not.   
Of course, often the intention of strategic bombing is to conduct area, as opposed 
to precision, bombing.  The use of strategic bombing by Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris of 
the RAF during WWII is one example of strategic attack that emphasized area bombing 
over precision.  Harris wrote in February 1945 “I do not personally regard the whole of 
the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier” (Cross 
1995) and that “the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive should be unambiguously 
stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the 
disruption of civilized life throughout Germany” (Denson 1999). He also illustrated how 
all targeting of non-military resources can be considered part of strategic attack, when he 
stated “it should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport 
and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the 
breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and 
intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy.  They are 
not by-products of attempts to hit factories” (Sokolski 2004). 
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Modern Interdiction  
One element that Biddle emphasizes as modern is inducing the systemic collapse 
of a defense while fighting only a fraction of it directly.  Destroying the support 
infrastructure (supply lines) and concentrating forces disproportionately at a given point 
in order to deny the enemy the ability to move resources behind the front line is 
considered modern.  The equivalent use of air power would be interdiction in which air 
operations are conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military 
potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces or otherwise 
achieve objectives (Warden 2000).  This also includes cases in which the targets are lines 
of communication whose destruction would impede the movement of the enemy's forces 
(for example, bridges or highways that the enemy needs to cross in order to conduct an 
attack) (Warden 2000).  Many of the advantages created by air interdiction are temporary 
windows of opportunity that must be taken advantage of by ground forces, which seems 
to fit with the modern style of war-fighting.  The Air Force doctrine document on 
counterland operations states how air interdiction can create “artificial or temporary 
chokepoints by laying large numbers of scatterable mines, dropping bridges, or 
collapsing tunnels” (200623). Thus, we can consider attacks on infrastructure of this sort 
to be in line with the modern system.  The transportation system may also be targeted in 
interdiction.  In this case we would classify as modern those attacks that targeted the 
aforementioned actual conduit for travel (roads, rail, etc.), energy required to operate 
vehicles, and the loading and unloading points in the transportation system (rail yards, 
harbors and airfields (Counterland Operations 2006).  Also, I will classify as modern 
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those attacks against non-combat military units, such as headquarters, which are aimed at 
disturbing the command and control of enemy forces.   
 
Non-Modern Interdiction 
Though interdiction generally seems to fall under the category of modern war-
fighting, not every single case of interdiction can be considered modern.  One of the aims 
of interdiction can be the attrition of enemy forces and materiel.  We can think 
specifically of cases in which the targets are military forces (such as the actual troops), 
which would not really fall into the category of targeting the lines of communication or 
transportation. Also, Warden (2000)categorizes as interdiction the use of air power to 
slow down an enemy that is pursuing forces in retreat.  This case of interdiction would 
not fall into Biddle’s definition of modern war-fighting, as it is not exploiting a window 
of opportunity or targeting resources.  Instead it is directly targeting the actual military 
forces.    When targeting the transportation system, we would classify as non-modern 
those attacks that targeted vehicles used to transport troops or supplies along the conduit 
(as these would be attacks on the actual military units).  The Air Force doctrine document 
on counterland operations states that air interdiction against fielded forces is one of the 
more limited uses of air interdiction, “mainly due to the difficulty of finding and targeting 
individual guns or vehicles” (200625).  We can see how air interdiction against the actual 
military units would require more assets and would therefore be less in line with the 
principles of modern war-fighting.   
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Modern Close Air Support (CAS) 
At first glance, we might not think of close air support (CAS) as being modern, as 
it often involves the destruction of as large a number of military targets that are 
threatening friendly forces.  A closer look, though, reveals differences within CAS.  The 
US Air Force doctrine document on counterland operations states that to be most 
effective, CAS “should be used at decisive points in a battle and should normally be 
massed to apply concentrated combat power and saturate defenses” (20066).  CAS should 
not always be thought of as a substitute for artillery.  In fact, this previous document also 
stresses the importance of using CAS against targets that are beyond the range of troops 
in contact.  CAS support can also be used in a modern fashion when its task is to provide 
selective and discriminating firepower (200634) 
 
Non-Modern Close Air Support 
One way in which close air support can be used in military conflicts is essentially 
as a substitute for artillery.  Aerial attacks on enemy forces that are in close proximity to 
the battlefield (and therefore to the friendly forces), is one example of this type of use of 
air power.  This use of air power, which does not rely on surprise or concealment, but 
rather can come to be expected by the opposing forces, would not be considered modern. 
 
Common Features 
If we look across the different uses of air power, we can see a pattern emerge 
between the modern uses of strategic attack, interdiction and close air support.  Across 
the different types, the targeted use of air power stands out as a defining quality of the 
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modern system.  Essentially, whether it is strategic attack, interdiction or close air support 
being used, when the style of war-fighting used is modern, the main aim is to use air 
power against key, decisive targets.  Modern air power, across the different types, does 
not seek to destroy all of the enemy’s forces, but rather to cripple them by hitting 
essential points that will have repercussions on other aspects of the enemy’s forces.  This 
targeted use of air power differentiates the modern system from the non-modern style of 
using air power to bomb indiscriminately, or of using it as a punitive resource during war.  
 
Table 3.2: Modern and Non-Modern Uses of Air Power 
 Modern Non-Modern 
Strategic Attack  Centers of gravity 
specifically targeted 
 Limited, short-term 
indirect collateral 
damage 
 Non-military production 
not damaged 
 Targets away from the 
enemy’s homeland 
 Enemy’s homeland 
targeted 
 Civilians targeted 
 Non-industrial urban 
targets 
 Attack is punitive in 
character 
Interdiction  Lines of communication 
targeted 
 Defenses avoided 
 Infrastructure targeted 
 Temporary windows of 
opportunity created 
 Non-combat military 
units (ie headquarters) 
targeted 
 Source of troops or 
materiel targeted 
 
 Combat forces are 
targeted 
 Vehicles used to 
transport troops or 
supplies along the 
conduit targeted 
 Aim is the attrition of 
enemy forces and 
materiel, while in transit 
 Air power used to slow 
down enemy pursuing 
forces in retreat 
Close Air Support  Used at decisive points in 
battle 
 Apply concentrated 
combat power and 
saturate defenses 
 Targets are beyond the 
range of troops in contact 
 Selective and 
discriminating firepower 
 Air power used as a 
substitute for artillery 
 Aerial bombardment of 
the enemy line 
 Attack preparatory to an 
offensive 
 Attack on troops 
“crossing the wire” 
 Air power used to hold a 
flank 
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The Effectiveness of the Modern System 
 At this point, having reviewed what the modern system entails, I will further 
explore the meaning of employing the modern system of warfighting.  Its largest 
advantage comes from it being able to multiply the effect of whatever amount of forces 
and resources is being used in the fighting, thus making it less costly to conduct the war.  
As Luttwak (2001) states, using this sort of strategy can result in disproportionately high 
gains, given the amount of resources used.  Thus, it allows even the weaker (capabilities-
wise) side to have a chance at victory.  In a bargaining sense, this puts the country that is 
using the modern system in a more advantageous position, as fighting is less costly for 
them.  It also introduces an element of uncertainty to the interaction between the two 
states, as military strategies are more difficult to quantify than material capabilities.   
 It thus would seem to be the case that states should always want to employ the 
modern system.  If employing a particular sort of strategy means that results are greater 
than the resources that are applied to it, we should expect all states to use that particular 
strategy, and thus to observe them converging in an equilibrium in which both sides use 
the modern system.  As this has clearly not been the case in history, there have to be 
some drawbacks to using the modern system.  Two appear to be the most important 
weaknesses of the modern system: its increased risk and its qualitative demands. 
 As Luttwak (2001) states, if one side is relying on the success of an operation that 
applies force to what is believed to be a key vulnerable point of the enemy’s forces, the 
failure of that particular operation could lead to the collapse of all related operations that 
depended on that one success.  Because the modern system can rely on getting a very 
large amount of moving parts to key places, any problem could easily result in chaos (S. 
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Biddle 2004).   The modern system relies on overwhelming a particular weak point and 
leading to the collapse of the enemy.  The point of it is not to overwhelm the enemy as a 
whole.  Thus, if (through misinformation, for example) that one key point is unexpectedly 
strong, the modern attack may fail.  As Biddle states, the modern system is “complex and 
unforgiving” (S. Biddle 2004, 47), which means that if there is a lack of coordination, 
one’s forces can end up exposed to the enemy’s firepower, with lethal consequences.   
For example, in the case of modern defensive operations, coordinating the moving parts 
of deep reserves is much more difficult than having a static defense, and may even have 
an adverse effect on the morale of the troops, who may feel isolated and exposed (S. 
Biddle 2004).  In contrast, under the non-modern system, missing a single target will not 
jeopardize the entire operation, or place a disproportionately high number of troops at 
risk (Luttwak 2001).  Under the non-modern system there is much less of a risk of a 
smaller force finding itself overwhelmed by the enemy, as in this case forces are rarely 
matched against much larger enemy ones. 
 Biddle (2004) also makes the point that engaging in limited aims attacks, while it 
may be thought of as less risky in the short-run (as there are likely to be less casualties as 
there would be from a full-out attack), may prove to be riskier in the long run.  This is the 
case because limited-aims attacks usually do not destroy the opponents, but rather defeat 
them through the exploitation of a temporary advantage.  This means that the opponent 
remains in the field, which could mean that they can recover and then come back to draw 
the other side into a much longer war with uncertain consequences.  This means that 
states may be wary of reaching a settlement without winning an absolute victory.  It can 
always be the case that as the balance of power changes in the future or the leadership of 
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the opponent changes, the opponent will not stick to the settlement and may try to 
continue fighting in order to obtain a more favorable outcome (Reiter 2009).  
 The case of Operation Market Garden in World War II provides us with a clear 
example of how the modern system can be risky, and how a few mistakes and unexpected 
events can result in an outcome that is much costlier than if the non-modern system had 
been used.  Operation Market Garden was an operation carried out by Allied forces in 
September of 1944.  Its aim was to flank the German defensive line known as the West 
Wall.  In line with the modern system, the aim of operation Market Garden was to avoid 
the German defenses and drive into the industrial heartland of Germany (a key target that 
should have had disproportionately large effects on the German system).  The first part of 
the operation involved two American (the 82
nd
 and 101
st
) and one British (the 1
st
) 
airborne divisions to be dropped behind enemy lines (again, bypassing defenses) in order 
for them to seize eight key bridges in the Netherlands.  Once these bridges were seized, 
the second part of the operation involved the British 30
th
 Army Corps advancing rapidly 
(again, relying on speed as the modern system would suggest) into Germany through a 
single highway that went past all of the towns and bridges captured by the airborne troops 
(Swanston & Swanston 2007).   
 Problems began when a large proportion of the British paratroopers were dropped 
safely, but over seven miles away from their intended drop zones.  This, combined with 
the fact that the majority of their jeeps were lost in glider crashes meant that they were 
significantly slowed down and unable to secure the bridges according to schedule.  Only 
the leading battalion was able to reach the bridge in Arnhem.  Further problems arose 
when that battalion’s radio sets did not work and commanders were unable to 
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communicate with each other.  Without the bridges captured, and with anti-tank positions 
on the highway, 30
th
 Corps’ advance was slowed down.  These problems resulted in the 
men defending the bridge having to surrender, troops that had been expecting the 30
th
 
Corps to be left without support, and the 1
st
 Airborne having to evacuate with only 2,500 
out of the 10,000 troops that it had come in with (Swanston & Swanston 2007).  Thus, we 
can see how an operation that is depending on momentum, avoiding defenses and 
destroying key targets may be risky, as minor problems can cause the whole operation to 
fail.   
 The other, perhaps more obvious, drawback to the modern system is that it can be 
prohibitively difficult to implement, making it an unrealistic choice for various states.  
For example, when we think about aerial strategic bombing, the modern system would 
dictate that key, specific targets should be bombed, expecting them to have repercussions 
on the rest of the system.  The problem in this case is that this sort of surgical bombing 
requires a certain level of military technology that is not available to all states (or that has 
not been available throughout time; simply consider how modern technology has enabled 
developed states to reduce the amount of collateral produced through aerial bombing).  
Even going beyond technology, implementing the modern system is also qualitatively 
demanding on the personnel expected to carry the strategy out.  According to Luttwak 
(2001), only high-quality units can be used to effectively carry out a successful targeted 
strategy.  Thus, even if a state manages to acquire the weapons needed to carry out a 
modern strategy, if its troops are not adequately trained it will not be able to carry out the 
strategy.  The modern system is one in which quality matters, and cannot be made up for 
in quantity (Luttwak 2001).  
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A Model of Strategy Choice 
We can begin to think of modeling the effectiveness of the modern system of air 
power at the individual state level, at which a single state makes the decision to use either 
the modern or the non-modern system of air power.   
I will assume that the state of interest, the coercer (we will refer to it as State A) is 
in a situation in which it is attempting to, through the use of air power, coerce another 
state that it is engaged in an armed conflict with
15
.  State A will then choose the 
proportion of “modern” strategy that it wants to use16.  I am assuming that states can 
incorporate aspects of both the modern and non-modern systems into their military 
strategy, so that they can range from using a pure non-modern strategy to a pure modern 
one, allowing for all different proportions in between.   
The aim of the state is to maximize its probability of victory.   I assume that the 
state derives positive utility from victory, such that it will derive higher utility from 
higher probabilities of victory than it would from low probabilities of victory.  I begin 
with the premise that achieving coercive success is in part dependent on the coercer 
state’s capabilities.  This is a rather uncontroversial assumption.  It basically says that, all 
else being equal, states that have higher material capabilities (larger military, greater 
industrial capacity, higher GDP’s, etc) will be more likely to get other states to do what 
                                                             
15 This of course leads to a selection bias in the study, as I will be looking only at the cases in which two 
countries have already engaged in armed conflict, a selection which is surely not random.  Unfortunately, if 
we want to be able to study the effect of using particular forms of air power on the outcome of conflicts, we 
cannot observe the effects of aerial power strategy in cases in which the strategy was not actually used.  
Pape (1996) categorizes strategy in threat-only cases based on the capabilities of the attacking state.  I 
believe that this approach could not be used in this project, as often the same aircraft can be used for both 
modern and non-modern strategies.   
16 Again, in this case the analysis will be limited to the cases in which states have air forces that they can 
use in conflict.  While this is obviously not a random selection of states, it would not make sense to study 
the use of air power by states that do not have an air force at their disposal.   
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they want them to.  This will be the case because they can threaten to inflict greater harm 
on states that do not comply with their wishes.  They can make larger threats that are 
credible, as these states will have the capacity to carry the threats out.   
This means that the utility function of the state will be dependent on its 
capabilities, with higher capabilities making victory more likely: 
 
U(Victory)=f(cap)   
 
Of course, the entire premise of this dissertation depends on the fact that coercive 
success, particularly when using air power as the tool of coercion, depends not only on 
capabilities, but also on how the air power is being used, on what the strategy is.  Thus, 
the utility function should be a function of not only capabilities, but also strategy 
 
U(Victory)=f(cap, strategy)   
 
We can refine this idea by thinking of whether a state uses the modern system of 
warfare in the air or not.  We can recall that earlier in this chapter we discussed how 
using the modern system effectively may serve as a force multiplier, allowing one attack 
to have effects beyond the magnitude of its target, based on the strategic significance of 
the target.  This has two implications.  The first is that the modern system requires less 
resources, and therefore is less costly to use.  We can think of how using a single aircraft 
to bomb one bridge would be much less costly than using various aircraft in an extended 
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bombing campaign to annihilate all the enemy’s troops17.  The second implication is that 
the state that is using the modern system could end up with an extremely favorable 
outcome, where it is able to quickly obtain the concessions it wants from its opponent 
without having to engage in a long and bloody war.    
Of course, the flip side of this argument is (again, as discussed earlier) that using 
the modern system can also be riskier (recall the examples of how campaigns that rely on 
effectively destroying a particular target can go very wrong if key operations fail).  Thus, 
what the modern system is in essence doing is increasing the variance of the distribution 
of potential outcomes in a conflict.  States that use the modern system can end up with a 
very positive outcome, or an extremely negative one
18
.  States that use a non-modern 
system will have a smaller variance in their outcomes.  They may end up with negative 
outcomes, but even these bad outcomes will not be as bad as they could potentially be 
under the modern system (if there are a variety  of bombing raids on the enemy’s trenches 
planned and one of them fails, we still should expect the state to be able to recover from 
it).    Thus, we can now think of the state is trying to maximize a utility function that is 
dependent not only on its capabilities, but also on the ratio of modern and non-modern 
strategies that the state in question is using.  We can think of this degree of risk being 
represented by the modern system variable having greater variance than the non-modern 
one: 
 
                                                             
17
 Of course, one might argue that training pilots to be able to precisely target the bridge is much more 
costly than just training them to carpet-bomb troops, but these are costs that have been incurred in the past 
and that should not affect decisions in the present.   
18 An implicit assumption being made here is that outcomes of military campaigns or conflicts go beyond 
just being “victory” or “defeat.”  Rather, there is variation within these categories.  A victory can be 
overwhelming, or it can come close to being a draw.  Clearly, all else being equal, states would prefer an 
overwhelming victory.   
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U(Victory)=f(cap, M, NM)   
  
 To begin, we will have a utility function, U, that represents the utility a given state 
is getting from a particular conflict outcome.  I assume that the state prefers victory over 
defeat, such that the variable “V” represents a positive payoff from victory.  As we 
discussed before, the state can make any proportion of its aerial strategy modern.  This 
will be represented as “m,” with the proportion of the strategy that is not modern being 
represented as “n.”  The general idea is that there is a total amount of air power that the 
state can use, and that it will distribute it between the two different strategies.  We can 
think of this total amount as a budget or capability restriction, and it will be represented 
as “B.”    There is some form of cost associated with using either one of the strategies, 
which is represented as “c”.  As stated before, I will assume that the cost of using the 
modern system, cM, will be less than that of using the non-modern system, cN, such that:  
      
The cost is then multiplied by the amount of either modern or non-modern that the 
state is using.  There will also be a probability function associated with both the modern 
and the non-modern system that will give us the probability of victory, given that 
particular system being used.  This probability of victory, multiplied by the value of 
victory, gives us the expected payoffs from using a particular amount of modern strategy.  
Thus, our utility function will be as follows: 
 
                                                                             {Equation 1} 
 
Subject to the constraint that  
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                                                                                                                                        {Equation 2} 
  
To incorporate the budget/capability constraint into Equation 1 we can use the 
Lagrangian multiplier such that 
 
                                                       {Equation 3} 
 
Because we want to know what amount of modern and non-modern air power a 
state would use in order to maximize its utility obtained from the conflict, we should 
maximize the function U.  We will begin by maximizing the Lagrangian function, taking 
its partial derivatives with respect to both of our key variables (amounts of modern and 
non-modern airpower), setting them equal to zero, and solving for both m and n: 
 
  
  
                       
  
          
   
                                                                                                                         {Equation 4} 
 
 And 
 
  
  
                       
  
           
   
                                                                                                              {Equation 5} 
 
We can also take the partial derivative with respect to λ,  
 
  
  
          
 
Since, 
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Then, 
 
  
                               
     
                                                                                    {Equation 6} 
 
So that we can solve for m and n: 
  
                      
        
                                                                                                   {Equation 7} 
And  
  
                      
        
                                                                                                    {Equation 8} 
From these equations we can derive some very basic (and intuitive) hypotheses 
about when states will derive more utility from using a given aerial strategy. 
If we look at equation 7, which tells us the proportion of the state’s strategy that 
will be modern, we can see that as the budget increases (all else being equal), the amount 
of strategy that will be modern will increase, as will the non-modern strategy. 
 
Hypothesis A: All else being equal, as the capabilities or budget of a state increase, so 
will the amount of modern (non-modern) strategy that it uses. 
 
 We can also see that as one strategy becomes relatively costlier, the other strategy 
will tend to be preferred. 
 
Hypothesis B: As the cost of the non-modern (modern) strategy increases, the amount 
of modern (non-modern) strategy that a state uses will increase. 
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 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we can see that as the difference in the 
probability of success given that the modern strategy is used and the probability of 
success given that the non-modern strategy is used increases (and I assume that this 
difference is positive), the amount of modern strategy used increases.   
 
Hypothesis C: As the probability of victory given that the modern (non-modern) system 
is used increases relative to the probability of victory given that the non-modern 
(modern) system is used, the amount of modern (non-modern) strategy will increase. 
 
These previous hypotheses tell us some general information about when any 
given strategy would be chosen over another one, but now we have to think in particular 
about what they can tell us about using a particular aerial strategy.  In order to do this I 
will begin by integrating into the equations the greater variance in outcomes that the 
modern system has, relative to the non-modern system.  We can think of the outcomes 
from using either strategy as being distributed as a Normal (Gaussian) distribution, such 
that: 
        
 
     
       
 
   
 
   
And 
        
 
     
       
 
   
 
   
Where 
      
  
This previous assumption is important because it represents the greater variances 
in outcomes when using the modern system.  In other words, we can think of outcome as 
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being simply defeat or victory, but the fact is that not all defeats and victories look the 
same for the states involved in them.  A victory can be an overwhelming victory, or it can 
be closer to a tie.  The same is true for a defeat.  Thus, we can think of outcomes as a 
continuum, with overwhelming defeats at one end, overwhelming victories on the other, 
and stalemates in the middle.  I argue that using a modern strategy will lead to greater 
variance in outcomes along this continuum.     
 
Thus, 
  
        
 
     
       
 
   
 
     
 
     
       
 
   
 
  
        
                                                                      {Equation 9} 
 
And 
  
        
 
     
       
 
   
 
   
 
     
       
 
   
 
  
        
                                                                      {Equation 10}                                                     
  
To simplify our equations we can even think of    as being equal to    
multiplied by a given factor that is greater than 1, such that: 
 
        
Where 
    
 
Such that, 
  
        
 
      
       
 
      
 
     
 
     
       
 
   
 
  
        
                                                                   {Equation 11} 
 
And 
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                                                                    {Equation 12} 
 
 
Assuming that states want to maximize the utility that they obtain from fighting 
an armed conflict, we can use the two previous equations to derive some hypotheses 
about the circumstances under which states should derive the most utility from using the 
modern system.   
If we assume that the mean value (µ) of the outcome is the same whether a state is 
using the modern system or the non-modern system (      , then we can see that as 
the value of ϵ increases, the proportion of strategy that will be modern (m) will 
decrease
19
.  This means that if the mean value of the outcome of the conflict is the same 
for both strategies, states will derive less utility from using the modern system, relative to 
the non-modern system.  In general, I have assumed that the modern system has greater 
variance than the non-modern system, but as that difference in variance increases, all else 
being equal, states will be less likely to use the modern system.  As I am assuming that 
they are risk averse, such that when given two options were equal expected payoffs, they 
would choose the one with lower variance in potential outcomes.  Thus, we can derive 
the next hypothesis: 
 
                                                             
19 I will make the assumption that when states are engaged in conflict they will behave in a risk-averse 
fashion, such that given two options with the same expected utility, the will choose the one with the lower 
amount of variance in outcomes.  
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Hypothesis D: If the mean values of both strategy systems are the same, as the 
difference in variance between the modern and the non-modern system increases, 
states will be less likely to use the modern system. 
 
 Of course, as the mean value of one system increases (all else being equal), that 
one system will be more likely to be used.  This means that as the mean value of using 
the modern system increases, states should be more likely use the modern system.   
 
Hypothesis E: In conflicts in which the mean expected value of using the modern 
system is greater, states are more likely to use the modern system. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA 
 
 This chapter describes the data to be used to test my hypotheses.  My dataset will 
be based on Allen (2007).  In her 2007 paper “Time Bombs” she augmented the data of 
Horowitz and Reiter (2001) and Pape (1996). The data used by Allen (2007) includes all 
coercive bombing campaigns in international conflicts, up to 2003.
20
    
Based on the theory developed in the previous chapter, my empirical analysis 
requires data on battlefield success.  In this dissertation I will argue that the way that the 
forces are employed (both on the ground and on the air), the military strategy, will make 
success more or less likely
21
. The actual data used to measure success will be derived 
from Horowitz and Reiter’s 2001 piece on aerial bombing, with additional cases coded 
according to their coding rules
22
.  Their coercive success variable (which is in turn based 
off of Pape’s 1996 work) is dichotomous, coded 1 if the demands of the attacker were 
met and 0 otherwise.   
 My main independent variable will be a measure of whether the aerial strategy 
being used in this case is modern or non-modern.  There is no existing dataset that 
                                                             
20 At the moment I have gone through and coded my key independent variables for all of the cases in 
Allen’s dataset.  While involved in this process I have discovered a few missing cases, as Allen (2007), 
Horowitz and Reiter (2001) and Pape (1996) focus exclusively on cases of strategic bombing, and I am 
hoping to include also cases of close-air support and interdiction.  An avenue for future research would be 
to add these other cases to the data, as well as some that go beyond 2003.   
21 There has been some discussion in the literature over whether countermilitary targeting can be 
considered coercion, as some argue that bombing military targets is simply using brute force against the 
enemy, not altering their will to fight (George, Hall and Simons 1971).  I will take the view that 
countermilitary targeting may be part of a coercive campaign, as it is rarely the case that countermilitary 
bombing completely eliminates the ability of the enemy to resist, but rather can force them to reevaluate 
their gains from continuing to fight and lead to their surrender (Byman, Waxman and Larson 1999, 
Horowitz and Reiter 2001, Pape 1996).    
22I recently (early April 2011) talked to Susan Allen about the new dataset on aerial bombing that she has 
been putting together.  This dataset includes newly-coded variables that define coercive success in terms of 
both the military and political aims of the attacker.  I believe that this would be a superior measure to use in 
future work, once it is published  
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includes a coding for this variable, so collected these data from primary documents (e.g. 
the official published military doctrines of various states) and historical accounts of 
conflict. I begin by categorizing the use of air power as close air support (CAS), 
interdiction, or strategic attack. According to the USAF Basic Doctrine, CAS provides 
direct support to friendly forces that are already in contact with enemy forces, and aids 
them in achieving their objectives.  Interdiction is directed against targets that are 
contributing to reinforcing the land battle, whereas strategic attack targets the enemy as a 
system, not just on the field (Air Force Basic Doctrine 2003).
23
   
I developed a series of questions that refer to key characteristics of each of the 
three forms of air power.  Each is answered yes or no.  I derived each question from the 
definition of interdiction, close air support, or strategic attack that I am using in this 
study.  These definitions were in turn (as described in Chapter 3) drawn from Air Force 
documents that defined these uses, such as the Air Force Doctrine and publications on 
counterland operations (Chapter 3 includes the particular definitions, as well as the 
sources I drew them from).  All questions refer to how the attack was carried out, as 
opposed to the plans or intentions of the state conducting the attack.  The main reason for 
making this decision is that I am attempting to explain how military strategies affect the 
duration and outcome of a conflict.  Thus, this refers to the way in which the strategy was 
actually used, not how it was intended to be used.  The strategy that the opponent 
observes, and uses to acquire information about the state carrying out the bombing 
campaign, is the strategy that was actually employed.  Also, states may not always be 
sincere about what their intended strategy is, which makes coding an intended strategy 
difficult.     
                                                             
23 All three of these terms are defined in detail in the Chapter 3 of this dissertation.   
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To provide an, one of the questions under the close air support category is as 
follows, “Is the attack carried out at a range from the battlefield within which terminal 
attack control is required for fratricide prevention?”  If the answer to the question was 
yes, I took that to be indicative of uses of air power being interdiction, as a key 
characteristic of interdiction is that it is far enough from the battlefield so as to not 
require ground forces to have terminal attack control.  The same process was repeated for 
all of the questions. The responses from these questions then allow me to determine 
whether the dominant use of air power was interdiction, close air support or strategic 
attack (I considered a case to be a dominant use of air power if more than half of the 
responses under that category were coded as 1).  In cases in which more than one form of 
air power was used, I code all forms of air power.  I included coding for all cases, even 
those that were later not included in some of the analysis (for example, cases of bombing 
against non-state actors).  The following three tables show the distribution of “yes” 
answers for each type of use of air power, as long as the mean values for each question 
(because each questions took on a value of either 1 or 0, the mean values can be also 
thought of as the percentage of “yes” answers).  
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Table 4.1: Questions to Determine Type of Air Power, Interdiction 
 Question Frequency of 
“Yes” 
Mean Value 
Interdiction  Are air operations being 
conducted to divert, 
disrupt, delay, or destroy 
the enemy’s military 
potential before it can be 
brought to bear 
effectively against 
friendly forces or 
otherwise achieve 
objectives? 
29 cases .60 
 Is the distance of the 
use of air power far 
enough from friendly 
forces that detailed 
integration of the air 
mission with friendly 
forces is not required? 
friendly forces or 
otherwise achieve 
objectives? 
39 cases .85 
 Are targets military 
resources that the 
enemy could have used 
against the nation in 
question? 
27 cases .56 
 Is air power directed 
against targets that are 
contributing to 
reinforcing the land 
battle? 
20 cases .43 
  Is the aim of the attack 
to cut off ground forces 
from command and 
supply lines in order to 
make them more 
vulnerable to attack? 
10 cases .21 
  Are the targets lines of 
communication whose 
destruction would 
impede the movement 
of the enemy's forces 
(for examples, bridges 
or highways that the 
enemy needs to cross in 
order to conduct an 
attack)? 
12 cases .44 
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Table 4.2: Questions to Determine Type of Air Power, Close Air Support 
 Question Frequency of 
“Yes” 
Mean Value 
CAS Is the air action against 
hostile targets that are in 
close proximity to 
friendly forces? 
16 cases .34 
 Is detailed integration of 
missions with friendly 
ground forces required? 
12cases .26 
 Is the attack carried out 
at a range from the 
battlefield within which 
terminal attack control is 
required for fratricide 
prevention? 
11 cases .24 
 Is air power being used 
in preparation for battle? 
24 cases .50 
 Is air power being used 
as reinforcement of 
attacks on the ground? 
24 cases .51 
 
Table 4.3: Questions to Determine Type of Air Power, Strategic Attack 
 Question Frequency of 
“Yes” 
Mean Value 
CAS Is the aim of the attack 
to affect the enemy's 
leadership, conflict-
sustaining resources 
and strategy? 
23 cases .48 
 Is the use of air power 
aimed at destroying 
resources that will 
weaken the enemy and 
its ability to prosecute 
the war? 
28 cases .58 
 Is the attack carried out 
at a large distance from 
the battlefield 
37 cases .76 
 Does the attack aim to 
target the enemy's 
sources of strength 
without first having to 
engage military forces? 
35 cases .71 
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 Is the attack intended to 
attack the enemy as a 
system, not just on the 
battlefield? 
35 cases .71 
 
Having determined the form(s) of air power that is (are) being used, I then go on 
to ask an additional set of questions to determine whether a particular case can be 
categorized as a “modern” use of air power. As discussed in Chapter 3 (the theory 
chapter), I identified the characteristics of modern and non-modern air power under each 
one of the three forms of air power.  The questions in each section identify the key 
characteristics of modern and non-modern air power, with again each one being answered 
in the affirmative or negative.  To provide another example, one of the questions under 
the modern interdiction section asks, “Are lines of communication and transportation 
(bridges, highways) being targeted?” Targeting the lines of communication and cutting 
off the enemy’s troops from their command and control is one of the key elements of the 
modern system.  Under the non-modern interdiction section, a sample question reads, 
“Are combat forces (i.e. the actual troops, tanks, etc) being targeted?” (under the 
traditional, non-modern form of fighting the aim of attack is to destroy the actual troops 
so that they will no longer be able to resist).     
Below, as Table 4.4, I reproduce the table from Chapter 3 that includes the 
different characteristics of both modern and non-modern forms of all three uses of air 
power.  The actual questions are included in the raw data in Appendix A.  To ensure that 
each question was actually reflecting how modern that particular use of air power was, I 
derived the questions from descriptions of targeted air power (analogous to Biddle’s 
modern system) from Warden’s “The Air Campaign,” as well as Air Force documents on 
Counterland Operations (these documents are described in more detail in Chapter 3, 
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where I define what the modern and non-modern versions of all three types of air power 
are).   
Table 4.4: Modern and Non-Modern Uses of Air Power 
 Modern Non-Modern 
Strategic Attack  Centers of gravity 
specifically targeted 
 Limited, short-term 
indirect collateral 
damage 
 Non-military production 
not damaged 
 Targets away from the 
enemy’s homeland 
 Enemy’s homeland 
targeted 
 Civilians targeted 
 Non-industrial urban 
targets 
 Attack is punitive in 
character 
Interdiction  Lines of communication 
targeted 
 Defenses avoided 
 Infrastructure targeted 
 Temporary windows of 
opportunity created 
 Non-combat military 
units (ie headquarters) 
targeted 
 Source of troops or 
materiel targeted 
 
 Combat forces are 
targeted 
 Vehicles used to 
transport troops or 
supplies along the 
conduit targeted 
 Aim is the attrition of 
enemy forces and 
materiel, while in transit 
 Air power used to slow 
down enemy pursuing 
forces in retreat 
Close Air Support  Used at decisive points in 
battle 
 Apply concentrated 
combat power and 
saturate defenses 
 Targets are beyond the 
range of troops in contact 
 Selective and 
discriminating firepower 
 Air power used as a 
substitute for artillery 
 Aerial bombardment of 
the enemy line 
 Attack preparatory to an 
offensive 
 Attack on troops 
“crossing the wire” 
 Air power used to hold a 
flank 
 
Again, the coding referred to the actual targets that were bombed, not to the 
intent, which could be interpreted more ambiguously.   
Across the different uses of air power (CAS, interdiction, strategic), the targeted 
use of air power stands out as a defining quality of the modern system.  Essentially, 
whether it is strategic attack, interdiction or close air support being used, when the style 
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of war-fighting used is modern, the main aim is to use air power against key, decisive 
targets.  Modern air power, across the different types, does not seek to destroy all of the 
enemy’s forces, but rather to cripple them by hitting essential points that will have 
repercussions on other aspects of the enemy’s forces.  In the case of interdiction, the 
targeted use of air power differentiates the modern system from the non-modern style of 
using air power to bomb indiscriminately, or of using it as a punitive resource during war.  
In the case of strategic attack a modern aerial attack refers to campaigns with 
limited aims and little collateral damage that target centers of gravity, attempting to 
impair the opponent’s ability to wage war (but not significantly damage non-military 
production).  This can be contrasted with the more punitive non-modern aerial strategic 
attacks that can emphasize area bombing over the centers of gravity (Warden 2000).  
Modern interdiction is also more selective, focusing attacks on the support infrastructure, 
lines of communication and command and control, in an attempt to destabilize the 
opponent.  Non-modern interdiction involves the more general bombing or enemy forces 
(fielded forces, for example) and materiel.  Finally, close air support, which is usually 
thought of as non-modern when it is used as a substitute for artillery, can be modern 
when selective firepower is applied to targets beyond the range of ground troops.      
To illustrate this preliminary stage of coding, I discuss Operation El Dorado 
Canyon, the US bombing campaign against Libya carried out in 1986 in response to the 
Libyan-sponsored terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by 
American military personnel that left 3 people dead and over 200 injured (Global 
Security.org n.d.).    This was coded as strategic attack.  Three out of the five questions 
referring to strategic attack (the attack was intended to destroy resources that would 
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weaken Libya’s ability to conduct attacks, it aimed to target Libyan sources of strength 
without engaging military forces, and aimed to attack Libya as a system rather than on 
the battlefield) had “yes” responses, zero of the questions on close air support had “yes” 
responses (the U.S. did not have any ground troops present in Libya), and only one 
question on interdiction had a “yes” response (the attack destroyed terrorist military 
potential before it could be brought to bear against American targets).  
 
Table 4.5: Questions to Determine Degree of Modern Strategic Attack (Operation El 
Dorado Canyon, 1986) 
 Question Response 
Modern  Are centers of gravity 
being targeted? 
No (0) 
 Does the attack cause a 
limited amount of 
indirect collateral 
damage and not have a 
long-term impact on the 
civilian economy? 
Yes (1) 
 Are targets selected to 
impair the enemy's 
ability to wage war but 
continue non-military 
production without much 
disturbance? 
Yes (1) 
 If there is aerial bombing 
used, is it on targets 
away from the enemy's 
homeland? 
No (0) 
Non-Modern If fighting is not 
occurring in the enemy’s 
homeland, is the 
homeland still being 
targeted? 
Yes (1) 
  Are civilians being 
targeted 
Yes (1) 
 Are non-industrial urban 
areas being targeted? 
Yes (1) 
 Is the campaign punitive 
in character? 
Yes (1) 
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 While President Reagan stated that the action was one of self-defense, in most 
historical accounts it is referred to as a punitive attack in retribution for the Berline 
bombings.  The attack was one on the Libyan homeland.  The targets were both military 
and civilian (though the official US stance was that only the military targets were 
intentional).  The military targets were mainly terrorist training facilities and airfields (to 
ensure that Libyan MiG fighters would not attack US aircraft).  These do not fall under 
the category of centers of gravity.  These targets were limited, and designed to impair the 
terrorist attack capabilities of the Libyan government, but allow non-terrorist production 
to continue.  Collateral from the attack, despite there being civilian casualties that 
received much press attention, was limited and did not have a long-term impact on the 
civilian economy.  Diplomatic and civilian sites in Tripoli were hit (again, these were 
likely unintentional, but as I am coding observed actions I included the raid as having hit 
civilian targets in non-industrial urban areas).  One of the compounds was the Bab al-
Azizia compound, where Qaddafi and his family lived.  Again, because some of these 
intended targets were civilians, the case was coded as including civilian targets.    
 Another coding example is that of Britain bombing Somali rebels in 1920 during 
an uprising in British Somaliland led by Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the Mad 
Mullah, who had been conducting anti-British operations in East Africa since 1899.  
After ground forces alone proved unable to stop the Mullah, aircraft were deployed to the 
area.  The aim of the campaign was to bomb the military forts held by the Mullah, as well 
as his supporters (with the expectations that this would drive them towards British ground 
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troops).  This case was coded as being predominantly interdiction
24
.  Despite there being 
British ground forces present, the aerial attacks were not close enough to (or coordinated 
enough with) them to consider this use of air power as close air support.  The campaign 
was also not a strategic one, as it was clearly fighting the Mullah’s military forces, not the 
Somali system as a whole.  Table 4.6 displays the coding of this air campaign.   
 
Table 4.6: Questions to Determine Degree of Modern Interdiction (Britain vs. Somali 
Rebels, 1920) 
 Question Response 
Modern Are the targets non-
military (ie bridges, 
roads, warehouses)? 
No (0) 
 Are lines of 
communication and 
transportation (bridges, 
highways) being 
targeted? 
No (0) 
 Are defenses avoided 
(going directly to center 
of gravity)? 
Yes (1) 
 Is the support 
infrastructure (supply 
lines) being targeted? 
No (0) 
 Is the aim of the attack 
to create a temporary 
window of opportunity 
that can be taken 
advantage of by ground 
forces? 
No(0) 
 Are non-combat military 
units, such as 
headquarters, being 
targeted? 
No(1) 
 Is the source of troops 
or materiel being 
targeted? 
Yes(1) 
                                                             
24 Four out of six questions on interdiction are answered “yes,” whereas only two out of five on CAS have 
“yes” responses, and two out of five on strategic attack have “yes” responses.  The attack was meant to 
divert Somali military potential before it could be brought to bear against British troops, the attacks were 
far enough for British troops that detailed integration with friendly forces was not required, attacks were 
against military resources that could have been used against the British, and the targets of the attacks were 
reinforcing Somali ground forces.   
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Non-Modern Are combat forces (ie 
the actual troops, tanks, 
etc) being targeted? 
Yes (1) 
  Are vehicles used to 
transport troops or 
supplies along the the 
conduit being targeted? 
Yes (1) 
 Is the aim of interdiction 
the attrition of enemy 
forces and materiel? 
Yes (1) 
 Is air power being used 
to slow down and 
enemy that is pursuing 
forces in retreat? 
Yes(1) 
  
In this campaign targets were mostly forts (which are military targets) and the 
Mullah’s fighters (the actual troops, as referred to by one of the questions).  Another 
target of the campaign was camels, which were used as vehicles to transport the Mullah’s 
troops.  At one point the Mullah’s forces were in retreat, and air power was used to slow 
them down and drive them towards the British ground forces.  These attacks did not 
engage the defenses of the Mullah directly, but rather bypassed them by bombing the 
forts, which were the Mullah’s source of troops and materiel.  The attack did not target 
roads, lines of communication and supply, or non-combat military units (Dean 1983).   
The answers to all of these questions are close to the conceptual definition of 
modern air power, as I drew the questions from the conceptual definitions described in 
Chapter 3.  Having collected the answers to these questions, I then move on to creating an 
operational definition of aerial strategy.  In particular, I create a single measure of the 
degree to which a state uses a modern or non-modern strategy.  In order to do this, I 
aggregate the answers to the individual questions to form an overall index of how 
“modern” a particular use of air power is.  In each case, only the answers from the 
dominant use(s) of air power are considered for that case’s classification.  Affirmative 
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answers to questions related to the use of modern air power are added to the score, as are 
negative answers to the questions referring to the use of non-modern air power.  As the 
number of questions varies between categories, the “modern score” is normalized to a 
score between 0 and 1, which essentially represents the percentage of questions that 
indicate the use of the modern system.  The higher that number is, the more modern that 
one particular case can be considered to be.   
I created a continuous (rather than dichotomous) measure of modern and non-
modern strategies because I believe that aerial strategies always contain aspects of both 
the modern and non-modern strategies (and the theory developed in chapter 3 represents 
this belief).  A continuous measure allows me to better represent the spectrum of strategy 
combinations available to states.  This measure also gives me the flexibility to create a 
dichotomous measure from it if the analysis requires it (in some of the analysis in later 
chapters I do use a dichotomous measure of aerial strategies).  
In figure 4.1, I present a histogram with the distribution of additive modern air 
power scores for the sample.  As we can see from the figure below, there are relatively 
few cases at the higher end of the modern spectrum.  The mean value for modern air 
power level is .47 and the modal category is .3.  The standard deviation is .20.  Cases on 
the higher end of the spectrum include campaigns such as NATO’s Deliberate Force 
Operation against the Serbs and the United States’ attacks during Desert Storm.   
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Aerial Strategies 
 
We can see from the following graphs that not only is there variation in the 
amount of modern air power that is used by states, but that this variation persists even 
when we divide the data up by the different uses of air power (CAS, interdiction and 
strategic attack). 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Modern Close Air Support 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Modern Interdiction 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Modern Strategic Attack 
 
In several of these cases both sides are using air power.  There are, of course, a 
few cases in which only one side used air power.  To account for this, I include a variable 
that determines, for each case, whether the opponent was using air power or not.  Asking 
whether the opponent used air power is also an important question, as it will may allow 
us to understand whether the effectiveness of air power is dependent on the other side 
using (or not using) air power.  In 30 of the cases, the opponent was using air power, 
while in 18 it was not.   
As far as the categorization of the ground strategies goes, I would have preferred 
to use an existing dataset, to maintain some uniformity with previous studies.  The 
problem with using past datasets that contain coding for military strategies (Stam 1996, 
Reiter and Meek 1999) is that while they may be appropriate for the particular studies 
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that they were built for, in this case they prove problematic.  One aim of this study is to 
evaluate the interaction of military strategies used in the air and on the ground.  This 
means that we need to have separately coded strategies for military strategies in the air 
and on the ground.  The problem with existing datasets is that their coding of military 
strategies encompasses both strategy on the ground and in the air.  This means that using 
datasets to measure ground strategy would not allow me to accurately measure their 
interaction with aerial strategies, as they will be affected by aerial strategies, which I am 
trying to measure separately. 
Because of this impediment, I will also include a new coding for ground 
strategies.  This coding will be based on Biddle’s definition of modern and non-modern 
strategies.  Similarly to the air power variables, the coding will be based on a series of 
questions that aim to determine whether the strategy is modern or not.  Again, what this 
variable will try to measure is how modern the ground strategy of a state is, following 
Biddle’s definition.  In order to capture this, the questions are drawn directly from 
Biddle’s definition of the modern system.  Like the questions on air power, these 
questions are phrased so as to reduce ambiguity.  In other words, they refer to observable 
actions, such that different coders looking through historical accounts should be able to 
come up with the same answers.  The questions, which are included in Appendix A, are 
ones such as, “Is the aim of a campaign to seize a strategically important piece of 
terrain?” or “Is the aim of the attack to exploit temporary advantage/ windows of 
opportunity?”  Below, in table 4.7, I present the questions on ground strategy, as well as 
the frequency of yes answers. 
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Table 4.7: Questions to Determine Type of Ground Strategy 
Question Frequency of 
“Yes” 
Mean Value 
Does the campaign 
have limited aims? 
14 cases .40 
Are defenses avoided? 
11 cases .31 
Is the aim of a 
campaign to seize a 
strategically important 
piece of terrain? 
17cases .49 
Is the aim of the attack 
to exploit temporary 
advantage/ windows of 
opportunity? 
12 cases .34 
Is cover and 
concealment (NOT 
quasi-permanent 
trench lines, irregular, 
camouflaged 
locations, interlocking 
fields of fire) an 
important part of the 
strategy? 
9 cases .26 
Are large formations 
broken up 
(dispersion)? 
18 cases .51 
Are subunits (platoons 
or sections, not 
battalions or 
companies) allowed to 
move independently? 
20 cases .57 
Is the whole operation 
NOT orchestrated from 
above? 
5 cases .14 
Does terrain allow 
subunits to move 
independently? 
32 cases .89 
Is suppressive fire 
emphasized over 
destructive fire? 
4 cases .11  
Is there combined 
arms integration 
(teaming together 
weapon types with 
contrasting strengths 
and weaknesses like 
infantry and artillery)? 
21 cases .60 
98 
 
Is the aim to induce 
the systemic collapse 
of a defense while 
fighting through only a 
fraction of it directly? 
15 cases .43 
Are targets the 
support infrastructure 
(supply lines)? 
6 cases .17 
Are forces 
disproportionately 
concentrated at a 
given point? 
23 cases .66 
Is depth emphasized 
over density when 
establishing defense? 
2 cases .06 
 
The answers to the questions are then aggregated into a general measure of how 
modern the land strategy is.  The aggregation is similar to that of the aerial strategy 
measure of strategy.  The “yes” answers are added up (coded as ones) and divided by the 
total number of questions, which results in a number between zero and one, with values 
closer to zero representing less modern ground strategies and values closer to one 
representing more modern ground strategies.  The values range from 0 to .73, and the 
mean value for the modern ground power score is .40.  Below is a histogram that shows 
the distribution of ground strategies across the different cases. 
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Ground Strategies 
 
 The analysis will also include a variety of variables that are expected to affect 
whether the coercing state is able to achieve its aims.  These will include capabilities of 
both the attacker and the adversary (as well as the ratio between the two), whether there 
are allied nations involved in the conflict, and any other ones that may arise in conducting 
the analysis for each empirical chapter.  These measures will thus be further discussed in 
each chapter. 
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CH. 5: SELECTING AN AERIAL STRATEGY 
 Before determining how effective a particular aerial strategy will be under 
different circumstances, I will begin by exploring what determines how a given state will 
choose its aerial strategy.  This is particularly important in order to address potential 
problems of endogeneity.  When we study the effect of military strategy on conflict, one 
roadblock that we quickly run into is the question of whether we can really separate the 
effect of military strategy on outcomes from strategy choice, as we can think that states 
will choose the strategy that is most likely to be successful in a given conflict.  Thus, 
there is a concern that if we attempt to evaluate the effect of strategy on conflict 
outcomes, we may obtain biased results because strategy was chosen with its effect on 
outcomes in mind.   
The aim of this chapter will be to argue for the relevance of studying the effect of 
aerial strategy on conflict outcomes.  I will do this by arguing for two main points.  The 
first will be that there is no such thing as an “ideal strategy” when it comes to aerial 
strategies.  I will argue that it is not the case that there is some single ideal aerial strategy 
that all states strive for and attempt to implement.  I will make this argument both by 
reiterating the strategy choice model I developed in the theory chapter of this dissertation 
and by making a general argument as to why targeted aerial attacks may not always be 
the most appropriate strategy for a conflict.  The second main point of this chapter will be 
that it is not the case that states always use the “best” aerial strategy in a conflict.  I will 
argue that states are often constrained by the structure of their military and their military 
doctrine and will thus follow a path-dependent approach to strategy selection.  I will 
support this claim through an empirical analysis in which I show that states with similar 
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capabilities in similar targeting situations will often opt for different aerial strategies.  I 
will discuss and compare individual cases (such as that of the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and the Vietnam War) to support this point.  This chapter will thus be 
devoted to showing that there is no one ideal aerial strategy, and that while in theory 
states may select the military strategy that is most likely to lead to victory, in practice 
their choices will tend to be constrained by their current military doctrine (which will 
take into account the institutional set-up of their military and the state’s current view on 
war-fighting).   
 
Ideal Strategies? 
 A key point that I will make in this chapter, and throughout the rest of this project, 
is that there is no single ideal strategy that is best for states to use in any sort of conflict 
that they might be involved in.  In other words, I will make the argument that under some 
circumstances the modern system will be the most effective one, whereas in others the 
non-modern system will be more appropriate.  In fact, it may be the case that a mixture of 
the strategies can be most effective rather a pure use of one.   
In particular, because the modern system can serve as a force multiplier, some 
might believe that it is inherently superior to the non-modern system.  This means that 
states that used the non-modern system would have done so either in error or because 
they lacked the capabilities to implement the modern system.  I find this view to be 
overly simplistic, as well as being unable to explain cases of powerful states choosing to 
implement aspects of the non-modern system.  Also, neither system (even while 
controlling for capabilities, etc) is a perfect predictor of campaign success.  I thus argue 
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that the “best” strategy for a conflict will depend on the context it is being applied to, and 
may indeed be a mixture of strategies.   
As I have previously reviewed how the modern system can serve as a force 
multiplier, I will also discuss how it can be a riskier system to use (thus making it inferior 
to the non-modern system in some situations).   
 
The Risks of Using the Modern System 
 A major drawback of using the modern system is simply that it can be a riskier 
strategy to use.  As Luttwak (2001)states, if one side is relying on the success of an 
operation that applies force to what is believed to be a key vulnerable point of the 
enemy’s forces, the failure of that particular operation could lead to the collapse of all 
related operations that depended on that one success.  Because the modern system can 
rely on getting a very large amount of moving parts to key places, any problem could 
easily result in chaos (S. Biddle 2004).   The modern system relies on overwhelming a 
particular weak point and leading to the collapse of the enemy.  The point of it is not to 
defeat the enemy as a whole.  Thus, if (through misinformation, for example) that one 
key point is unexpectedly strong, the modern attack may fail.  As Biddle states, the 
modern system is “complex and unforgiving” (Biddle 2004, 47), which means that if 
there is a lack of coordination, one’s forces can end up exposed to the enemy’s firepower, 
with lethal consequences.   For example, in the case of modern defensive operations, 
coordinating the moving parts of deep reserves is much more difficult than having a static 
defense, and may even have an adverse effect on the morale of the troops, who may feel 
isolated and exposed (Biddle 2004).  In contrast, under the non-modern system, missing a 
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single target will not jeopardize the entire operation, or place a disproportionately high 
number of troops at risk (Luttwak 2001).  Under the non-modern system there is much 
less of a risk of a smaller force finding itself overwhelmed by the enemy, as in this case 
forces are rarely matched against much larger enemy ones. 
 One well-known example of an operation that relied on what could be referred to 
as a modern form of force employment would be the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu (often 
referred to as “Black Hawk Down,” after Mark Bowden’s book of the same name).  The 
battle ensued after a raid by US Special Forces to capture a group of Somali leaders loyal 
to Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid (a group hostile to the United States) 
deteriorated into an unplanned urban confrontation with hostile Somalis.  This was a raid 
that relied on the superior training of its troops (as compared to the Somalis) to get in, 
achieve their aim of capturing the warlords and evacuate before the confrontation could 
escalate (the entire operation was estimated to last no longer than thirty minutes).  The 
operation was intended to be a low-cost one (politically and as far as the number of 
troops committed to it goes).   
The problems began when the convoy that was supposed to extract the prisoners 
was slowed down by protests on the ground.  The operation was further slowed down by 
an accident in which one of the rangers involved was injured after falling while fast-
roping from one of the Black Hawk helicopters involved and had to be evacauted.  Soon 
afterwards, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali RPG’s, stranding 
their crews at the crash sites.  The Somalis then got a chance to overwhelm the superiorly 
trained, but vastly outnumbered Americans.  The raid resulted in nineteen American 
soldiers killed and seventy-three wounded, with only one survivor being rescued from the 
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second crash site (Bowden 1999).  What could have resulted in an easy, low-cost victory 
instead resulted in a large number of casualties and political costs to the Clinton 
administration.  One can imagine that if the US had attempted the raid with a larger 
number of forces, in a less “modern” fashion, the high level of casualties could have been 
avoided.     
 Biddle (2004) also makes the point that engaging in limited aims attacks, while it 
may be thought of as less risky in the short-run (as there are likely to be less casualties as 
there would be from a full-out attack), may prove to be riskier in the long run.  This is the 
case because limited-aims attacks usually do not destroy the opponents, but rather defeat 
them through the exploitation of a temporary advantage.  This means that the opponent 
remains in the field, which could mean that they can recover and then come back to draw 
the other side into a much longer war with uncertain consequences.  This means that 
states may be wary of reaching a settlement without winning an absolute victory.  It can 
always be the case that as the balance of power changes in the future or the leadership of 
the opponent changes, the opponent will not stick to the settlement and may try to 
continue fighting in order to obtain a more favorable outcome (Reiter, How Wars End 
2009).  
 Another issue with using the modern aerial system, which involves much more 
targeted attacks than the non-modern system, is that it requires states to effectively 
identify key targets that will have repercussions throughout the enemy’s system.  Mandel 
(2004) argues that one of the key difficulties involved in carrying out a targeted attack is 
simply indentifying what the key vulnerability points of the opponent are.  This can be 
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particularly difficult when the target is a non-state actor (Mandel 2004)
25
.  A greater 
amount of intelligence is needed if an attack is to be a more targeted one.  The 
intelligence needs to provide information on what the key vulnerable point is, and where 
it is located (for example, even if the attacker knows that bombing the leadership of the 
opponent will cause repercussions throughout the system, it also needs to inform itself on 
where the leadership is located at the time that the attack is to be carried out).  This again 
makes the coordination of the entire attack more difficult, bringing in another dimension 
that could lead to error and thus to negative outcomes.  Non-modern aerial attacks  also 
rely on destroying the chosen targets, but as they tend to be larger and more destructive, it 
will be less likely that a single attack will fail and negatively affect the outcome of the 
conflict.  The intelligence needed for a modern attack not only has to contain information 
on where the target is located, but also on what the effect of the attack will be (Mandel 
2004).  An effective modern aerial attack needs appropriate intelligence on what the 
effect of bombing different targets will be, in order to choose the one that will have the 
greatest repercussion on the opponent’s system.  If the intelligence predicts that a targeted 
attack on a key point will have certain consequences but this turns out not to be the case, 
then the attack will not achieve its aims.   
 Another issue with using the modern system may be that these key vulnerable 
points may not actually exist for the target in question.  The modern system relies on 
hitting key targets that will have repercussions throughout the system.  The assumption 
then is that these points actually exist, but if they do not exist, or if the reperscussions are 
                                                             
25
 Note that while Mandel (2004) makes the point that carrying out a targeted attack against a non-state 
actor because of the challenges involved in identifying their key weak points, carrying out a non-targeted 
aerial attack against a non-state actor can also be difficult.  For example, the option of bombing the 
opponent’s major cities is not available if the opponent is not a state (e.g. if the target is a terrorist group 
with no identified homeland).   
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actually minimal, then the best option for the attacker will be to use the non-modern 
system.  Mandel (2004) argues that this is more likely to be the case with non-state 
actors, but we could also identify cases of states in which it is difficult to identify a 
particular target that will have repercussions throughout the entire system if hit. 
 
Testing the Theory? 
The common implication from the model presented in Chapter 3 and the 
hypotheses derived from it is that there are specific circumstances in which the modern 
system is more likely to be chosen by states.  These hypotheses predict the circumstances 
under which states are most likely to select either a modern or a non-modern military 
strategy.  One way to address the problem of endogeneity would be to use these 
hypotheses to build an empirical model of strategy choice.  The problem with trying to 
build and test a model of strategy choice empirically is that most of these independent 
variables that would predict strategy choice would be extremely difficult to 
operationalize.  For example, hypothesis A states that attackers will be more likely to use 
the modern system as the probability of victory from using the modern system increases 
relative to the probability of victory from using the non-modern system.  This means that 
in order to test this hypothesis we would have to derive a measure of both of these 
probabilities.  The problem is that this gets back at the research question of this project, 
which is seeks to understand the circumstances under which each strategy would be most 
effective.  This means that having a hypothesis that tells us that states use the modern 
system when it is most effective, without actually knowing when it is most effective, will 
not do much good.     
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 The main question to answer, then, is when military strategies, in this case the 
modern and non-modern systems of air power, will be the most effective.  Note that I am 
not making the argument that the modern system is a dominant strategy for states 
deciding how to employ their air power.  As demonstrated by the model I derive in the 
theory chapter of this dissertation, there are times when choosing the modern system will 
not be in the best interest of the state that is using air power.  As stated before, when it 
comes to air power, the greatest difference between the modern and non-modern system 
is how targeted the attack is.  Modern-style air power relies on hitting targets that will be 
expected to have disproportionately high repercussions on other aspects of the opponent’s 
military functionality (whereas non-modern air power relies more on destroying the 
opponent’s capacity to continue fighting).  The modern system will be dependent on two 
factors: the existence of such targets that can have a disproportionate effect on the 
enemy’s ability to function and on being able to identify these targets (Mandel 2004).  I 
will argue that these two factors are not always present, and that when they are not then it 
is in the best interest of the state to use the non-modern system.  In different situations 
there will be different ideal strategies.   
 
Of course, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, if this previous statement is 
true, the problem that we run into is that it becomes impossible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of aerial strategies, as there will be a large selection bias.  This would be the 
case because we should expect states to in every situation use the strategy that is best 
suited for that particular conflict, which would mean that any evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the strategy would be biased.  The argument that I will make in this 
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chapter, though, will be that states will often be constrained in their strategy choice.  
Thus, we will be able to observe what the effect of military strategies is on outcome, as 
this choice is not always dependent on the conflict a state is about to fight.   
 Seeing as conflicts often have one side that is victorious and one that is not, we 
know that states will often apply a particular style of fighting and this will not result in a 
victory.  Now, we can argue that states could have suffered an even worse defeat if they 
had applied a different strategy, but more often than not, states’ choice of military 
strategy is constrained by their capabilities and the training of their troops
26
.  In other 
words, it is not always the case that states maximize their ability to win.  We will often 
observe states using non-optimal styles of fighting.   
 As stated, part of this may stem from the fact that states are constrained by their 
capabilities and the training of their troops before the conflict began.  Also, it may be the 
case that states do not know enough about their opponent before the conflict begins to be 
able to choose the optimal military-strategy response against their opponent.  As the 
duration of these conflicts is generally short (the mean value of campaign duration is only 
16 months, including long campaigns such as those from WWII (Allen 2007)), there is 
often not enough time for states to adapt their strategy to that of their opponent during the 
actual conflict.   
States may not always use “the best possible system” (I am referring to the best 
possible system for that particular conflict, as I argue that there is no one-size-fits-all 
strategy that is optimal for every conflict) to fight a conflict because this option is not 
                                                             
26
 States are sometimes able to adjust the training of their troops during a conflict, and thus change their 
military strategy.  The Russians appear to have done so during their intervention in Afghanistan.  Their 
close-air support began as strongly non-modern, but as the conflict (which was an atypically lengthy one) 
progressed, the Russians adjusted their close air support style to a modern one that proved to be more 
effective against the Afghans.   
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available to them.  In the remainder of this chapter I show this is by finding examples of 
states that are equal as far as capabilities go, but where only one of them uses the modern 
system.   
 
A Test of Strategy Choice 
 The concern with studying the effect of military strategies on conflict outcomes is 
that states may choose the best military strategy to fight a particular opponent.  Thus, any 
conclusions that we draw about the effectiveness of a particular military strategy cannot 
be generalized, as the strategy was chosen with that particular conflict in mind and was 
chosen to be effective in that context.  Thus, in a different context the same strategy 
might not be effective. 
 If this were indeed to be the case, then the implicit assumption would be that there 
is a “best” strategy to use in a given conflict (or at least that some strategies will work 
better than others).  Thus, when similar states find themselves in the same types of 
situations, we should expect them to choose the same types of strategies, the “best-
response” strategies.  What I will show in this section is that similar states will find 
themselves in the same types of conflicts (facing similar opponents) and will still opt to 
use different strategies. 
 The analysis that follows uses the characteristics of the opponent to attempt to 
predict the aerial strategy that the attacker will use.  The idea behind it is that if states 
really do choose the best possible strategy for a conflict, then the characteristics of the 
opponent should be a good predictor of strategy choice.  States (especially states with 
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roughly similar capabilities) should always use the best strategy available for the 
particular conflict they are fighting in. 
 The dependent variable in this analysis will be the choice of aerial strategy by the 
attacker.  This means that I will be using the newly coded data on aerial strategies as my 
dependent variable.  The data were collected as a series of questions that determine how 
“modern” (or “non-modern”) a particular use of air power is.  The questions will be 
aggregated into a single measure of modern proportion by adding a point for every 
question that was answered in the affirmative in the coding process.  I use only data for 
the dominant type (or types) of air power (CAS, interdiction or strategic attack) that was 
used by the state in that particular conflict
27
.  In order to be able to compare across 
different uses of air power, I create a measure of modern air power that measures the 
proportion of the total amount of air power used that is modern.  For the analysis I 
convert this continuous variable into a dichotomous one, in which states that have more 
than .50 of their aerial strategy as modern are coded as modern and states which have an 
aerial strategy value of less than .50 are coded as non-modern. 
 For my independent variables, I will begin by including the widely-used 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) for the attacker (Singer, Bremer and 
Stuckey 1972).  I include this measure because one of the points that Biddle (2004) 
makes about the modern system is that it can be a demanding system to implement, 
requiring extensive training of troops and coordination with intelligence.  One could 
argue that this is something that is easier to execute for states that have greater material 
                                                             
27 These categories are not mutually exclusive, meaning that a given air campaign can include one, two or 
all three forms of air power. 
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capabilities, so that it is important to control for the capabilities of the attacker when 
predicting strategy choice. 
 Beyond the capabilities of the states carrying out the attack, the characteristics of 
the opponent should also determine the aerial strategy that a state uses, at least to a 
certain degree, if states always use the best possible strategy against an opponent.  Thus, 
for example, when states were fighting industrialized opponents that were stronger than 
them and that they had been involved in a rivalry with for many years, they should follow 
the best strategy for that option.  Or, there should be an ideal way to fight less-powerful 
non-state actors.  Thus, I will include in my analysis a variety of independent variables 
that represent the characteristics of the target state. 
 One independent variable included in the analysis will be a measure of the 
difference in power between the attacker and its target.  This is operationalized as the 
ratio between the CINC score of the attacker and the CINC score of the target, with less-
than-one values indicating cases in which the attacker is weaker than the target (Singer, 
Bremer and Stuckey 1972).  The reasoning behind including this variable is that the way 
in which a state fights an opponent that is much weaker than it will be different from the 
way in which it fights an opponent that is its equal, or even stronger than it. For example, 
a state that is fighting a much weaker opponent might choose more targeted attacks to 
avoid civilian casualties, while if it were fighting an opponent that was stronger than it 
then it might choose to actually choose to hit civilian targets in order to attempt to turn 
the population against its government (in place of actually having to defeat the military of 
its opponent). 
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 Another indicator of the type of target that the attacker may be facing is whether 
the opponent is also using air power.  The aerial strategy that states would use against an 
opponent that is also using air power should be expected to be different from that which 
they would use against an opponent that did not have aerial capabilities.  We would 
expect that the aerial strategy of a state that was facing an opponent that also had aerial 
capabilities would have to take into account the defense of its own aircraft (or other key 
targets) from aerial attacks from the enemy.  Thus, this should determine the aerial 
strategy that a state used against its opponent.  One possibility is that states will be more 
likely to use modern aerial strategies against opponents that are using air power, as part 
of the air defense plan may involve destroying the opponent’s aircraft through a targeted 
attack.   
 It also may be the case that states will fight differently against those that they 
have engaged before than they would against a new opponent.  If states have a history of 
being involved in conflict with a particular target, they may be more likely to attempt to 
cause absolute destruction in the target state, perhaps to prevent it from attempting to 
challenge the attacker again in the future.  I will thus include in the analysis a binary 
variable that states whether the attacker is involved in a rivalry with the target in that 
given year (Bennett 1998). 
 Though the modern system of air power is not exclusive to any particular 
technology, it is true that the development of precision-guided munitions (PGM’s) have 
made the use of more targeted aerial attacks easier.  Thus, I will include a control variable 
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that will tell us whether the observation took place before or after 1950
28
, to control for 
more common uses of the modern system as time progresses. 
 Given that the dependent variable has been transformed into a dichotomous one, I 
will use a probit analysis to test the effect of the target’s characteristics on the choice of 
aerial strategy.  The main operational hypothesis will thus be the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: A state’s likelihood of using the modern system of air power will be 
independent of the target’s characteristics 
 
Testing this particular hypothesis is difficult because I am essentially relying on a 
null finding to support my hypothesis.  It is also problematic that the sample size is small 
(since we are only considering conflicts in which air power was used).  I address the issue 
of the small sample size by using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 bootstrap estimates.  I 
also create two models, one that includes the characteristics of the target state as well as 
the attacker’s CINC score and the post-1950 variable as control variables, and a null 
model that simply contains the control variables.  After bootstrapping both models, I then 
run a likelihood ratio test to compare the fit of the two models.  I compute the p-values to 
decide whether we can reject the null model.   
I choose a standard significance level of 0.05 (which is marked as the vertical line 
in the graph) as a guideline that will determine whether the null model can be rejected.  In 
other words, to determine whether adding the variables for the characteristics of the 
                                                             
28 The year 1950 is a somewhat arbitrary marker.  PGM’s were beginning to be developed during World 
War II, such that they were not widely used until after that.  Using cut-off dates of plus or minus five years 
does not make a difference in the results of the analysis.   
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opponent adds much to a simple model that simply includes a post-1950 variable and a 
variable that represents the CINC score of the attacker.   
 
Figure 5.1: P-values Derived from Likelihood Ratio Test, Comparing Null Model and 
Model Including Opponent Characteristics (Power Ratio as Measure of Relative 
Capabilities) 
 
 As we can see from Figure 5.1, 85% of the p values from the likelihood ratio tests 
(on each of the bootstrap estimates) are values that are greater than 0.05
29
.  This means 
that in 85% of our simulations, we are unable to reject the null model (the model with 
only the control variables included).  Thus, it tells us that in 85% of our cases adding 
variables about the characteristics of the target does not add a significant predictive value 
to our model.   
                                                             
29 I use a p-value of 0.05 as the standard because in recent empirical IR literature it is common to use a 
standard of a .95 level of significance to determine statistical significance.   
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 We can also measure the capabilities of the attacker using GDP per capita.  
Because this is an absolute measure, it may be a better way to get at the concept of how 
capabilities make it possible for states to implement the modern system than the CINC 
score (which is a relative measure).  I thus substitute the CINC score with a measure of 
GDP per capita as a control variable by the model
30
.  Below I present a similar graph that 
presents the p-values of the likelihood ratio tests on each of the bootstrap estimates, using 
GDP per capita as a control variable. 
 
Figure 5.2: P-values Derived from Likelihood Ratio Test, Comparing Null Model and 
Model Including Opponent Characteristics (GDP as Measure of Capabilities) 
  
 As we can see from this graph, measuring capabilities of the attacker through 
GDP does not alter the results much.  86% of the p-values are still greater than 0.05, 
                                                             
30 I use Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade data to measure GDP.  Because the data only begin in 1950, I 
use 1950 values as an approximation of pre-1950 values in observations that occur before 1950.   
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showing that the addition of the target characteristic variables does not add much to the 
predictive power of the model.    
 We can also look at some simple two-way correlations between the dependent 
variable and the characteristics of the target and see that the correlations between the use 
of the modern system and the characteristics of the target are somewhat weak.  
 
Table 5.1: Correlation Between the Use of Modern Air Power and Target Characteristics 
 Power Ratio Rivalry 
Presence 
Target use of 
Air Power 
Use of the 
Modern 
System 
0.22 -0.02 -0.37 
  
The only independent variable that seems to be more strongly correlated to the 
use of the modern system is whether the target used air power.  The variable is also 
negatively correlated, meaning that we would expect states to be less likely to use the 
modern system in cases in which the opponent is also using air power.  This result may 
simply be a function of the small sample size, and be driven by the fact that out of the 
cases in which a non-modern system was used against an opponent that was utilizing air 
power, a large proportion of them are World War II cases.  Because these are all pre-1950 
cases, when carrying out targeted attacks was much more challenging and less of a choice 
for various states, this correlation may have more to do with the availability of the 
modern system than with the strategy being determined by the characteristics of the 
opponent.  World War II is also somewhat of an anomaly in that it was mostly being 
fought by major powers, all of which possessed air capabilities.  Thus, it seems that this 
relationship is mostly driven by the fact that major powers were fighting other major 
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powers in World War II, but the use of the modern system was not as prevalent then as it 
would be in the future.   
While trying to draw conclusions from a null finding can be problematic, this 
analysis certainly seems to imply that states are not always able to select the military 
strategy that is best suited for fighting a particular opponent.  To further support this 
argument, I will argue, in the section that follows, that this is the case because states are 
already constrained in their choice of strategy by their military doctrine and the 
institutional set-up of their military.  I will then look comparatively at the cases of the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the United States in Vietnam, to illustrate how states’ 
aerial strategy follows more closely from their doctrine than it does from the 
characteristics of their opponents.      
 
Military Doctrine 
 Earlier in this dissertation I discussed how one major drawback of the modern 
system is that it can be prohibitively difficult to implement for some states.  As Luttwak 
(2001) argues, effectively implementing the modern system places great demands on the 
military personnel tasked with doing so.  This means that only high-quality, extensively 
trained units can be used to effectively carry out a modern strategy.  This means that a 
state cannot simply make the decision to use the modern system at the beginning of the 
conflict.  It cannot do so because if its troops are not already trained to implement the 
modern system, they will not be able to execute it effectively.   
 Because military training, particularly training that enables troops to implement 
the modern system, takes time, states must train their troops to be able to implement the 
modern system before a conflict even begins.  Also, this training, because it is more 
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extensive and requires higher-quality personnel, is costly for the state that is carrying it 
out.  The costs of implementing the modern system also go beyond training the actual 
troops.  As Mandel (2004) argues, successfully implementing the modern system also 
requires extensive intelligence.  This means that a state that is planning to implement the 
modern system will also have to invest a considerable amount of its resources on 
developing a extensive intelligence structure that can provide it with the information on 
what the opponent’s key vulnerable points are, and how they can be located.   
Thus, we can argue that for some states it will be best to choose not to choose to 
implement the modern system.  This choice can be a rational one if they believe the 
potential gains from using the modern system in conflict will not outweigh the costs of 
changing their doctrine, training their troops to be able to implement the modern system, 
and setting up an intelligence-gathering structure to support the implementation of the 
modern system of air power.  This is particularly true once states take into account the 
potential risk involved in using the modern system.
31
 
When it comes to implementing the non-modern system, because it is true that it 
is less challenging to implement, it might seem to be the case that it would always be 
available to states that are able to implement the modern system (Luttwak 2001, Mandel 
2004).  While this might be true in theory, it may be the case that certain aspects of the 
non-modern system are not palatable to the population of the state which is considering 
it, thus making it unavailable to them.  For example, fire-bombing civilian centers would 
fall under the category of non-modern.  For some states, whose military doctrines 
emphasize minimizing civilian casualties, using this strategy would not be a realistic 
                                                             
31 As discussed earlier, modern uses of air power rely on coordination and causing temporary disruption in 
the opponent’s operations.  Minor mistakes can cause the entire operation to fail, leading to worse 
outcomes for the attacker than if they had used the non-modern system.   
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option under most circumstance.  Thus, even if it were the best strategy to use in a 
particular situation, political and military leaders would feel constrained against using it.   
I thus argue that states will fight according to their military doctrines.  A military 
doctrine can be very difficult to change both because it involves retraining troops and the 
restructuring of the military establishment.  It is almost never in the best interest of a state 
to deviate from its military doctrine right before beginning a conflict.  Troops go through 
extensive training so that they will be able to function effectively and implement that 
training once they find themselves in conflict. This means that we should expect that 
states will stick by their doctrine when fighting in a conflict. 
 Because a military doctrine is long-lasting, it will very rarely be chosen to fit a 
particular conflict that a state engages in.  Rather, states choose their military doctrine not 
knowing what their future conflicts will be, or what their future opponents will be.  
Military doctrine is in fact often determined by factors that go beyond the characterisitcs 
of even potential opponents.  While we may assume that military doctrines are formed 
with potential adversaries in mind, it may be the case that domestic factors have a 
stronger influence on them than we would imagine.  For example, Pilster and Bohmelt 
(2011) make the argument that military doctrine is often greatly determined by internal 
threats, with states often setting up their military doctrine to coup-proof the state, even at 
the expense of military effectiveness.   
This means that, at least in theory, the choice of military strategy will be 
exogenous to the conflict that the state is engaged in.  It will then be possible to derive 
conclusions about what the effect of military strategy (in particular, aerial strategy) will 
be on conflict outcomes. 
120 
 
 
The Case of the USSR in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam 
 Because it is difficult to test a model of strategy choice empirically (because of 
the difficulties involved in coding what the military doctrines of states are), I will instead 
choose to do a case analysis of two similar states, fighting similar opponents, that used 
different aerial strategies, in accordance with their military doctrines.  If states really did 
use the best strategies for every conflict, we should observe two different states with 
roughly similar capabilities, in similar situations, using the same strategy in the air.  In 
particular, I will look at the case of US vs. Vietnam 1972 (Linebacker I and II) and the 
Soviet Union vs. Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War.  In both of these cases we 
are observing a major power (the two largest major powers at the time of the Cold War) 
fighting a less powerful opponent (the North Vietnamese and Afghanistan, respectively) 
in the opponent’s homeland.  If strategy choice really were to be determined by the 
conflict, their strategies should be extremely similar.   
 In the Vietnam War, Operation Freedom Train (which was renamed Linebacker in 
April of 1972) began in February of 1972 and marked the renewal of major air strikes by 
the United States for the first time since 1968.  This operation was a response to the 
North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, the Easter Offensive.    Linebacker I 
involved bombing a very wide range of targets, including roads, warehouses, bridges, 
industrial facilities, vehicles, power plants and shipyards (and many of these targets were 
targets of opportunity).  Still, there did seem to be a focus on cutting the lines of 
communication of the North Vietnamese army and destroying their transportation 
resources.  Using both precision instruments and visual strikes, the American forces 
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aimed to destroy targets such as bridges and roads that would weaken the North 
Vietnamese by isolating them from their supply lines.  In particular, the Thanh Hoa 
Bridge (which the Americans had failed to destroy under Operation Rolling Thunder) 
was destroyed through the use of guided bombs.  These were all attacks on targets that 
were not intrinsically valuable, but that were significant because they were expected to 
have a disproportionately large effect on the effectiveness of the opponent.  In other 
words, the attacks of Linebacker I could be considered to fall under the category of 
modern uses of air power (GlobalSecurity.org).   
 During Linebacker II, the U.S. objective was to force the North Vietnamese 
government to enter into negotiations on a cease-fire agreement.   A wide range of targets 
was included in Linebacker II, which meant that it had elements of both the modern and 
the non-modern system of air power.  While Linebacker included attacks on targets such 
as army barracks, which would not be considered modern, there was also a continuation 
of attacks on railroads and highways (which were expected to cut off the North 
Vietnamese troops from their supply lines).  Linebacker II also included strategic attacks 
on targets such as petroleum storage areas.  Thus, while both Linebacker I and II included 
elements of both the modern and non-modern systems, in the aggregate there seems to be 
a modern tendency to the way the U.S. conducted its air campaign (GlobalSecurity.org). 
 From 1979 to 1988, the Soviet Union was involved in its Afghan War, which is 
often compared to the US involvement in Vietnam.  Despite the large number of aircraft 
commanded by the Soviets, the air arm remained subordinate to the ground forces 
throughout most of the conflict.  Most fixed-wing aircraft was used for strategic 
bombing.  The Soviet strategy for strategic bombing involved carpet-bombing the Afghan 
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targets.  The aim of the strategic bombing was the destruction of Afghan society, which 
meant that targets included actual villages or agricultural targets that were the Afghans’ 
sources of food production.  Civilian casualties were high, and expected to be so.  This 
type of attack, which focuses on destroying the enemy rather than impairing its ability to 
fight, would fall under the non-modern category of air power.    
 The Soviet attacks on military targets did have an element of the modern system 
to them, particularly the close-air support.  Jets would use deceptive techniques by 
working in pairs, one of them being used for distraction.  Helicopters would rely on 
surprise and reducing the reaction time allowed to the Afghan rebels.    A few of the jet 
pilots were given the opportunity to act more independently and attack targets of 
opportunity in the rear of enemy positions, but in general attacks tended to be coordinated 
from the top.  The bombing of SAM sites showed a lack of pilot initiative, as they were 
bound by the textbook approach to this sort of attack and rarely deviated from their flight 
plan.  This often resulted in them being unable to hit the key points that would have 
crippled the Afghan forces the most (McMichael 1991).  
 Soviet doctrine at the time emphasized the principle of annihilation of the enemy.  
It stressed the importance of destroying the opponent’s forces, not simply leading them to 
retreat.  Aviation was viewed as being unified with ground forces, and not expected to 
operate independently.  Beyond the air force being tied to the ground forces, the troops 
themselves were trained in a relatively inflexible manner, being expected to be able to 
executive specific and detailed orders.  The stressing of destruction of the opponent’s 
forces over disruption, along with the lack of independence between arms of the military 
and across levels of authority, would be more in line with the non-modern system of 
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strategy.  Much of the emphasis of the Soviet doctrine was on choosing the space and 
time of the battlefield.  In other words, on being able to decide when and where the 
battles would be fought, in order to choose the most advantageous position for the Soviet 
forces.  Because in Afghanistan this option was often not open to the Soviets, they were 
unable to adapt their strategy to the situation.  Of course, as demonstrated by the score of 
modern air power use by the Soviets in this situation, the Soviet doctrine did have some 
elements of the modern system included in it.  For example, the Soviet doctrine 
emphasized the inclusion of intelligence-gathering personnel as combatants.  As 
discussed before, the gathering of intelligence is key to being able to successfully 
implement the modern system.   
 US aerial doctrine at the time of the start of the Vietnam war was geared towards 
fighting a powerful, industrialized state.   It emphasized targeting vital production 
facilities through strategic bombing to impair the war-fighting capabilities of the 
opponent (Hamilton 1993).  This was of course a problem for the United States when 
they entered a conflict with the less industrialized Vietnam (and probably explains the 
lack of success the US experienced at the beginning of the conflict).  At the same time, 
though the United States did adjust to the situation, their actions weren’t necessarily 
contradictory to the doctrine.  If we look at the cases of Linebacker I and Linebacker II, 
we can see that the U.S. was attempting to bomb the targets that would halt the supply of 
goods to the North Vietnamese army.  Seeing as North Vietnam was not an industrialized 
state, the analogous action was to target the other sources of supplies for the North 
Vietnamese, which in this case meant targeting their lines of supply.  The bombing 
campaigns in North Vietnam tended to remain somewhat limited, in accordance with the 
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modern system, which stresses the attacking of key targets instead of the total 
annihilation of the opponent.   
 At the time, the CINC scores were .163286 for the US and .168808 for the Soviet 
Union (some of the closest ones in the sample).  Neither attacker was considered to be 
involved in a rivalry with its target.  They were both significantly stronger than their 
opponent, and the difference between the attacker’s and the target’s CINC score was .157 
for the US and .167 for the Soviet Union (again, these are extremely similar).  Their 
military expenditures to military personnel ratios were also not too different from each 
other (33,421 for the US and 46,153 for the USSR).   
 This means that under the assumption of endogenous strategy choice, we should 
expect the two states to use similar forms of air power.  Yet the value for the percentage 
of air power that is modern is .76 for the US and only .50 for the Soviet Union (the mean 
value for the modern air variable is .47, with a .20 standard deviation).   
 What is helpful about these results is that they also tell us that it does make sense 
to study the effects of military strategy on conflict outcomes.  The fact is that these two 
states (the US and USSR) looked very similar as far as their capabilities go, and also 
found themselves in very similar situations.  After all, they were both fighting an 
ideologically-motivated war (one fighting against Communists, the other supporting 
Communists) in a less-powerful country.  They were both fighting away from their 
homeland and facing an opponent that often fought in guerrilla style.  If there really were 
some sort of dominant aerial strategy (for each particular type of conflict) that states 
would default to if they were capable of it, then both the Soviet Union and the United 
States should have used the same military strategy in both conflicts.   
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 This case also addresses the concern that states will always choose the military 
strategy that is more likely to lead to a victorious outcome.  In this case, we have two 
very similar states (at least as far as military capabilities go) fighting similar opponents.  
Yet they used different aerial strategies.  Clearly one of them should have been more 
effective in that particular situation, yet the two countries chose very different strategies.  
This shows that states will not always choose “the most effective strategy” when fighting.  
They may choose the one that they believe to be most effective, but this will not also be 
perfectly correlated with outcomes.  Also, as looking at these cases in more detail shows, 
states are often constrained not only by their capabilities, but also by their military 
doctrine and the way their troops are trained to fight. 
 The Soviet case in particular is a good illustration of how states can be 
constrained in their strategy choices when initially entering a conflict.  In this case the 
aerial strategy of the Soviets shifted towards a more modern one (in particular in their use 
of close air support as the conflict progressed).  Because this conflict is one of the longest 
ones included in the data (almost 10 years), there is time for the state to change its 
strategy.  Most states, though, will be constrained by their military force structure and 
doctrine when they enter the conflict.  That means that the military strategy chosen will 
not always be the “optimal” one (for that type of conflict), but the one that is available to 
the attacker.  This will address the problem of whether states always simply choose the 
best strategy for that conflict.   
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CHAPTER 6: AIR CAMPAIGN DURATION AND THE 
INTERACTION OF AIR AND GROUND STRATEGIES 
 
 The previous chapter, Chapter 5 of this dissertation, dealt with how states choose 
an aerial strategy.  It made the point that states will not always choose a military strategy 
based only on the particular conflict that they are about to engage in.  Rather, states’ 
aerial strategy choices are likely constrained by their military doctrines, which have been 
selected earlier, and often driven by domestic concerns as well as foreign ones (Pilster 
and Bohmelt 2011, T. D. Biddle 2002).  This means that it will be possible to evaluate the 
effect of using different aerial strategies on a number of conflict outcomes. 
As mentioned before, much of the earlier work on aerial strategies has focused on 
air power somewhat independently of forces on the ground.  Though a few works, such 
as that of Horowitz and Reiter (2001), do include in their analysis a variable that 
measures whether there were ground troops present during the duration of an aerial 
bombing campaign, there is still much room to determine how the different types of 
strategies on the ground can influence the effect that bombing campaigns have on the 
outcome of a conflict.  Most aerial bombing campaigns will be accompanied by some 
form of ground attack (and the ones that aren’t can be thought of as cases in which the 
choice of ground strategy is simply having no ground troops), which means that 
considering how bombing campaigns affect outcomes without taking into account the 
nature of the ground invasion may be strongly biasing results. This chapter will study 
what forms of ground strategy will lead to a more effective use of the modern system in 
the air.   
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Modeling the Interaction of Air and Ground Power 
The model developed in the theory chapter begins by explaining the aerial 
strategy choices of different states.  The assumption it makes is that states’ strategy 
choices will be based on the expected effect of a strategy on conflict outcomes.  This 
means that the next question to explore is what the effect of aerial strategies will be on 
conflict outcomes.  In past work, the effect of ground strategies on conflict outcomes has 
been extensively studied, as has the effect of bombing either civilian or military targets.   
As was mentioned before, though, the success of an air campaign will depend strongly on 
what is happening on the ground.  This means that there is much room to explore what 
the effect of aerial strategies is on conflict outcomes, taking into account what is 
happening on the ground.   
 In determining how the effectiveness of the modern system will depend on the 
strategy on the ground, it is important to think about what makes the modern system more 
likely to be successful.   
In the theory chapter I derived the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis D: If the mean values of both strategy systems are the same, as the 
difference in variance of outcomes between the modern and the non-modern system 
increases, states will be less likely to use the modern system. 
 
This hypothesis assumes that states are not risk acceptant, implies that the modern 
system of air power will provide greater utility to states when the variance in outcomes 
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between the modern and non-modern systems is smaller.  We can imagine that the 
strategy that is being used on the ground may help to decrease this variance. 
When discussing variance in outcomes, we can think that there are different types 
of victories (and by extension different types of defeats).  When we say that a state’s 
campaign was victorious, we mean that the state was able to achieve its aims, but we 
could be referring to the case of a close victory (in which the state was at a high risk of 
being defeated) or an overwhelming victory in which it was very clear that one side was 
superior to the other and it was able to achieve its aims easily.  Another way to think 
about the variance in outcomes is to think about states that use a particular type of 
strategy (for example, modern air power) will have more variance in their propensity to 
be victorious in conflict.  The problem with trying to measure the variance in outcomes is 
that the data on campaign outcomes is measured dichotomously, which means that in 
order to differentiate between different types of victories we would have to devise a 
separate measure that indicates the degree of victory or defeat
32
.  This would of course 
entail a separate, and time consuming, data collection effort.     
An alternate way to think of the effect of ground troop presence on aerial power 
strategies will be to study the duration of aerial campaigns instead of their outcomes.  
While the ultimate aim of this project will be to understand how different air and ground 
strategies can affect the outcome of aerial campaigns, their duration provides an 
intermediate characteristic that allows us to understand how strategies will affect the 
characteristics of aerial strategies.  Duration can be understood to represent different 
                                                             
32
 One possibility would be to address this problem by using the heteroskedastic probit model, which can 
measure variance in cases in which outcomes are dichotomous.  One potential problem with this approach, 
though, is that the small size of the sample that will be used in this study will place to large of strain on the 
data. 
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types of outcomes.  In the case of success, it should be the case that those campaigns that 
are the shortest should be the most overwhelming victories (because it is quickly resolved 
that one side is stronger than the other and the conflict ends).  For example, when 
Germany carried out a bombing campaign against Poland in 1939 as part of its plan for a 
Polish invasion, the bombing campaign lasted for only one day.  As the German tanks, 
infantry and cavalry penetrated Poland through several fronts, the Luftwaffe bombarded 
Polish cities (including Warsaw) with incendiary bombs.  By starting hostilities without a 
declaration of war and emphasizing the rapid movement of troops, Germany was able to 
surprise Poland.  Despite efforts by the Polish military (including the Polish Air Force) to 
fight the Germans back, Poland was overwhelmingly defeated by Germany.  In other 
words, the duration of a campaign can be used as an indicator of the degree of victory or 
defeat.   
Of course, if one side achieves victory very quickly, it means that its opponent 
was defeated quickly.  Thus, short campaigns that ended in defeat should represent those 
cases in which one side was overwhelmingly defeated by the other, or in which it became 
obvious early on that it was not going to be able to achieve its goals through the aerial 
campaign.  For example, in the case of 1986’s Operation El Dorado Canyon, in which the 
United States retaliated against Libya for the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin 
that was frequented by American service members, the bombing campaign lasted only a 
few hours.  Despite the aircraft hitting most of its intended targets, the campaign is coded 
as a defeat for the United States (Allen 2007).This is because through the bombing raid 
the United States was unable to achieve its goals of either killing Gaddafi (Gaddafi was 
not in the expected location that U.S. intelligence had place him at) or reducing Libyan 
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terrorist activity.  Rather, there was a large international reaction against the U.S. 
bombing Libya in a situation in which there was no imminent threat against the U.S.  
Thus, the United States quickly realized that this bombing strategy was unlikely to help it 
achieve its aims and did not extend the duration of its bombing campaign over Libya.   
I will also make the argument that longer aerial campaigns will signal cases in 
which there was more uncertainty over which opponent would achieve victory, and thus 
had to be continued until supremacy could be established by one side or the other.  I am 
assuming that if a state had to continue an aerial campaign for a long period of time, it is 
because it was more difficult for it to achieve victory.  Thus, cases that are coded as 
successes and have a long duration will likely refer to those victories that were more 
difficult for the attacker, as both sides were more evenly matched in the conflict.  The 
same applies to defeats that came after a long aerial campaign.  These will be the cases in 
which it was not immediately obvious to one side that it would lose the campaign, and 
thus it continued to fight.  One example of such a campaign is that of the Iran-Iraq War, 
which is coded as having lasted for 93 months.  This is a case in which both sides were 
somewhat evenly matched, and both sides incurred enough casualties and costs to prevent 
us from saying that either one was able to achieve an overwhelming and clear victory 
over the other.     
Longer campaigns will thus represent the cases that are neither overwhelming 
victories nor overwhelming defeats (and we think of victory or defeat as being defined by 
whether the state we are considering was able to achieve its aims through the campaign), 
or even cases or draws.  Thus, longer campaigns will represent a smaller variance in 
potential outcomes.  Shorter campaigns will represent a greater variance, covering cases 
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in which victory was achieved quickly by one side, which means also that the opponent 
chose to stop fighting (by being incapacitated or realizing it was not going to achieve its 
aims) quickly.   
 
Table 6.1: Duration of Victories and Defeats 
Outcome Duration Description Example(s) 
Victory Short Overwhelming victory Germany vs. Poland 
(1939) 
 Long Close victory or draw United States vs. 
North Korea (Korean 
War) 
Defeat Short Overwhelming defeat, 
quick evidence of 
erroneous strategy 
Operation El Dorado 
Canyon (American 
aims not achieved) 
 Long Close defeat or draw Iran-Iraq War (draw) 
 
Given this set-up, I will further argue that ground troops will contribute to shorter 
durations of aerial campaigns.  I will argue this to be the case because ground troops are 
able to correct for mistakes and aid the air campaign in being able to locate key targets.  
Without ground troops, and the intelligence they provide, present, it will take a longer 
time (more trial and error) to achieve a victory.  This should be particularly true in the 
case of the use of the modern system of air power, which relies strongly on the correct 
intelligence on the ground to identify key targets, and for which the presence of ground 
troops will be particularly useful to correct for mistakes.   
Further, one of the main arguments for the use of combined arms (in this case, air 
and ground troops) is that it leads to an increased effectiveness when fighting the 
opponent (which for this situation would mean that victory could be achieved quickly).  
When an opponent faces a combination of ground and air forces, that opponent must 
simultaneously react to both.  That means that while a certain strategy (dispersing tanks 
so that they cannot easily be bombed from the air, for example) may be the most effective 
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one for fighting an opponent that is attacking from the air, that same strategy will not be 
the most effective one against an opponent from the ground (in this case, the dispersed 
tanks would be more vulnerable to ground forces than if they were clustered together 
defensively).  While this argument refers specifically to swift victories, it fits in with the 
general framework of this paper.   
 
The Presence of Ground Troops 
Before considering the effect of different strategies on the ground on the duration 
of air power, the first question to consider is simply whether ground troops are present at 
all.  Previous work has found that aerial bombing in general is more effective in cases in 
which there are troops on the ground (Horowitz and Reiter 2001).  The question to 
develop in the chapter will then be to see how the presence of ground troops will affect 
the duration of aerial campaigns, depending on the different types of aerial strategies that 
are being used.   
Cases in which aerial bombing is conducted without any ground forces are rare, 
but when they are conducted effectively they can provide states with a “clean” and 
politically low-cost victory.  One example of such a case is NATO’s bombing campaign 
in Kosovo.   In 1999 NATO intervened to stop the killing of ethnic Albanians by Serbian 
leader Slobodan Milosevic.   Possibly concerned about negative domestic responses to 
the commitment of ground troops (and the possibility of casualties), NATO intervened 
solely through an air campaign that targeted government buildings, factories, and 
infrastructure, focusing on hitting those targets that were most important to Milosevic 
himself (Simos and Smale 2006).  The air campaign was successful, resulting in the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, without a need for a ground campaign and 
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the commitment of NATO ground troops.  This means that the NATO states were able to 
achieve their aim while minimizing their own costs
33
.   
Another example of an air-only campaign would be the most recent use of air 
power by NATO in Libya in 2011.  The revolution that began in Libya in August of 2011 
was carried out by local militias that were opposed to Muammar el-Qaddafi.  While many 
governments favored the toppling of the Qaddafi regime, there was reluctance in the 
international community (particularly in the case of the United States, which was already 
involved in two wars abroad) to involve foreign troops in the Libya conflict.  As the 
Qaddafi’s repression of the opposition grew, the U.N. approved the creation of a no-fly 
zone in Libya.  This no-fly zone was to be a way to prevent aerial attacks by Qaddafi’s 
forces on the opposition.  NATO took responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone, and 
also provided air support for the rebel forces.  By October of 2011, only months after the 
beginning of the air campaign, Qaddafi was dead and his regime toppled, all without the 
commitment of any NATO ground units.  
From observing these two cases it would seem to be the case that it should be in 
states’ best interests to always use aerial campaigns without committing ground forces.  
After all, the air campaigns allow states to achieve their desired outcomes without having 
to place their troops at risk and incurring both the financial and political costs of a 
deployment of ground troops.  In this chapter I argue that the reason that states do not do 
this more often is that by giving up the option of using ground troops, they are losing a 
lot of control over the outcome of the campaign.  For example, in the case of the NATO 
                                                             
33
 Of course, it can be argued that beyond the air campaign, the Serbs were convinced to capitulate by the 
possibility of a NATO ground campaign (which NATO did appear to be preparing for) and warnings from 
Russia that they would not protect Serbia from an attack.  Still, this does not take away from the dominance 
of air power in the Kosovo campaign.   
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bombing of Libya in 2011, NATO had to rely on rebel Libyan forces to be the ones to 
actually bring down Qaddafi’s regime, regardless of the strategy they were using on the 
air. Thus, the ultimate outcome of the campaign came to depend not on the efforts of 
NATO itself, but on local rebel forces, many of them poorly trained and disorganized.  
Also, we should keep in mind that although the NATO campaign in Serbia was 
successful in destabilizing the Milosevic government, the human costs of the war was 
extremely high.  It might be the case that a substantial NATO ground presence would 
have been able to prevent the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing campaigns that UN peacekeeping 
troops were unable to stop
34
.   
When combined with air power, ground troops will play three very important 
roles in support of the air power.  First, ground forces can help to identify targets on the 
ground.  Whether an attacker is using a modern or a non-modern aerial strategy, the 
success (and also the duration) of the aerial campaign will depend in large part on having 
enough intelligence to correctly identify where its intended target is located.  Gathering 
this intelligence from the air can be difficult, as targets can be camouflaged (for example, 
tanks in the desert are often covered with netting that allows them to blend in with the 
sand) or hidden (for example, a factory may be operating in what from the air appears to 
                                                             
34
 As the former Yugoslavia began to dissolve in the 1990’s, Bosnia became a particularly difficult area to 
manage because of the large populations of Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims.  With the declaration of 
Bosnian independence in 1992, the conflict turned into an international one (with Serbia and Croatia 
supporting Serbs and Croats against Muslim Bosnians.  The conflict was extremely violent, with violence 
from all sides, but particularly from the Serbs, who engage in ethnic cleansing campaigns against Bosnian 
Muslims.  The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was sent into Bosnia, with the aim of 
preventing this violence.  The peacekeeping force, composed mostly of European troops was a traditional 
peacekeeping force, lightly armed, with orders to fire only in self-defense and to stay neutral.  One of the 
ways the peacekeepers attempted to protect the Bosnian Muslim population was through the designation of 
certain Bosnian cities as “safe havens,” where civilians could find safety from the war under the protection 
of the peacekeepers.  The UN peacekeepers, though, were ill-equipped for carrying out their mission of 
protecting Bosnians civilians.  This is perhaps most obviously illustrated by the massacre of 7,000 Muslim 
men and boys that occurred when Serb forces overran the safe haven of Srebrenica, with the 600 Dutch 
peacekeepers in charge of it being able to offer little resistance (Simons 2007).   
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be an abandoned building).  Forces on the ground are better able to identify these targets, 
by getting close to them and observing past the camouflage.  In fact, ground troops can 
even mark the target for the air power, reducing room for error.    
With good intelligence on the location of a target, an aerial campaign will be 
expected to be shorter.  Air power will waste less time trying to guess where the enemy 
targets are located and will be able to hit them more quickly, which, all else being equal, 
should end the conflict sooner than it would without this intelligence.  In cases in which 
there are no ground troops present, or if the ground troops are independent from the state 
conducting the aerial attack (such as the rebel Libyan troops were from NATO in 2011), 
then the attacker has less reliable intelligence and has to rely on more trial-and-error 
attacks in order to achieve its aims.  For example, when the United States began its 
bombing campaign in Iraq in 2003, it initially attempted to destabilize the regime by 
killing Saddam Hussein.  This aim was not achieved, as Saddam turned out to not have 
been in the location where the Americans expected him to be at.  We can imagine that if 
the Americans had had better intelligence on his location they might have been able to 
assassinate him and this could have significantly shortened the length of the bombing 
campaign in Iraq.  Though it is the modern system that relies on the identification and 
destruction of key targets, intelligence is also important under the non-modern system.  
For example, even if the aim of an aerial bombardment is to bomb the opponent’s fielded 
tanks, it is still important to know where the tanks are located.  Otherwise, valuable air 
power time and resources will be spent on reconnaissance missions trying to locate the 
tanks before the bombardment begins.   
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The second role that ground forces will play in support of air power will be to 
provide post-bombing assessment.  Whenever any sort of aerial bombing is carried out, it 
is important to know whether the intended target was actually destroyed by the attack.  If 
it was not, the attacker will likely have to go through and bomb the target again 
(sometimes several times) in order to achieve its aims.  If there is some uncertainty as to 
whether a target was destroyed, it may be in the interest of the attacking state to go 
through and bomb it again, to be sure that the target was destroyed.  This bombing 
(potentially redundant) of the same target can increase the duration of the aerial 
campaigns.  Also, if the attacking state believes that it destroyed a target but didn’t 
actually do so, it may discover its error in the future (for example, it may discover that a 
factory it had bombed remains operational) and have to go back and bomb the same 
target.   
Ground troops can serve the role of providing this post-bombing assessment for 
air power.  As with the case of intelligence, post-bombing assessment is easier to do from 
the ground than it is from the air.  Ground troops can provide more accurate information 
about whether a target was destroyed or needs to be hit again.  As mentioned earlier, the 
use of combined arms can lead to swifter victories.  This should, all else being equal, lead 
to shorter aerial campaigns.   
Finally, ground forces should be able to combine with air power to increase the 
overall effectiveness of the aerial campaign.  A combined arms approach seeks to 
conduct a military campaign using different forces that are able to complement each 
other.  In this case, ground power may be a complement to air power, making up for its 
shortcomings and providing it with new advantages that will lead to increased 
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effectiveness.  Combined arms attacks are expected to be more effective because they 
present more complicated threats to enemy units.  In the case of an aerial campaign that is 
integrated with ground forces, opponents will have a more difficult time defending 
against the attack.  For example, to defend against an aerial attack, it might make more 
sense to spread out the artillery units, so that they will not make an easy target to bomb.  
In contrast, if the attack is coming from the ground, forces should be kept together so that 
no one unit can be surprised and overwhelmed by the opponent.  If a state is 
simultaneously facing attacks from both the ground and air, it will have to trade off 
between defending against one or the other (House 1984).   
If a combined arms attack is more difficult to defend against, it should also 
contribute to the effectiveness of air power.  Thus, we should also expect the use of 
combined arms (which implies the presence of ground troops in these cases) to lead to 
swifter victories.  Again, all else being equal, this will lead to shorter aerial campaigns.   
 
Hypotheses 
 Having explored the role that ground troops can play in affecting the outcome of 
aerial campaigns, I will now focus on deriving specific hypotheses that will allow us to 
evaluate some of these ideas.   
 Before taking ground power into account, I will begin by drawing up a general 
hypothesis on the effect that I expect modern aerial strategies to have on the duration of 
an aerial campaign.  Modern aerial strategies rely on destroying key targets and expecting 
them to have a multiplicative effect on the rest of the system, such that the opponent can 
be defeated without necessarily destroying its capability to keep fighting.   This means 
that we should expect these campaigns to conclude faster, because they rely on simply 
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destroying key points to destabilize the opponent and get them to capitulate, as opposed 
to destroying enough of the opponent’s forces to prevent them from continuing to fight, 
which should take longer.  Thus, the first hypothesis to be tested in this chapter will be 
the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1:   Aerial campaigns that use the modern system should have a shorter 
duration that those that use the non-modern system. 
 
 Of course, the aim of this chapter is not only to think about how aerial strategies 
affect campaign durations, but also about how they can interact with ground strategies to 
affect the characteristics of bombing campaigns.  Thus, it is important to think of what 
role ground troops will play in determining the outcomes of bombing campaigns.  As 
stated before, I will make the point that ground troops can also serve to shorten the length 
of bombing campaigns.  Ground troops can serve three purposes, that of providing 
intelligence that helps to identify where targets are (which should reduce the number of 
tries it takes to destroy a desired target), that of providing post-bombing assessment 
(which means that states will know whether they have hit the targets they want and will 
not have to fly extra sorties to make sure that the targets are hit), and that of increasing 
the effectiveness of an aerial campaign through the principles of combined arms.  All 
three of these mechanisms should lead to shorter air campaigns, even independently of 
the aerial strategy being used.  Thus, we can derive the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Air campaigns involving the presence of ground troops should be 
shorter than those without ground troops.  
 
139 
 
These are the independent effects that we can expect aerial strategies and the 
presence of ground troops to have on the duration of bombing campaigns.  It is also 
important to think about how ground troops can affect the outcome of bombing 
campaigns when particular aerial strategies are being used.  
As stated previously in this dissertation, campaigns that use the modern system of 
air power rely strongly on good intelligence on the ground to mark what the key, decisive 
targets are.  Thus, even though the presence of ground troops should decrease the 
duration of aerial campaign, it should make an even larger difference in the case of 
modern aerial campaigns.  To consider this possibility, I will derive the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: The interaction of modern air power and the presence of ground 
troops will lead to a shorter duration of aerial campaigns. 
 
While air-only campaigns such as the ones in Kosovo and Libya can get a lot of 
press attention, most cases of uses of air power will involve some sort of a ground 
component.  In other words, air-only wars are a rarity.  While air power has gained 
importance in recent years, it still remains true that it is often used in support of ground 
troops.  This means that when we evaluate the effectiveness of an air campaign, we have 
to consider the fact that the outcome of the conflict is also going to depend very heavily 
on what the ground troops are doing.  In a joint campaign that involves ground and air 
elements, the different military forces will have to coordinate in order to achieve the best 
outcome.  In fact one of the principles behind an effective combined arms approach is 
that forces should be operating under the same doctrine, and should ideally even have 
trained together (House 1984). This means that certain combinations of air and ground 
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strategies should be more effective than others at achieving the desired outcomes of the 
state at a lower cost.   
.  In the analysis to follow I will consider two possibilities.   The first will be that 
the strategy of the ground troops does not really affect the characteristics of the aerial 
campaign (such as outcome or duration).  Rather, it is simply the presence of the ground 
troops, and the informational role that they serve, that can affect how an aerial campaign 
plays out. 
The other possibility is that the strategy of the ground troops will interact with the 
aerial strategy and affect the characteristics of the aerial campaign.  Using the modern 
system in the air relies on hitting key targets that will have a disproportionate effect on 
the opponent’s ability to function.  This means that these sorts of attacks will often create 
a temporary window of opportunity that has to be exploited.  In other words, the modern 
aerial attacks will not necessarily create an absolute victory for the state that is using 
them, but rather they will interrupt the functioning of the opponent enough to allow for 
more costs to be imposed on them.  If this window of opportunity is not well taken 
advantage of, the opponent may recover from the aerial attack and continue to fight. This 
means that modern aerial attacks will likely not create military success on their own, but 
rather provide an opportunity for ground troops to more easily achieve this success.  
Because these windows of opportunity are often temporary, the ground troops must also 
be operating under the same mentality as the air power, focusing on momentum and 
amplifying the effect of attacks.  This focus on momentum and attacking the opponent’s 
weak points is what the modern system refers to on the ground.  This means that we can 
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expect coordination between modern air and ground strategies to make campaigns go by 
faster.  Thus, we can also derive the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.4: Modern aerial attacks are more likely to lead to shorter campaigns in 
cases in which the modern system is also being employed on the ground.    
  
 To test these hypotheses I will be using the coding for aerial strategies and 
conflict outcomes that were previously mentioned, as well as a variety of control 
variables.  When it comes to the strategy on the ground, I will use the new coding of 
ground strategy that I have collected for this dissertation.  As stated before, it would be 
ideal to be able to use a previous dataset on ground strategy.  The problem with doing this 
is that none of these datasets contain strategy variables that refer specifically to military 
strategy on the ground.  Rather, they take into account both military strategy on the air 
and on the ground.  Seeing as my aim in this chapter will be to understand the effect of 
ground strategies on the effectiveness of aerial strategies, I could not use these datasets in 
my analysis.    
 
Testing the Theory 
 I will begin by testing the first three hypotheses of this chapter, hypotheses 2.1-
2.3, which state that bombing campaigns should be shorter when the modern system is 
being used in the air, when there are ground troops present, and in particular when 
ground troops are being used along with modern aerial campaigns.  One way to think 
about this will be to think of there being four potential types of campaigns, based on 
whether there are ground troops present or not and the sort of aerial strategy that is being 
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used by the attacker.  As we can see from the table below, though there are significantly 
more cases in the category of ground troops coupled with non-modern air power, there 
are observed cases in each category, which should facilitate the evaluation of these 
hypotheses.   
 
Table 6.2: Distribution of Cases 
Ground Troops, Modern Air 
Power (GM) 
(20% of cases, n=8) 
Ground Troops, Non-Modern Air 
Power (GN) 
(50% of cases, n=20) 
No Ground Troops, Modern Air 
Power (NM) 
(12.5% of cases, n=5 ) 
No Ground Troops, Non-Modern 
Air Power (NN) 
(17.5% of cases, n=7) 
 
  The dependent variable is drawn from Allen’s (2007) piece on the duration of 
bombing campaigns.  It is a continuous variable that measures the duration of a bombing 
campaign in months.  The following graph shows the duration of the bombing 
campaigns.  As we can see from the graph below, most campaigns will tend to be shorter, 
lasting less than 2 years.  The longest observations refer to cases that can be considered 
outliers, such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war.  The mean 
duration of a campaign is only around 15 months (including the outlier cases).   
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  Figure 6.1: Distribution of Campaign Durations
 
 The independent variables will include a measure of how modern the use of air 
power was in that conflict (measured as a percentage, with higher values indicating more 
modern uses of air power)
35
.  This is the same measure of aerial strategy that was used in 
                                                             
35  As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, I have identified the characteristics of modern and 
non-modern air power under each one of the three forms of air power (CAS, interdiction, strategic attack).  
I then design questions that identify the key characteristics of modern and non-modern air power, with each 
one being answered in the affirmative or negative.  To provide an example, one of the questions under the 
modern interdiction section asks, “Are lines of communication and transportation (bridges, highways) 
being targeted?” (as I discussed before, targeting the lines of communication and cutting off the enemy’s 
troops from their command and control is one of the key elements of the modern system).  Under the non-
modern interdiction section, a sample question reads, “Are combat forces (ie the actual troops, tanks, etc) 
being targeted?” (under the traditional, non-modern form of fighting the aim of attack is to destroy the 
actual troops so that they will no longer be able to resist).     
The answers to these individual questions are then aggregated to form an overall index of how 
“modern” a particular use of air power is.  In each case, only the answers from the dominant use(s) of air 
power are considered for that case’s classification.  Affirmative answers to questions related to the use of 
modern air power are added to the score, as are negative answers to the questions referring to the use non-
modern air power.  As the number of questions varies between categories, the “modern score” is 
normalized to a score between 0  and 1, which essentially represents the percentage of questions that 
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the previous chapter, and that was derived using the data coded for this project.  The 
histogram below shows the distribution of values for the uses of air power, showing how 
modern a state’s strategy was. 
 
Figure 6.2: Distribution of Aerial Strategies 
 
As we can see from the figure above, there are relatively few cases at the higher 
end of the modern spectrum.  The mean value for modern air power level is .47 and the 
modal category is .3.  Cases on the higher end of the spectrum include campaigns such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
indicate the use of the modern system.  The higher that number is, the more modern that one particular 
case can be considered to be.   
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NATO’s Deliberate Force Operation against the Serbs and the United States’ attacks 
during Desert Storm.   
I will also include a dichotomous variable that measures whether there were 
ground units present.  Note that this variable measures whether the attacker had ground 
units present.  In other words, if the bombing is in support of local forces (we can think of 
the NATO campaign in Libya in 2011 as an example), this would not count as a case in 
which ground units were used.  This is because I am assuming that ground units that are 
not part of the attacker’s forces cannot be relied upon to execute strategy and coordinate 
like the ground units of the attacker could. 
To understand the effect that ground troops have on the effectiveness of the aerial 
strategies I will also include an interaction between the use of ground power and the use 
of the modern system.   
As a control variable, to represent the advantage that stronger attackers have in conflict, I 
will include a variable for the military power ratio between the attacker and the target.  It 
may be the case that campaigns being fought by more powerful attackers will end sooner 
as the attacker is able to more easily overwhelm its opponent.  Conversely, it may also be 
the case that stronger attackers are able to keep a bombing campaign going for a longer 
period of time because of their greater resources.  To measure the power ratio between 
the two states I will use the ratio of their CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) 
score (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987).  This of course is a surrogate 
measure, which measures the industrial capabilities, population and military 
personnel/expenditures of states.  Still, the CINC score is a widely used measure that is 
generally accepted as a measure of military power.   
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 I will also include a post-1950 control variable, to represent the possibility that as 
weapons systems became more sophisticated they allowed for shorter campaigns.  I will 
also include a post-1970 control variable to represent the first uses of smart bombs, 
allowing for the possibility that this new technology may have affected the duration of 
aerial campaigns
36
.  Finally, I will include (from Allen (2007)) a variable that controls for 
whether the attacker was making a demand of the target that was large and salient (such 
as regime change (Allen 2007, Horowitz and Reiter 2001)).  The idea behind this control 
variable is that we should expect targets to be less likely to capitulate in cases in which 
there is a large demand being made of them.  This variable is coded dichotomously, with 
a one representing a large demand.   
 Because I am working with duration data, in my analysis I will use a Weibull 
duration analysis.  The Weibull duration model is restricted by the fact that it has a 
monotonic baseline hazard.  In this case I find it appropriate for this set of data because I 
can make the assumption that the baseline hazard will be increasing.  In other words, the 
probability of a campaign ending in a given period will increase as time goes by (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  As we can see in Table 2.1 below, the shape parameter 
in this regression is greater than one, showing a hazard rate that is monotonically 
increasing with time.  In this case I will use the accelerated failure-time form of the 
Weibull model, which means that positive coefficients will indicate a longer duration and 
negative coefficients will indicate a shorter duration(because in the AFT form the effect 
of a covariate is to multiply the predicted event time by a constant)
37
. 
                                                             
36
 As mentioned in the research design chapter, I tried using a few different dates (such as 1945 or 1973) to 
define this variable and obtained similar results.   
37 The accelerated failure-time form of the model will also be robust to the possibility of omitted variables 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004) 
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 Below, in table 6.3, I present the results of the Weibull regression analysis, in 
which the coefficients (as well as the standard errors) are presented: 
 
Table 6.3: Weibull Duration Analysis: Duration of Aerial Campaigns 
(Accelerated failure-time form)  
 
 Coefficient 
(standard errors)  
Modern Air Power  -8.38***  
(2.60)  
Ground Forces Present  -2.42*  
(1.40)  
Interaction of Modern Air 
Power and Ground Forces 
Present  
7.65***  
(2.71)  
Post-1950  1.32 
(1.14)  
Post-1970  0.16 
(0.93)  
Demand  1.02 
(0.67)  
Power ratio  -0.003 
(0.009)  
n  40 
Log likelihood  -77.71 
Shape parameter  1.48 
(0.19) 
(Wald) Chi2 
(p-value)  
22.05 
(0.003) 
***significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level, *significant at .10 level  
  
 
 To assess the fit of the model we can run a likelihood ratio test, comparing a null 
model that includes only the control variables to one in which we add the variables for 
the aerial strategy, the presence of ground troops, and the interaction between the two.  In 
this case the LR chi-squared is equal to 9.82 and the probability of obtaining the chi-
squared statistic if there were no effect of the variables is equal to 0.0201.  We can also 
perform a Wald test of the whole model.  In this case the chi-square is equal to 22.05 and 
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the probability of obtaining the chi-squared statistic if there were no effect of the 
variables is equal to 0.0025. 
As we can see from Table 2.1, both the presence of ground troops and the use of the 
modern system contribute to campaigns ending more quickly.  This finding supports 
hypothesis 2.1, which argues  that modern campaigns do not rely on completely 
destroying the enemy (which we can consider to be a more time-consuming endeavor), 
but rather on maintaining momentum and creating windows of opportunity that can be 
exploited by the attacker. Thus, modern aerial campaigns can be expected to have a 
shorter duration than non-modern ones.  This also supports hypothesis 2.2, which argues 
that the presence of ground troops will allow for the identification of key targets and the 
faster assessment of attacks on the ground, which should lead to a faster conclusion of the 
bombing campaign.  
As can be expected, bombing campaigns by stronger attackers are more likely to end 
sooner (though the coefficient on the power ratio is not actually significant), and 
campaigns that involved large demands will drag on for longer.  We should also note that 
while the coefficients for the power ratio and the post-1950 variable are both positive, 
they are not significant.   
 A somewhat odd finding is that the interaction term between the presence of 
ground troops and the modern system has a significant coefficient, but it is in the opposite 
direction than would be predicted by the theory (and by hypothesis 2.3).  The theory 
would predict that the presence of ground troops should decrease the duration of the 
bombing campaign, particularly when the modern system is being used.  Instead, the 
results show campaigns lasting longer in cases in which the modern system is being used 
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along with the ground troops.  Thus, it is important to further analyze the interaction 
between modern air power and the presence of ground forces. 
 Using Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000), I conduct Monte Carlo 
simulations to illustrate how both aerial strategies and the presence of ground troops will 
affect the duration of bombing campaigns.  In these simulations the values of all control 
variables were set at either the mean (for continuous variables) or median (for 
dichotomous variables).   
 In the graph below I present the expected duration of aerial campaigns as the level 
of the use of modern air power increases, for cases in which ground troops are used as 
well as for cases in which there are no ground troops.  In the graph the dots represent 
mean expected durations, with the lines representing the 90% confidence interval around 
that mean value.  The light grey lines represent the cases in which there are no ground 
troops and the dark grey lines represent the cases in which there are ground troops 
present.  The aerial strategy of the state is represented on the x axis, going from the least 
to the most modern strategy.  Campaign duration is on the y-axis.   
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Figure 6.3: Campaign Duration and Modern Air Power 
 
  
 The graph above is particularly interesting in that in the case in which there are no 
ground troops present, we see expected duration behaving as we would have expected it 
to under our hypotheses.  As the proportion of modern air power being used increases, 
the expected duration of the bombing campaign decreases.  Also, as the proportion of 
modern air power being used increases, the variance around expected duration also 
decreases.  What is interesting to note is what happens in the cases in which we introduce 
the presence of ground troops.   
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 When the level of modern air power being used is low, we can see that adding 
ground troops decreases the duration of aerial campaigns, as is predicted by hypothesis 
2.2.  This is in accordance with the explanation that suggests that ground troops are able 
to serve an informational role that allow air power to identify its targets more easily and 
effectively and conclude the bombing campaign in a shorter period of time.   
 What is interesting is that when more modern air power is being used, the 
addition of ground troops leads to longer expected duration of conflicts, as well as greater 
variances around this estimate.  This appears to explain the unexpected negative 
coefficient on the interaction term in the analysis.  It seems to be the case that what 
ground troops are really doing is moderating the duration of the aerial campaigns.  As we 
can see from the graph, the mean duration of conflict tends to remain somewhat stable 
when ground troops are used in conjunction with the air power.  Thus, in cases in which 
the less modern air power is being used, the addition of ground forces allows for shorter 
campaigns.  This may be because the ground troops are serving the role of providing 
information that can be utilized by air power, and allow it to overcome some of its 
shortcomings.  In the case of the most modern cases of air power, though, it seems that 
the presence of ground troops removes the option of the quickest sorts of campaigns, in 
which the air power can just come in, bomb, and leave.  Once ground troops are involved, 
ending the campaign becomes a more complicated and time-consuming process. 
 While in order to truly assess whether this was the effect of adding ground troops 
under different circumstances we would have to replicate the different campaigns while 
modifying only the presence of ground troops, we can still look to the data and see if it 
seems to support these conclusions.  Out of the cases in which there were no ground 
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troops present, the case with the highest score for modern uses of air power is that of 
Operation Deliberate Force, conducted by NATO against Serbia in 1995.  This was a case 
in which targeted attacks were carried out in order to reduce the Serbs’ military capability 
to attack “safe areas” in Bosnia.  The attacks were meant to isolate both the leadership as 
well as Serbian fielded forces, as well as to destroy selected infrastructure.  Though there 
were UN Rapid Reaction Forces present in Bosnia, NATO itself never committed any 
ground troops.  The duration of this aerial campaign was only two weeks, which is 
significantly shorter than the mean duration of 15 months. 
 In contrast, the least modern (as far as air power goes) of the air-only campaigns 
is that of the 1940-1942 British bombing campaign against Germany.  This campaign was 
happening at a time in the war when Britain had adopted a policy of attacking large towns 
through area bombing (much of this following the ideas of Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris of 
the Royal Air Force).  The aim of these attacks was not only destruction but the 
shattering of civilian morale through the use of incendiary and high-explosive bombs.  
This campaign lasted for 14.5 months, less than the mean (which is of course driven up 
by a few outlier cases), but much longer than the two-week duration of Operation 
Deliberate Force.  Our first reaction might be to attribute this to the time period in which 
these campaigns were being carried out, and to argue that the British bombing of 
Germany had a larger duration because it happened over fifty years before Operation 
Deliberate Force.  This may be a possibility, but we can also point to the case of the least-
modern air campaign that did include ground troops.  This is the case of the Italian 
bombing of Ethiopia during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1936.  This was obviously 
a case closer in time period to the British bombing of Germany, and was also very non-
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modern (for example, many of the bombing sorties focused on the actual masses of 
Ethiopian soldiers).  This case, though, which included a large presence of Italian 
soldiers, lasted for only 7 months. 
Of course, this analysis only speaks to the duration of bombing campaigns, while 
what we really are interested in is whether campaigns are short and successful.  In order 
to understand the effect of the aerial strategies on the duration as well as outcomes of 
campaigns, I will use a competing risks model.   The competing risks model takes into 
account the difference between cases in which the campaign ended because the outcome 
of it was successful and cases in which the campaign ended because the outcome was 
unsuccessful.  In the first model, the success model, cases that don’t end in a success will 
be treated as right-censored (as explained by Allen (2007), this is because these cases 
never end in a successful outcome).  In the second model, the failure model, cases that 
don’t end in a failure are treated as right-censored (because these cases, the successes, 
will never end in a failed outcome). 
 
Below are the results for both the success and failure models: 
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Table 6.4: Competing Risks Model 
 
Competing Risks Model 
 Success Model 
Coefficient, (Standard Errors)  
Failure Model 
Coefficient, (Standard Errors)  
Modern Air Power  -14.44***  
(5.10)  
-5.41*  
(3.25)  
Ground Forces Present  -3.57  
(2.87)  
-1.67  
(1.60)  
Interaction of Modern Air Power and 
Ground Forces Present  
10.58**  
(5.13)  
5.82*  
(3.39)  
Post 1950  3.49 
(2.45)  
0.47 
(1.28)  
Post 1970  0.20 
(2.21)  
0.26 
(0.97)  
Demand  1.12 
(1.32)  
0.88 
(0.77)  
Power Ratio  -0.02 
(0.02)  
0.003 
(0.010)  
n  40  40  
Log likelihood  -45.44  -54.66  
Shape parameter  1.80 
(.41)  
1.32 
(0.21)  
(Wald) chi2 
(p-value)  
15.96 
(0.03)  
7.21 
(0.40)  
 
  
In the success model, the variable that measures the use of the modern system 
remains significant and has a negative coefficient, which means that it contributes to 
campaigns ending in success sooner.  What is interesting is that the ground variable loses 
it significance in this model.  The interaction between ground troops and the use of the 
modern system remains significant but (again) in the opposite direction that the theory 
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would predict.  In the case of the failure model the modern ground power variable again 
remains significant (and in the expected direction).  The interaction term between modern 
air power and the presence of ground troops also remains significant but positive, as it did 
in the success model.     
A somewhat odd finding from this analysis is that once we take the outcome of 
the campaign into account, the coefficient on the “presence of ground troops” variable 
becomes insignificant.  This may be because ground troops themselves may not actually 
have that strong of an effect on the outcome of a bombing campaign.  What they might 
do is identify targets and help the campaign reach success sooner, or do bombing 
assessment that tells a state when to give up on the campaign (and cut its losses), but not 
actually affect the outcome of the campaign.   
One example of this form of interaction between air and ground forces is that of 
the Algerian War.  During the French air campaign against Algeria in 1962 (which is 
coded as a non-modern use of air power) the French adopted a policy of collective 
punishment in which villages that harbored rebel forces would be destroyed.  This was 
generally done by ground forces, but villages that could not be reached by ground forces 
were bombarded by the French Air Force.  This was a case in which the interaction of the 
air and ground forces was limited to the ground forces identifying the villages that 
harbored rebels and the air forces would then destroy these villages without the ground 
troops having to fight in them.  While both air and ground forces were contributing to the 
aim of destroying villages that harbored rebels and decreasing Algerian support for the 
rebels, the aircraft involved depended on the ground forces only for information.   
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Another example of this type of interaction can be observed during the Russian-
Chechen War of 1999 (also coded as a non-modern use of air power).  In this case, the 
Russian troops originally expected artillery and air strikes on Chechen cities to lead to a 
decisive victory, which meant that they really had no contingency plans involving the 
interaction of the ground and air forces.  Once it became obvious that Chechen resistance 
was stronger than had been expected, Russian ground troops that moved into Chechnya 
would keep mobbing if they found no resistance.  If resistance was encountered, the town 
would be sealed off and bombarded with either artillery or air power.  Again, in this case 
we can see how the ground forces played a large role in identifying targets, but the 
interaction between air and ground strategies was somewhat limited.   
As for the positive coefficient on the interaction term, we can use the same 
method as we did in the previous model to show what the actual effect looks like (King, 
Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).  Below I present substantive effects for both the cases of the 
success and the failure model: 
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Figure 6.4: Campaign Duration and Modern Air Power, Success Model 
    
In the case of the success model we can see that the general pattern of the 
substantive effects resembles that of the joint model.  In the case in which there is no 
ground troop presence there is a clear decline in the duration of conflict as there is an 
increase in the use of the modern system of air power.  When adding in ground troops 
(again, the dark lines in this case), expected duration is lower than it would be in the 
cases of no ground troops when the aerial strategy is less modern.  Similarly to the first 
model, at high levels of modern air power, ground troops lead to longer expected 
durations.  
The same is true in the case of the failure model: 
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Figure 6.5: Campaign Duration and Modern Air Power, Failure Model 
 
 
 These two graphs illustrate how the presence of ground troops can help to 
moderate the duration of aerial bombing campaigns, whether these are campaigns that 
end in success or in defeat.  Thus, it appears to be the case that more modern aerial 
campaigns, while they will not always lead to victory, will lead to faster victories.  Of 
course, they will also lead to faster defeats.  In both cases, the presence of ground troops 
moderates this expected duration, taking away the option of very quick defeats or 
victories in the case of the most modern campaigns, but also shortening the less modern 
campaigns.    
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The next step will be to test hypothesis 2.4, which states that modern uses of air 
power will be more useful when combined with modern uses of ground power.  To 
measure ground power I will be using the newly-coded ground strategy variable that 
measures how modern the uses of ground forces are (see Chapter 4 for a more extensive 
description).  This measure is analogous to the air power variable, meaning that it can be 
measured both as a percentage or dichotomously.   
 The dependent variable in this analysis will again be the duration of the aerial 
campaign, measured in months.  While the ultimate aim of a project of this sort is to 
understand the effect of air power on conflict outcomes, while taking into account factors 
such as the actions of troops on the ground, at this point I will use duration as a 
dependent variable
38
.  Besides duration itself being of interest as an independent variable 
(after all, it makes sense that states would want to know the expected duration of an aerial 
campaign they are about to engage in), I have argued before that campaign duration can 
be an indicator of the type of outcome of a campaign.   
 The dependent variable is drawn from Allen’s (2007)piece on the duration of 
bombing campaigns, which is in turn drawn from work by Pape (1996) and Horowitz and 
Reiter (2001).  It is a continuous variable that measures the duration of a bombing 
campaign in months.    
 Below I present the results of a Weibull duration analysis in which I include a 
variable for the type of ground power that is being used, as well as an interaction between 
the air and ground strategies of the attacker.   
                                                             
38
 Current data on bombing campaign durations measures outcomes dichotomously.  Because several of the 
hypotheses in this work refer to the variation in outcomes, this data is problematic.  One possibility would 
be to use a heteroskedastic probit analysis, but the small size of the sample makes it difficult to apply this 
model with confidence.   
160 
 
Table 6.5 Weibull Duration Analysis: Duration of Aerial Campaigns 
(Accelerated failure-time form)   
 Coefficient 
(standard errors)  
Modern Air Power  0.05  
(3.08)  
Modern Ground Power  0.76 
(2.04)  
Interaction of Modern Air Power and Modern Ground Forces  -1.88  
(3.64)  
Post 1950  1.72 
(0.89)  
Post 1970  -0.45 
(0.86)  
Demand  0.76 
(0.60)  
Power ratio  -4.46 
(2.86)  
n  33 
Log likelihood  -64.66 
Shape parameter  1.55 
(0.22) 
(Wald) Chi2 
(p-value)  
9.21 
(0.24) 
  
 
***significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level, *significant at .10 level  
 
 As we can see from the table above, none of the major variables in this analysis 
have significant coefficients.  Thus, it appears to be the case that the strategy of ground 
troops does not affect the characteristics (in this case, duration) of bombing campaigns.  
Of course, part of the reason for the lack of significance in these results may be the fact 
that I am working with a very small sample size that makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions on this question.  Still, these results seem to show that it is really the modern 
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system of air power that determines the duration of a bombing campaign, and that it does 
not really matter what the ground troops are doing.   This may seem like a 
counterintuitive conclusion to reach, particularly because it is the case that air power is 
often deployed in support of ground troops.  Still, note that this analysis is referring to the 
duration of only bombing campaigns.  Thus, it may be the case that when it comes to the 
duration of aerial campaigns, the ground troops really do just play more of an 
informational role, supplying intelligence and bombing assessment to the air power.  
What the strategy of the ground troops may have a real effect on will be the 
characteristics of the conflict as a whole.  So, in this case, it is likely that the strategy of 
the ground troops would affect the duration of the conflict as a whole, but not of the 
bombing campaign.   
 In the case of this analysis we can also look at what the substantive effects would 
look like.  I again use Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) to create Monte Carlo 
simulations that will show what the effect on duration is of using the modern system on 
the ground, for various levels of modern air power.  In the graph below, the grey lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals around the estimated mean duration of an aerial 
campaign that is being carried out in conjunction with a non-modern ground strategy, for 
several different levels of modern strategies.  The blue lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals around the estimated mean duration of aerial campaigns carried out 
alongside modern ground strategies
39
.    
                                                             
39
 Note that to create this graph I used a dichotomous measure of modern ground power.  This was done in 
order to more clearly illustrate the substantive effects of changing over from modern to non-modern ground 
power.  The variable is coded as 1 if the value for the ground strategy is greater than the mean and 0 
otherwise.   
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 We can see from the graph that the duration of the campaign seems to be shorter 
in cases in which the air power is being used in conjunction with modern ground power.  
Still, this does not really support hypothesis 2.4 because the hypothesis predicts that 
campaigns will be shorter when modern ground power is combined with modern air 
power.  The graph shows that modern ground power leads to shorter campaigns at all 
levels of modern air power.  The only potential support for the hypothesis could come 
from the fact that the decrease in mean duration (from switching from non-modern to 
modern ground power) is larger in the most modern uses of air power.  Still the lack of 
significance of all of the coefficients in the analysis makes it risky to draw conclusions 
from the substantive effects
40
.   
Figure 6.6: Campaign Duration and Modern Air Power, the Effect of Ground Strategies 
 
                                                             
40 Running a Wald test on the original Weibull analysis gives us a chi-squared value of 9.21, with Prob > 
chi2 being 0.2377 
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 Note that this is because we are referring solely to cases of the duration of 
bombing campaigns, not the outcome of the war as a whole.  In order to really be able to 
understand the interaction of ground troops and air power it might make more sense to 
look at the duration of the conflict as a whole.   
 
Other Possibilities 
One more possibility that I would like to consider is whether the effect of using 
the modern system in the air on the duration of the aerial campaign is affected by the 
power ratio between the attacker and its target.  It is possible that when an attacker that is 
much stronger than its target is using the modern system, it may be able to end the 
campaign sooner by taking advantage of the modern system’s propensity to destabilize 
the opponent without necessarily having to destroy its ability to fight.  Some might argue, 
though, that less powerful states are not able to fully take advantage of the benefits of the 
modern system, as they are not able to implement it correctly.  In other words, it might be 
the case that if a state is heavily outnumbered when carrying out an aerial bombing 
campaign, it may be harder for air power to have the same effect that it otherwise would, 
regardless of the strategy being employed.  To consider this possibility, I re-do the 
analysis from the first Weibull model and add an interaction variable between modern air 
power and the power ratio between the attacker and target.   
As it is shown in the table below, adding this new variable does not dramatically 
alter the results of the analysis.  The ground forces variable loses some of its significance, 
but this may be caused by the fact that we are adding yet another variable to an analysis 
that relies on a small dataset.  Even so, the coefficient on all key variables remain in the 
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expected direction, and the modern air power variable, along with the interaction between 
modern air power and the presence of ground troops, remains significant.  The coefficient 
on the modern air power-power ratio variable is negative (meaning that the combination 
of attackers that are more powerful than their targets and modern air power usage leads to 
shorter aerial campaigns) but not significant.   
 
Table 6.6: Weibull Duration Analysis: Duration of Aerial Campaigns 
(Accelerated failure-time form)  
 
 Coefficient 
(standard errors)  
Modern Air Power  -5.37*  
(3.22)  
Ground Forces Present  -1.86  
(1.37)  
Interaction of Modern Air 
Power and Ground Forces 
Present  
5.79** 
(2.82)  
Post-1950  0.33 
(1.30)  
Post-1970  0.99 
(1.03)  
Demand  0.91 
(0.66)  
Power ratio  -0.06 
(0.04)  
Interaction of Power Ratio 
and Modern Air Power 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
n  40 
Log likelihood  -76.75 
Shape parameter  1.45 
(0.19) 
(Wald) Chi2 
(p-value)  
27.08 
(0.0007) 
***significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level, *significant at .10 level  
 Another possibility to consider is the role that ground troops that were not under 
the control or coordination of the air forces of the state carrying out the aerial attack 
played.  I mentioned earlier in this chapter that the variable that measures whether ground 
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forces were present includes only cases in which the state carrying out the attack had its 
own ground forces present.  Thus, cases of bombing that was done in support of local 
forces were coded as zeroes.  This was because I assumed that ground forces that were 
not part of the attacker’s forces could not be relied on to execute strategy and coordinate 
like the ground troops of the attacker could.  Still, it could always be a possibility that 
some of these foreign ground forces do provide some support for aerial attacks.   
 In order to consider this possibility, I included a variable that measures the 
presence of ground forces.  This is a dichotomous variable that was coded as “1” if there 
were ground troops present that had the following characteristics: 
1) They were present in the target state’s territory at the time of the aerial campaign. 
2) They were troops not under the direct control of the attacker state 
3) The troops were fighting on the same side as the attacker state. 
To consider the possibility of these troops’ influence, I re-do the analysis from the 
first Weibull model and add the “Other ground troops” variable. 
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Table 6.7: Weibull Duration Analysis: Duration of Aerial Campaigns 
(Accelerated failure-time form)  
 
 Coefficient 
(standard errors)  
Modern Air Power  -10.45** * 
(2.56)  
Ground Forces Present  -3.10**  
(1.30)  
Interaction of Modern Air Power 
and Ground Forces Present  
8.84*** 
(2.52)  
Post-1950  1.38 
(1.02)  
Post-1970  0.53 
(0.85)  
Demand  0.38 
(0.64)  
Power ratio  -0.003 
(0.01)  
Other ground troops present 0.39 
(0.70) 
n  40 
Log likelihood  -73.34 
Shape parameter  1.38 
(0.19) 
(Wald) Chi2 
(p-value)  
26.98 
(0.0007) 
***significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level, *significant at .10 level  
As it is shown in the table above, adding this new variable does not dramatically 
alter the results of the analysis.  The coefficient on the ground forces variable remains 
significant and in the expected direction, as does the one on the modern air power 
variable.  The interaction term between ground forces and the modern air system also 
remains significant and positive, as in the original analysis.  The coefficient on the “other 
ground troops”  variable is positive (meaning that the presence of ground troops not 
under the control of the state carrying out the aerial attack leads to slightly longer aerial 
campaigns) but is not significant, which means that we should be wary of generalizing 
too much from this result.   
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CHAPTER 7: THE STRATEGY OF THE OPPONENT 
  
Up until this point I have discussed the choice of aerial strategy solely as part of 
one individual state’s cost-benefit analysis, independently of its opponent’s strategy.  As 
stated before, though, the effectiveness of a state’s air campaigns will depend strongly on 
the strategy that is being used by the other side. While in the first analytical chapter of 
this dissertation I argued that many of the decisions on military strategy and doctrine are 
made generally, not with a particular adversary in mind (or at least not with a particular 
war in mind), it is also the case that whether a strategy is successful or not depends 
strongly on the actions of the adversary that the strategy is being used on.   
As Stam (1996) has suggested, there is often no “optimal” military strategy, but 
rather a best response to what the opponent is doing. Modern-system attacks often come 
with the possibility of large gains at low costs, yet they may not always be the optimal 
strategy to use.  For example, the main characteristic of modern defense operations is that 
they are deep
41
, meaning that they have to be less dense, as there is always a trade-off 
between depth and strength (if there is a fixed number of troops, and they are spread 
through a larger area, the density of troops per area will be lower).  For attackers, deeper 
defenses thus mean that they have to travel longer distances under counterattack, but that 
this counterattack will be less dense.  If the attackers are able to accelerate, then they can 
travel faster, which means that the defenders’ deeper defenses will not actually allow 
them extra time to react (S. Biddle 2004).  Biddle (2004) states that the modern system 
defenses are still effective against modern attackers because they are not able to 
                                                             
41 In this case, a deep defense is one in which defensive troops are not placed only at the furthest edge of 
the territory they are defending, but also further into the territory.   
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accelerate enough without harming the modern methods.  This implies, though, that the 
deeper defenses would not be as effective against a non-modern attack that was able to 
accelerate dramatically.   
Thus, the effectiveness of a military strategy has to be evaluated in the context of 
the opponent’s strategy.  In this chapter I will go beyond the isolated decision of which 
form of air power to use and incorporate a decision that depends on the military strategy 
of the other side.  This third analytical chapter will take into account the strategy of the 
opponent, and what effect it can have on the effectiveness of the aerial strategy chosen.   
Besides the strategy being used by the opponent, this chapter will also take into 
account the opponent’s characteristics.  As Byman, Waxman and Larson (1999) state, it 
can be difficult to understand the relationship between a particular target and a desired 
outcome.  Hitting a type of target can have a large effect on one adversary, leading it to 
capitulate, while that very same sort of target may hardly affect a different adversary.   
 
The Strategy of the Opponent 
 Note that I have referred to the military strategy of the opponent, not necessarily 
to their aerial strategy.  While this dissertation focuses on strategies of air power, I will be 
taking into account the general military strategy of the opponent, rather than their air 
strategy alone.  The aim of aerial attacks is often to hit some target on the ground or to 
provide support for ground troops fighting an opponent on the ground.  In fact, one of the 
ways in which states often attack the opponent’s air force is by bombing aircraft on the 
ground (this is considered one more way in which aerial bombing can target the military 
capabilities of the opponent). Because of this, I will be considering how the opponent’s 
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strategy on the ground can affect the probability of victory when using a particular 
strategy in the air
42
.   
We can begin to think of this third set-up as having a given state, State A, that is 
choosing whether to use a modern or a non-modern air strategy
43
.  There is also another 
state, State B, which is the opponent, and it has chosen its strategy on the ground (it also 
has a choice between a modern and a non-modern strategy).  The opposing state, State B, 
has also made a choice whether to use air power or not.  Thus, basing ourselves on the 
theoretical model, we will determine in which cases the targeted system of air power will 
be most effective.   
Hypothesis D from the theory chapter implied that as the mean value of using the 
targeted system increases, states should be more likely use the targeted system.  Biddle 
(2004) makes the point that the best defense against a modern-system attack is a modern 
defense.  Biddle makes this point when discussing two armies facing each other on the 
ground, but we can extend it to study what the best aerial strategy is against different 
strategies on the ground. 
Modern ground strategies rely on deep, less dense defenses.  Modern ground 
attacks will avoid defenses and aim to exploit temporary windows of opportunity.  They 
use cover and concealment, as well as small subunits that operate independently to induce 
the collapse of the opponent’s defense.  Also importantly, modern ground attacks do not 
attempt to overwhelm all of the opponent’s defenses, but rather they concentrate their 
                                                             
42
 I also have a variable for whether the opponent is using air power or not, which I include as a control 
variable in the analysis, because having to protect one’s forces against aerial attacks may alter the 
effectiveness of an aerial strategy.   
43 I have stated before that an aerial strategy does not necessarily have to be purely modern or non-modern, 
but that it can be somewhere in between.  At this point we can illustrate this as a choice between targeted 
and mom-targeted if we think of the state choosing what to do for an individual sortie.  Thus, in the 
aggregate the state could end up with a mix of targeted and non-targeted strategy.   
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forces disproportionately at a given weak point, again to be able to break through and 
disrupt the operation of the opponent, with the expectation that this will lead to a 
systemic collapse (S. Biddle 2004).  An effective aerial attack should therefore be able to 
stop the progress of these ground forces. 
The more general, non-modern attacks, which aim to destroy the opponent and 
keep them from continuing to fight, should be able to halt any sort of ground force, if it is 
a large enough attack.  In other words, a large enough aerial attacks that simply bombs 
everything and anything on the ground will of course mean that the opponent will not be 
able to continue to fight, as it has been completely annihilated.  An attack of this sort may 
be unrealistic, both because most states do not have the capability to actually completely 
annihilate the enemy and because most will not be willing to be completely 
indiscriminate in their bombing of the opponent.  Thus, we need to think about what sort 
of actual aerial attack will be more effective against a modern strategy on the ground.   
In the realm of real, limited war, I will make the argument that the best way to 
counter modern ground strategies from the air is to also use modern aerial strategies.  A 
modern ground strategy focuses on concentrating troops on particular weak points in the 
opponent’s defenses, quickly overwhelming them, and destabilizing the opponent’s 
forces by cutting them off from each other (S. Biddle 2004).  Imagine that a non-modern 
aerial campaign is being used against this sort of attack.  Biddle (2004) makes the point 
that traditional aerial surveillance (and attacks) tend to be, because of the nature of 
aircraft, intermittent.  This means that ground forces will be able to enjoy extended 
periods when the air is clear of enemy aircraft.  If the ground forces are implementing the 
modern system, they will take advantage of these breaks in air surveillance or bombing to 
171 
 
move from cover to cover.  If they are able to move quickly enough (which is 
emphasized in the modern system), they may be able to complete the attack before the 
area is bombed.  This means that traditional, non-modern air campaigns will be less 
effective against modern ground strategies.  Also, indiscriminate, non-modern campaigns 
that targeted other elements that were not part of the modern system’s concentrated force 
would be an inefficient use of resources, as the attack could have been stopped simply by 
bombing that stopped the progress of this one key attack. 
In contrast, a modern strategy would identify the key points that, if destroyed, 
could stop the progression of this modern ground attack.  In fact, a modern aerial strategy 
would not even have to destroy the forces carrying out the attack on the ground.  Because 
the attack relies on momentum and surprise rather than on overwhelming forces, all that 
the air power might have to do is to slow it down.  This could be achieved by a modern 
attack on the communications or supply line of the ground forces.               
Thus, we can imagine that when the opponent is using a modern system on the 
ground, states will derive more value from using a modern system.  We can then derive 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: When the adversary is using a modern strategy, the 
effectiveness of a modern strategy of air power by the attacker will increase, relative to 
the non-modern system. 
 
The Characteristics of the Opponent 
 Clearly the military strategy that the opponent is using will have an influence on 
how effective a given aerial strategy will be in conflict.  That being said, it may be the 
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case that characteristics of the conflict that are beyond the control of either the state 
carrying out the aerial campaign or its opponent can also matter.  Independently of what 
the opponent may be choosing to do on the ground, both its characteristics and the 
characteristics of the conflict may affect the effectiveness of different aerial strategies.   
First of all, the environment in which the conflict is being fought, and in which 
the aerial campaign is being carried out, may determine how effective certain aerial 
strategies will be.  In particular, we can think of the terrain in which the conflict is being 
fought.  Byman, Waxman and Larson (1999) argue that in general, the use of air power 
will be less effective in mountainous, jungle or urban terrains.  This will be the case 
because these types of terrain will make the identification of targets from the air more 
difficult than if the conflict were being fought in an open terrain.  While the adversary 
cannot alter the terrain of the area in which the war is being fought, it can move to such 
areas that would make the use of air power more difficult and remove some of the 
coercer’s advantages.  For example, armed forces may move into the hills, or start 
attacking urban areas.   
Rough terrain will decrease the effectiveness of any aerial strategy, but in 
particular it will affect modern aerial strategies.  Despite new technologies, rough terrain 
heavily inhibits the ability of aerial attacks to detect targets (for example, electronic 
emissions can be detected even through rough terrain, but this is only helpful in targeting 
the emission itself) (S. Biddle 2004).  As Stephen Biddle states, “the natural complexity 
of the Earth’s surface is still sufficient to degrade aerial targeting when exploited 
properly” (S. Biddle 2004, 57).  A non-modern aerial strategy will stress less discriminate 
bombing, and will focus on general destruction of the enemy.  This means that even if the 
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opponent is concealing its forces and/or key support centers within a rough terrain, if the 
state carrying out the aerial campaign engages in an extensive-enough bombing 
campaign, it should be able to destroy at least some of the resources/troops of the 
opponent, if nothing else by sheer chance.  Large-scale bombing will also serve to 
disorient the defenders, thereby disrupting their operations, even if the actual targets 
cannot be identified in the rough terrain.  For example, in the early stages of the Vietnam 
war the United States used chemical defoliants (such as the well-known Agent Orange) to 
deny cover to opponents hiding their operations in jungle terrain, as well as to destroy the 
crops of and demoralize the opposition.  This sort of non-modern campaign, which 
sought to starve out and demoralize the opponent, would not be a drastically affected by 
rough terrain.   
In contrast, modern aerial strategies rely on being able to pick out key targets that 
will have a disproportionately large effect on the enemy’s forces.  If the terrain makes it 
more difficult to either identify or hit these targets, this means that the effectiveness of 
the modern strategy will decrease.  If the enemy is concealed in mountains, for example, 
then traditional, less targeted forms of aerial attack (less discriminatory forms) become 
more effective relative to a targeted strategy.  From this argument I derive hypothesis 3.2: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: When the adversary is fighting in rough terrain, the effectiveness of 
the modern system of air power will decrease, relative to the non-modern system. 
 
 We can also think about the nature of the adversaries against whom the air power 
is being used, and which characteristics make them more or less vulnerable to the use of 
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particular strategies against them.  In particular, non-state actors may be less vulnerable 
to modern aerial strategies than traditional forces.  Non-state actors have few key military 
targets that could be hit by a coercer, relying instead on guerrilla-type warfare (Byman, 
Waxman and Larson 1999, Horowitz and Reiter 2001).  Without key military targets to 
hit, the modern system of air power may lose much of its effectiveness.   Also, non-state 
actors often rely on low-technology systems of communication.  While this can be a 
disadvantage to them in war-fighting, it also means that it is more difficult to disrupt their 
communications with a single (or a few) attack(s), as one would under the targeted 
system.  We can thus derive hypothesis 3.3a: 
 
Hypothesis 3.3a:      When the adversary is a non-state actor, the effectiveness of the 
modern system of air power will decrease, relative to the non-modern system. 
 
 Of course, it may not be just the fact that the opponent is a non-state actor that 
leads to a decreased effectiveness of targeted aerial strategies, but rather the way in which 
the opponent is fighting.  For example, the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was 
technically against another state, Afghanistan, but the United States found itself fighting 
an opponent that fought in a non-traditional way, using guerrilla tactics and engaging in 
“terrorist” acts.  Again, it may be the case that opponents that rely on guerrilla and other 
weak-actor types of warfare are missing these key centers of gravity that targeted aerial 
attacks seek to take advantage of.  Because of this, I will include another hypothesis that 
refers to the use of unconventional warfare by the opponent: 
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Hypothesis 3.3b:      When the adversary is engaging in unconventional warfare, the 
effectiveness of the modern system of air power will decrease, relative to the non-
modern system 
 
Data 
The dependent variable used to test all of the hypotheses will be the outcome of 
the aerial campaign.  In this case, the dependent variable will be whether the campaign 
was a success or not.  This variable is derived from Allen’s (2007) dataset, which 
includes a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if the state that was carrying out the 
bombing campaign achieved the campaign’s aims and 0 otherwise (in the research design 
chapter I describe this measure in greater detail). 
The main independent variable will be a measure of how modern the aerial 
strategy is (this is the same measure that I used in the previous chapters and that I coded 
specifically for this project)
44
.   
                                                             
44 As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, I have identified the characteristics of modern and non-
modern air power under each one of the three forms of air power (CAS, interdiction, strategic attack).  I 
then design questions that identify the key characteristics of modern and non-modern air power, with each 
one being answered in the affirmative or negative.  To provide an example, one of the questions under the 
modern interdiction section asks, “Are lines of communication and transportation (bridges, highways) 
being targeted?” (as I discussed before, targeting the lines of communication and cutting off the enemy’s 
troops from their command and control is one of the key elements of the modern system).  Under the non-
modern interdiction section, a sample question reads, “Are combat forces (ie the actual troops, tanks, etc) 
being targeted?” (under the traditional, non-modern form of fighting the aim of attack is to destroy the 
actual troops so that they will no longer be able to resist).     
The answers to these individual questions are then aggregated to form an overall index of how 
“modern” a particular use of air power is.  In each case, only the answers from the dominant use(s) of air 
power are considered for that case’s classification.  Affirmative answers to questions related to the use of 
modern air power are added to the score, as are negative answers to the questions referring to the use non-
modern air power.  As the number of questions varies between categories, the “modern score” is 
normalized to a score between 0 and 1, which essentially represents the percentage of questions that 
indicate the use of the modern system.  The higher that number is, the more modern that one particular case 
can be considered to be.   
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To test hypothesis 3.1, I will need a variable that indicates the military strategy 
that the opponent is using.  As I stated earlier, I will focus on the opponent’s military 
strategy on the ground.  Besides being a better measure of what this hypothesis aims to 
understand, this also allows me to study those cases in which the opponent was not using 
air power.  To measure the ground strategy of the opponent I use a variable that ranges 
from 0 to 2, with 0 being the least modern uses of ground power and 2 being the most 
modern ones.  This variable is derived from newly-coded data by Matthew Knuth (Knuth 
2012).  Specifically, Knuth includes in his data two different variables that measure 
whether a state used a maneuver land strategy in its offense, defense, or both.  The 
aggregate measure I use is coded 0 if neither strategy involved maneuver, 1 if either the 
offensive or defensive did, and 2 if both did
45
. While the modern system is not perfectly 
analogous to the distinction between maneuver and attrition (particularly because 
guerrilla warfare cannot fit under either category), there are some similar characteristics 
between the modern system and the maneuver strategy.  This data also has the advantage 
of coding aerial and ground strategies separately, so that even if a maneuver strategy isn’t 
perfectly analogous to the modern system I can still be confident that this measure is not 
“contaminated” by aerial strategies.    
Hypothesis 3.1 makes specific reference to the effect that the opponent’s ground 
strategy will have on outcomes when the targeted system of air power is being used in the 
air.  This means that I will also be including an interaction between aerial strategies and 
the ground strategy of the opponent.  Besides the variables about the ground strategy of 
the opponent, I will include a dichotomous variable that measures whether the opponent 
                                                             
45 I added coding for the following campaigns, which were not included in the Knuth dataset: 1st and 2nd 
Russian-Chechen Wars, the French-Algerian War, the Tanker War, the Soviet-Afghan War, the Spanish 
Civil War, Operation Desert Strike and the Kurdish Revolt.   
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was using air power or not.  This is a variable that I coded specifically for this project and 
that simply indicates the use of air power in combat by the opponent.   
To test hypothesis 3.2 I will use a variable that indicates whether the terrain that 
the campaign is being carried out in can be considered “rough” terrain.  This variable is 
coded using data from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War.”  In this piece, Fearon and Laitin measure the proportion of a state that is 
mountainous.  This measure does not take into account other types of terrain that could be 
favorable for hiding from an aerial attack (such as jungle or urban terrain), but is 
nonetheless a measure that is generally accepted within the IR literature.    I use the 
terrain value for the state in which the aerial campaign was being carried out
46
.   
To test hypothesis 3.3a I use a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if the target of 
the attack is a non-state actor.  Those targets that are not considered a state under the 
Correlates of War Project state membership list in that given year are considered to be 
non-state actors (Correlates of War Project 2008). 
Finally, to test hypothesis 3.3b, I need to determine whether the target of the 
attack is using unconventional tactics on the ground.  In order to do this I again use 
Matthew Knuth’s (Knuth 2012) dataset.  The Knuth dataset includes a variable which 
measures force utilization and strategy at the military strategic level.  Knuth’s variable 
indicates whether the strategy involved conventional warfare only, conventional and 
unconventional warfare, unconventional warfare only, unconventional warfare and 
terrorism, or terrorism only.  I aggregate these measures into a dichotomous variable that 
                                                             
46 The Iran-Iraq War was fought on the border between the two states.  Because of this, for bombing that 
did not involve the bombing of cities, I used an average of the terrain values for both states.  In the case of 
the Spanish civil war, I used the value for Spain, for the Russian Chechen War I used the value for Russia 
and in any attacks against the PLO I used Israel’s terrain value.   
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is coded 1 if either unconventional warfare or terrorism are used by the state that is the 
target of the aerial bombing campaign
47
.   
 
Analysis 
Hypothesis 3.1 states that when the opponent is using a modern strategy on the 
ground, using a modern aerial strategy against it will be likely to lead to increased 
effectiveness and therefore to an increased probability of achieving success in the 
campaign.  As mentioned before, the key to testing this hypothesis will be to look at the 
interaction between the aerial strategy of the state that is carrying out the bombing 
campaign and the ground strategy of its target.  Note that I am not making the argument 
that a modern strategy will always lead to an increased probability of success, but rather 
that it will do so under a particular set of circumstances.  In this case, the argument is that 
a modern aerial strategy will be more effective (than a non-modern aerial strategy), when 
it is being used against an opponent that is also using a modern strategy on the ground.  
Thus, the key variable in this analysis will be the interaction between the measure of how 
modern the aerial strategy of the state carrying out the aerial attack is and how modern its 
opponent’s ground strategy is.   
 Because the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, whether the aerial attack 
was successful or not, I will use a logistic regression (logit analysis).  Below, in table 7.1, 
I present the results of one model (Model 3.1a)  that includes only the variables for how 
modern the attacker’s aerial strategy is, how modern the opponent’s ground strategy is, 
                                                             
47 There were a few cases that were included in Allen’s (2007) dataset that were not included in the Knuth 
dataset.  I have coded this variable myself for the following cases: 1st and 2nd Russian-Chechen Wars, Israel 
vs. PLO 1970-1979, Soviet-Afghan War, Nigerian-Biafran War, Operation Wooden Leg, Tanker War, 
Operation Desert Fox, French-Algerian War, Kurdish Revolt, Britain vs. Somali Rebels, Operation Peace 
for Galilee, Operation Deliberate Force, Operation El Dorado Canyon.   
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and the interaction between the two variables and a second model (Model 3.1b) that 
includes a variety of control variables (explained earlier).   
Table 7.1: Logit Analysis, the Effect of the Opponent’s Strategy 
 Model 3.1a  Model 3.1b  
Constant -0.75 
(1.21) 
-1.29 
(2.03) 
Modern Air Power  0.69 
(2.20) 
2.60 
(3.53) 
Modern Ground Strategy (Opponent)  -0.51 
(1.01) 
-0.68 
(1.12) 
Interaction of Modern Air Power and 
Opponent’s Modern Ground Strategy  
0.82 
(1.94) 
0.61 
(2.33) 
Post 1950  --- -1.86 
(1.51) 
Post 1970  --- 0.81 
(1.52) 
Power Ratio --- 0.02 
(0.01) 
Opponent’s Use of Air Power  -- 0.36 
(1.19) 
n  41 36 
Log likelihood  -26.45 -22.04 
LR chi2 
(Prob> chi2)  
0.95 
(0.8143) 
 
4.04 
(0.7756) 
Pseudo R2 0.0176 0.0839 
 
 
 We can see from the table above that in both models, with and without the control 
variables, the coefficient on the modern air power strategy is positive (meaning that it is 
more likely to lead to successful campaigns) and the coefficient on the use of modern 
ground strategies by the opponent is negative (meaning that it is less likely to lead to 
successful air campaigns).  Most importantly, though, the interaction of the use of 
modern air power and the use of modern ground strategies by the opponent has a positive 
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coefficient.  This seems to support hypothesis 3.1, which states that the modern uses of 
air power will be more effective against an opponent that is also using a modern strategy 
on the ground.   
 What is problematic about these results is the fact that despite the coefficients 
being in the expected direction, they are not statistically significant.  One option, since I 
am focusing on an interaction variable, is to look at the substantive effects of changing 
the opponent’s strategy from a non-modern strategy to a modern one.  Below I present a 
graph in which I use Monte Carlo simulations to present these effects (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg 2000).  The x-axis represents how modern the aerial strategy being used in 
the campaign is (with higher values representing more modern strategies).  The y-axis 
represents the probability of being successful in the campaign.  In the graph the dots 
represent mean probabilities, with the lines representing the 90% confidence interval 
around that mean value.  The light grey lines represent the cases in which the opponent’s 
strategy was non-modern and the dark grey lines represent the cases in which the 
opponent’s strategy was modern.   
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Figure 7.1: Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power, by Opponents’ Strategies 
 
 
 As we can see from the above figure, it is difficult to distinguish a significant 
substantive effect using this approach.  A problem with this analysis may be the fact that 
we are dealing with such a small sample size.  Because of this, it may be useful to simply 
look at some cross-tabulations between the outcome of the campaign and some key 
independent variables. 
 First of all, I look at the cross-tabulation between the campaign outcome and the 
use of modern air power by the state carrying out the campaign.  In the table I present the 
number of cases, as well as the percentage of cases, by column (written in parentheses): 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
V
ic
to
ry
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Modern Air Power
Non-Modern Opponent Ground Strategy
, Modern Opponent Ground Strategy
by opponents' strategies
Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power
182 
 
Table 7.2: Cross-Tabulation, Aerial Strategy and Outcome 
 Non-Modern Air Power Modern Air Power 
Failure 21 
(66%) 
15 
(65%) 
Success 11 
(34%) 
8 
(35%) 
 
 As we can see from the table above, 66% of the cases that use non-modern air 
power ended in failure, while 34% ended in success.  Very similarly, 65% of the cases 
that used modern air power ended in failure and 35% in success.  This is consistent with 
my previous statement that neither strategy will necessarily always be superior in conflict 
(which makes sense, as we observe states using both strategies). 
I then look at the cross-tabulation between the campaign outcome and the use of 
modern strategies by the target state.  In the table I present the number of cases, as well as 
the percentage of cases, by column (written in parentheses).  I present percentages by 
column to represent the difference between the cases that ended in success and in failure, 
both in the cases in which a modern strategy was used and in those in which a non-
modern strategy was used: 
 
Table 7.3: Cross-Tabulation, Opponent’s Ground Strategy and Outcome 
 
 Non-Modern Ground Strategy 
(by opponent) 
Modern Ground Strategy 
(by opponent) 
Failure 10 
(55%) 
22 
(73%) 
Success 8 
(45%) 
8 
(27%) 
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As we can see from the table above, 55% of the cases in which the opponent used 
a non-modern ground strategy ended in failure, while 45% ended in success.  73% of the 
cases in which the opponent used a modern ground strategy ended in failure and 27% in 
success.  This would seem to show that, in general, modern ground strategies make it 
more difficult for a state to carry out an effective air campaign, independently of how that 
campaign may be carried out (this is consistent with Biddle’s (2004) statement about the 
modern system being less vulnerable to aerial bombing). 
Finally, I look at the cross-tabulation between the campaign outcome and the 
interaction between modern aerial strategies and modern ground strategies used by the 
opponent.  In the table I present the number of cases, as well as the percentage of cases, 
by column (written in parentheses).  I present percentages by column to represent the 
difference between the cases that ended in success and in failure, both in the cases in 
which a modern aerial strategy was used against a modern ground strategy and in those in 
which this was not the case: 
Table 7.4: Cross-Tabulation, Aerial Strategy, Opponent’s Ground Strategy and Outcome  
 Modern Aerial 
Strategy + 
Modern Ground 
Strategy 
(by opponent)  
Modern Aerial 
Strategy + Non-
Modern 
Ground 
Strategy (by 
opponent) 
Non-modern 
Aerial 
Strategy + 
Modern 
Ground 
Strategy (by 
opponent) 
Non-modern Aerial Strategy 
+ Non-Modern Ground 
Strategy (by opponent) 
Failure 6 
(75%) 
5 
(63%) 
16 
(72%) 
5 
(50%) 
Success 2 
(25%) 
3 
(37%) 
6 
(27%) 
5 
(50%) 
 
184 
 
As we can see from the table above, 65% of the cases in which the attacker used a 
non-modern aerial strategy and/or the opponent used a non-modern ground strategy 
ended in failure, while 35% ended in success.  75% of the cases in which the attacker 
used a modern aerial strategy against a modern ground strategy ended in failure and 25% 
in success.  This would seem to show that, in general, modern ground strategies make it 
more difficult for a state to carry out an effective air campaign, though modern aerial 
strategies seem to work best against them.  Still, we should be cautious when interpreting 
this result, as simply changing one of the values in the right column from a failure to a 
success would change this conclusion.  It thus might be the case that modern ground 
strategies resist aerial attacks better, independently of how those attacks are carried out.   
Hypothesis 3.2 states that when the opponent is fighting in rough terrain, the 
effectiveness of the modern system of air power will decrease (because it will become 
more difficult to identify and destroy key targets).   
The dependent variable will again be whether the campaign was successful.  The 
two key independent variables will be the terrain in which the attack is being carried out 
(measured using the Fearon & Laitin (2003) measure) and how modern the aerial attack 
is.  As before, I am particularly interested in understanding the interaction between these 
two variables, which means that I will also include an interaction variable in the analysis. 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I will use a logistic regression 
(logit) analysis to test it.  The first model (Model 3.2a) will simply include the three basic 
independent variables, while the second one (Model 3.2b) will also include some control 
variables.  In particular, I will include measures of whether the attack was carried out 
post-1950 or 1970 (to reflect the effect of changing technology on the effectiveness of 
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aerial attacks) and the power ratio between the state carrying out the aerial campaign and 
its target.   
 
Table 7.5: Logit Analysis, the Effect of Terrain 
 Model 3.2a  Model 3.2b  
Constant -0.49 
(1.04) 
-1.22 
(1.20) 
Modern Air Power  0.17 
(2.03) 
2.63 
(2.81) 
Rough Terrain  -0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
Interaction of Modern Air Power and Rough 
Terrain  
0.05 
(0.14) 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
Post 1950  --- -2.55 
(1.77) 
Post 1970  --- 1.49 
(1.73) 
Power Ratio --- 0.04 
(0.02) 
n  48 40 
Log likelihood  -29.62 -21.92 
LR chi2 
(Prob> chi2)  
1.87 
(0.5999) 
 
7.96 
(0.2413) 
Pseudo R2 0.0306 0.1536 
 
 As we can see from the above results, once we take into consideration the control 
variables, the coefficient on the interaction term between modern aerial campaigns and 
rough terrain is negative, meaning that the combination of the two is likely to lead to 
decreased probability of victory through aerial campaigns.  This is true despite the fact 
that the coefficient on the targeted aerial campaigns alone is positive.  A problem with 
these results, of course, is that they do not achieve statistical significance.  Also, as we 
are again dealing with interactions, it is important to look at substantive effects as well. 
186 
 
Below I present a graph in which I again use Monte Carlo simulations to present 
these effects (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).  The x-axis represents how targeted the 
aerial strategy being used in the campaign is (with higher values representing more 
modern strategies).  The y-axis represents the probability of being successful in the 
campaign.  In the graph the dots represent mean probabilities, with the lines representing 
the 90% confidence interval around that mean value.  The light grey lines represent the 
cases in which the value for the terrain in which the conflict was being fought on is set at 
the mean and the dark grey lines represent cases in which the value is increased by one 
standard deviation.   
 
Figure 7.2: Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power, by Terrain 
 
As we can see from the above figure, it is again difficult to distinguish a 
significant substantive effect using this approach.  I will thus again look at the cross 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
V
ic
to
ry
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Modern Air Power
Rough Terrain
, Non-rough terrain
by terrain
Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power
187 
 
tabulations between outcome and the terrain variables (as I have already shown above the 
cross-tabulation between outcome and the targeted air power variable).  In order to do 
this, I will use a dichotomous measure of terrain.   I will thus create a variable that is 
coded 0 is the value for the terrain variable is less than the median value of 6 and one 
otherwise.  As we can see from the histogram below, it seems that the cases are 
somewhat evenly distributed on either side of the median (the mean value is about 12).    
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of Terrain Values 
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terrain in which the campaign was carried out.  In the table I again present the number of 
cases, as well as the percentage of cases, by column (written in parentheses).  I present 
percentages by column to represent, the difference between the cases that ended in 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
0 20 40 60 80
Terrain
Distribution of Terrain Values
188 
 
success and in failure, both in the cases in which the terrain was rough and in which it 
was not: 
 
Table 7.6: Cross Tabulation, Terrain and Outcome 
 Non-Rough Terrain Rough Terrain 
Failure 21 
(70%) 
11 
(61%) 
Success 9 
(30%) 
7 
(39%) 
 
As we can see from the table above, in the case in which the terrain is not rough, 
70% of the cases are failures, whereas 30% of them are successes.  In the case of the 
terrain being rough, a slightly higher percentage of the cases (39%) are successes.  It 
would appear that the cases with rough terrain have more successful aerial campaigns, 
though switching over two cases from failure to success would make the relationship 
change. 
The variable that matters the most, though, is the interaction between the modern 
use of air power and rough terrain.  Below I present the cross-tabulation between these 
two variables: 
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Table 7.7: Cross Tabulation, Aerial Strategy, Terrain and Outcome 
 Modern Aerial 
Strategy AND 
Rough Terrain 
Non-modern 
Aerial Strategy 
AND Rough 
Terrain 
Modern 
Aerial 
Strategy AND 
Non-rough 
terrain 
Non-
modern 
Aerial 
Strategy 
AND Non-
rough 
terrain 
Failure 3 
(50%) 
9 
(64%) 
6 
(75%) 
12 
(67%) 
Success 3 
(50%) 
5 
(36%) 
2 
(25%) 
6 
(33%) 
 
In this case there seems to be a lack of support for hypothesis 3.2, as the 
combination of rough terrain and modern aerial strategies has a higher percentage of 
successes than cases in which this combination does not occur.  Part of the reason that 
this may be happening is that the Fearon and Laitin (2003) variable measure only 
mountainous terrain, while the theory predicts that any sort of rough terrain (including 
urban or jungle) should make it more difficult to use the targeted system of air power. 
 
Finally, I turn to testing hypotheses 3.3a and 3.3b.  Hypothesis 3.3a states that the 
effectiveness of the modern system will decrease when it is being used against a non-state 
actor.  Note that this hypothesis is referring to the interaction of the modern air power 
variable and the non-state actor variable.  In other words, it is not stating that either the 
modern system or the opponent being a non-state actor will make success less likely, but 
rather that the combination of the two will lead to decreased effectiveness and therefore 
to a lower probability of achieving success in the campaign.   
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In this case, the dependent variable will again be whether the campaign was a 
success or not ( from Allen’s (2007) dataset) 
The main dependent variables will be a measure of how modern the aerial 
strategy is (this is the same measure that I used in the previous chapters and that I coded 
specifically for this project).  I will also include a variable that measures whether the 
target is a non-state actor.  Of course, as I stated before, it will really be the interaction of 
these two variables that will be the key variable in this analysis and in the testing of 
hypothesis 3.3a.   
As a control variable, to represent the advantage that stronger attackers have in 
conflict, I will include a variable that measures whether the attacker has greater 
capabilities than the target of the bombing campaign.  The variable is coded 
dichotomously, with 1’s representing cases in which the state carrying out the attack is 
stronger than its target.  This is of course to consider the idea that an attacker that is much 
stronger than its target is more likely to achieve its aims in the bombing campaign, 
regardless of the military strategy that it may be using
48
.  To determine which of the two 
states is stronger, I compare their CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) scores 
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987).  This of course is a surrogate measure, 
which measures the industrial capabilities, population and military 
personnel/expenditures of states.  Still, the CINC score is a widely used measure that is 
generally accepted as a measure of military power
49
.   
                                                             
48 Using the power ratio in this regression causes the variables for non-state target and the interaction 
between non-state target and targeted air power to be omitted, as the power ratio variable is perfectly 
correlated with the non-state target variable.   
49 To potentially better measure military might, I also tried the analysis using only the military expenditures 
measure to compare to military power of both states.  This generated very similar results to the analysis that 
used the CINC score as a measure of power.   
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  I will also include a post-1950 control variable, to represent the possibility that as 
weapons systems became more sophisticated they increased the effectiveness of aerial 
campaigns.  I will also include a post-1970 control variable to represent the first uses of 
smart bombs, allowing for the possibility that this new technology may have affected the 
duration of aerial campaigns
50
.  In the table below, the first model, Model 3.3aa, will 
include only the first three independent variables, while the second model, Model 3.3ab, 
will include the control variables.   
 
Table 7.8: Logit Analysis, the Effect of Non-State Targets 
 Model 3.3aa  Model 3.3ab  
Constant -1.37 
(0.85) 
-2.02 
(1.15) 
Modern Air Power  1.51 
(1.62) 
2.87 
(2.15) 
Non-State Target  11.16 
(9.35) 
12.24 
(9.90) 
Interaction of Modern Air Power and Non-
State Target  
-23.95 
(20.59) 
-24.57 
(21.03) 
Post 1950  --- -1.35 
(1.25) 
Post 1970  --- 0.28 
(1.27) 
Weaker Target --- 0.78 
(0.92) 
n  48 48 
Log likelihood  -28.51 -21.92 
LR chi2 
(Prob> chi2)  
4.08 
(0.2529) 
 
7.96 
(0.2413) 
Pseudo R2 0.0668 0.1536 
 
                                                             
50 As mentioned in the research design chapter, I tried using a few different dates (such as 1945 or 1973) to 
define this variable and obtained similar results.   
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 As we can see in the above table, in both models the interaction variable between 
the target being a non-state actor and the use of a modern aerial strategy has a negative 
coefficient.  This would appear to support the proposition that the combination of a non-
state actor and the use of the modern system leads to a decreased probability of achieving 
the ends of the bombing campaign (which I argue is because of the decreased 
effectiveness of the modern system of air power when it is being used against a non-state 
actor).  The problem, of course, as we can see from this table, is that the coefficients are 
again not significant.   
 Another possibility to consider is of course that it may not be the fact that the 
target is a non-state actor that matters, but that it is using unconventional methods of war.  
Below, I present the results of a similar model that substitutes a measure of whether 
unconventional methods of war were used for the variable that measures whether the 
target was a non-state actor.  I again include a model with only the main independent 
variables (Model 3.3ba) and one that includes the same control variables as in the 
previous two models (Model 3.3bb).   
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Table 7.9: Logit Analysis, the Effect of Unconventional Targets 
 Model 3.3ba  Model 3.3bb  
Constant -1.02 
(1.20) 
-1.35 
(1.29) 
Modern Air Power  1.06 
(2.25) 
2.56 
(2.74) 
Unconventional Target  0.16 
(1.64) 
-0.20 
(1.76) 
Interaction of Modern Air Power and 
Unconventional Target  
-0.82 
(3.12) 
0.30 
(3.46) 
Post 1950  --- -1.55 
(1.43) 
Post 1970  --- 0.26 
(1.33) 
Power Ratio --- 0.01 
(0.01) 
n  47 39 
Log likelihood  -29.96 -24.04 
LR chi2 
(Prob> chi2)  
0.36 
(0.9477) 
 
2.85 
(0.8275) 
Pseudo R2 0.0060 0.0560 
 As we can see from the table above, in the model that includes no control 
variables, the coefficient on the interaction variable (modern air power being used against 
an opponent that is using unconventional methods of war) is negative, as hypothesis 3.3b 
predicts, but it sign switches to positive once the control variables are included.  Also, the 
coefficients are again not significant. 
Again, since the key variables that I am interested in are interactions, it is also 
important to graph the substantive effects.  As before, I again use Monte Carlo 
simulations to present substantive effects (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).  In the 
following graphs, the x-axis represents how modern the aerial strategy being used in the 
campaign is (with higher values representing more modern strategies).  The y-axis 
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represents the probability of being successful in the campaign.  In the graph the dots 
represent mean probabilities, with the lines representing the 90% confidence interval 
around that mean value.  The light grey lines represent cases in which the target was a 
non-state actor (or was fighting using unconventional war) and the dark grey lines 
represent cases in which the target was a state actor (or was fighting using conventional 
methods).   
 
Figure 7.4: Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power, for State and Non-State 
Opponents 
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Figure 7.5: Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power, for Conventional and 
Unconventional Opponents 
  
  
From the two previous figures, it is again difficult to distinguish a significant 
substantive effect using this approach.  I will thus again look at the cross tabulations 
between outcome and the non-state actor/unconventional war variables (as I have already 
shown above the cross-tabulation between outcome and the modern air power variable).   
I begin by looking at the cross-tabulation between the campaign outcome and 
whether the opponent was a non-state actor.  In the table I again present the number of 
cases, as well as the percentage of cases, by column (written in parentheses).  I present 
percentages by column to represent, the difference between the cases that ended in 
success and in failure, both in the cases in which the target was a non-state actor and in 
which it was a state actor: 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
V
ic
to
ry
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Modern Air Power
Unconventional Opponent
, Conventional Opponent
for conventional and unconventional opponents
Campaign Outcome and Modern Air Power
196 
 
Table 7.10: Tabulation, State or Non-State Targets and Outcomes 
 State Target Non-State Target 
Failure 27 
(66%) 
5 
(71%) 
Success 14 
(34%) 
2 
(29%) 
 
In this graph, the cases in which the aerial campaign is being carried out against a 
state actor are 66% failures, whereas the campaigns carried out against non-state actors 
are 71% failures.  While the percentage is higher in the case of non-state actors, the 
difference is minimal.   
I now turn to a cross-tabulation between outcome and cases in which modern air 
power is being used against a non-state actor: 
 
Table 7.11: Tabulation, Aerial Strategy, Non-State Targets, and Outcome 
 Modern Aerial 
Strategy AND Non-
State Target 
Non-Modern 
Aerial Strategy 
AND Non-State 
Target 
Modern Aerial 
Strategy AND 
State Target 
Non-Modern 
Aerial Strategy 
AND State 
Target 
Failure 3 
(100%) 
2 
(50%) 
8 
(62%) 
19 
(68%) 
Success 0 
(0%) 
2 
(50%) 
5 
(38%) 
9 
(32%) 
 
 The percentages on this table seem to show that failure is indeed much more 
likely when a Modern aerial strategy is used against a non-state actor.  Of course, as the 
cases of targeted aerial strategies being used against non-state actors are so few, this 
result would likely not be very stable. 
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 We can do similar cross-tabulations for the case in which the opponent is using 
unconventional modes of war-fighting: 
Table 7.12: Tabulation, Unconventional and Conventional Targets and Outcomes 
 Conventional Target Unconventional Target 
Failure 10 
(63%) 
21 
(68%) 
Success 6 
(37%) 
10 
(32%) 
 
 As we can see in the table above, the is no difference in the percentage of 
campaigns against conventional targets that end in defeat (63%) and the percentage of 
campaigns against unconventional targets that end in defeat (68%).  Thus, I do a similar 
cross-tabulation for the cases in which it is specifically modern aerial strategies that are 
used against an opponent that is using unconventional methods of war-fighting: 
Table 7.13: Tabulation, Aerial Strategy, Unconventional Targets, and Outcome 
 Modern Aerial 
Strategy AND 
Unconventional 
Target 
Non-Modern 
Aerial Strategy 
AND 
Unconventional 
Target 
Modern 
Aerial 
Strategy AND 
Conventional 
Target 
Non-Modern Aerial 
Strategy And 
Conventional 
Target 
Failure 8 
(71%) 
13 
(65%) 
3 
(60%) 
13 
(65%) 
Success 3 
(27%) 
7 
(35%) 
2 
(40%) 
7 
(35%) 
 
 In this case, the percentage of failures when using the targeted system of air 
power against an unconventional target is higher than in other aerial campaigns.  Again, 
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though, because the number of cases is small, the result will not be stable if the one of the 
cases is changed from failure to success. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter took into account the characteristics and strategy of the opponent 
when evaluating the effectiveness of aerial strategies.  While the small sample size makes 
it difficult to draw conclusions from this set of results, this chapter does give us some 
idea of what are some concepts that are worthy of further exploration.  For example, it 
appears to be the case that modern strategies on the ground are in general more resistant 
to aerial attacks.  That being said, there does seem to be some evidence that the more 
effective aerial strategy against a modern ground strategy will be another modern 
strategy.   
 Still, targeted aerial strategies do not appear to be very effective against non-state 
actors or actors using unconventional methods of war-fighting.  While the evidence for 
this claim is somewhat weak, it is an argument that could be further explored through 
case studies, for example. 
 There does not appear to be much evidence for targeted aerial campaigns being 
less effective against opponents that are fighting in rough terrain.  As stated earlier, 
though, this might be because the theory refers to all types of rough terrain, while the 
operationalization of terrain takes only mountainous terrain into account.   
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation project began with the premise that there is no ideal aerial 
strategy that will lead to greater effectiveness in all circumstances, but rather that 
different aerial strategies will be more effective in different types of conflict.  Thus, its 
largest contribution was to explore how different aerial strategies perform under actual 
bombing campaigns, taking into account the actions of ground troops, as well as the 
general characteristics of the conflict.   I not only considered how aerial strategies could 
affect the outcome of the conflict (viewed as either success or defeat), but also how they 
influence how the conflict played out, particularly considering how aerial strategies affect 
the duration of bombing campaigns. 
 
Data Contribution 
 Independently of the analysis, one major contribution of this project was the data 
collection, which not only added new information on aerial bombing campaigns to 
available data sources, but also derived a new classification of aerial strategies based on 
characteristics that go beyond the identification of a target as either military or non-
military.  Deriving this new classification created a need to classify and collect data on 
both aerial and ground strategy, which I have done in this project.  By making this data 
(and the coding scheme) publicly available I believe that I will allow researchers whose 
research question requires them to look beyond the identification of a target as either 
military or civilian.   
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 To study the effectiveness of aerial strategies, I needed a way to categorize them.  
The categorization I developed in this project was based on Stephen Biddle’s (2004) 
modern system of force employment as well as John Warden’s discussion (2000)  of 
centers of gravity. I distinguished between modern and non-modern uses of air power.  
The unit of analysis was the aerial campaign, which is defined as “A series of related 
major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given 
time and space” (Department of Defense 2012). Modern uses of air power are those 
campaigns that are more targeted, and in which the aim of the campaign is not to destroy 
the opponent, but rather to disrupt its operations for a long-enough period of time in order 
to exploit this opportunity and achieve the campaign’s aims.   
In creating the coding scheme I distinguished between three different uses of air 
power: close-air support, interdiction and strategic attack
51
.  For each use of air power I 
created a set of questions that could be answered in either the affirmative or negative.  I 
then aggregated these responses (for the particular use of air power that was employed in 
each campaign) into a single measure of how “modern” the use of air power in that 
                                                             
51
 Air interdiction refers to air operations conducted to divert (divert enemy forces from the places where 
they are most needed, or to more vulnerable areas), disrupt (disrupt command and control, intelligence, 
transportation, supply lines and psychological will), delay (delay to gain time for friendly forces, to 
pressure the opponent to attempt urgent movement, or to maintain the initiative), or destroy (destroy enemy 
forces and supplies, or create the perception of imminent destruction) the enemy’s military potential before 
it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives (Air Force 
Basic Doctrine 2003).    
To define close air support I use the Department of Defense Dictionary’s definition: Air action by fixed and 
rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require 
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.  The proximity of close 
air support to friendly forces is not defined by actual distances, but rather by a “range within which some 
form of terminal attack control is required for fratricide prevention” (Counterland Operations 2006).   
Strategic attack can be defined using the United States Air Force’s Basic Doctrine, which states that 
strategic attack is “offensive action conducted by command authorities aimed at generating effects that 
most directly achieve […] national security objectives by affecting the adversary’s leadership, conflict-
sustaining resources, and strategy” (200340).  We can also refer to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, 
which states that  "”strategic bombing […] is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which 
will most weaken the enemy by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war” (US 
Strategic Bombing Survey, Jan 1947, p.2, pt. 2). The USAF Basic Doctrine best sums up strategic attack in 
noting that it is about attacking the enemy as a system, not just on the field.   
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campaign was.  There were two major advantages to using this approach for coding the 
data (rather than just identifying each use as either modern or non-modern).  The first was 
that it allowed me to have a continuous measure of how modern the use of air power is.  
This fits well with the theory used in this project, as I have argued that most uses of air 
power (if not all) are a combination of modern and non-modern elements.  The second 
advantage was that this approach helped to protect me against having my previous 
impressions of the campaigns bias my coding.  Answering specific questions one at a 
time allows me to be more objective in my coding, and to have to base myself on 
historical accounts or primary documents, rather than my own previous impressions.  
Using this approach also meant that it would be easier for others using the data to decide 
to use only some of the questions in creating an index and/or to choose a different 
weighting scheme than I did.   
Most of the existing datasets that include categorization of ground strategies (for 
example, those that distinguish between maneuver, attrition and punishment strategies) 
appear to take into account aerial strategies as well.  Since I wanted to study the impact of 
air power separately from ground power, the existing dataset were not appropriate for my 
research
52
.  The creation of a ground strategy variable which distinguished between a 
range of modern and non-modern aerial strategies, followed an analogous process to the 
creation of the air power variable and had the added advantage of allowing me to 
compare the two strategies on the same terms.  
                                                             
52
 Note that in Chapter 7, to measure the ground strategy of the opponent, I used a dataset created by 
Matthew Knuth (2012).  Unlike previous datasets, this one does distinguish between military strategies on 
the ground, air and sea.  This dataset, though, is very recent and was not complete at the time I was 
considering datasets to use in measuring the ground strategy that the state carrying out the aerial campaign 
was using. 
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This project represented a first draft of the dataset that classified different 
strategies of air power.  While I felt comfortable analyzing these present data, in the 
future I would like to expand it to include a more detailed operational definition of 
modern and non-modern air power.  A more detailed operational definition should also 
help with potential problems of reliability of the data (as this would leave less room for 
ambiguity when conducting the coding).   
 
Military Doctrines and Aerial Strategies 
 Before studying the effect of aerial strategies on the durations or outcomes of 
campaigns, I had to address the possibility that states would simply choose their aerial 
strategy based on the characteristics of their opponents. This would result in a strong 
selection bias.  If states optimized their aerial strategy based on the characteristics of their 
opponents, any results on the effect of aerial strategies on the outcomes of aerial 
campaigns (or conflicts) would not be generalizable to other cases. 
   If this alternative was correct then air strategy choice would be predicted by the 
characteristics of the opponent.  The alternative idea I suggested was that military 
doctrines are more likely to have an effect on aerial strategy selection than are the 
characteristics of the conflict or opponent that the state is fighting.  In order to consider 
these two possibilities, I conducted an empirical test that asked the question of whether 
the characteristics of the opponent predict strategy choice.  I compared two different 
models, one that included only some control variables (such as time and the capabilities 
of the attacker) that would be expected to affected the choice of aerial strategies and 
another that included the characteristics of the opponent.  After conducting the analysis 
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using both of these models, I conducted a likelihood ratio test to compare the fit of the 
two models.  The results showed that the model that included the characteristics of the 
opponent added very little value to the model that included only the control variables.   
The results seems to lend support to the idea that states do not modify their aerial 
strategies for every new conflict that they fight.  Of course, this was a null finding, and 
not necessarily evidence that it was military doctrines that drove strategy choice.  
Because of this, I went on to do some additional work.  I also conducted a qualitative 
comparison of the aerial strategies of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan.  These were cases of two major powers, whose capabilities are 
reasonably close to each other (within this sample), fighting in similar time periods 
against foes that, by the metrics being used, looked similar to each other.  At the same 
time, there were vast differences in the military doctrines of both the US and the USSR, 
with the American doctrine placing a much stronger emphasis on the modern style of air 
power.  I argued that if states really were to choose the “best” possible aerial strategy for 
each conflict, then the United States and the Soviet Union should have chosen similar 
strategies.  Instead, it appears to be the case that both the U.S. and the USSR chose aerial 
strategies that were different from each other, and in line with their respective military 
doctrines. 
 In the future, I would like to further explore the question of how it is that states 
select their military strategies.  This would entail building an actual model of strategy 
choice that incorporated military doctrine as a factor that can affect military strategies.  
Testing this model would require obtaining data on what the military strategies of states 
were.  The collection of these data would be useful in understanding the link between 
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doctrine and strategy, as it would allow me to test the hypotheses on aerial strategy 
selection directly. 
 
Air and Ground Strategies 
 As stated earlier, one of the major contributions of this dissertation was to study 
air power in conjunction with ground forces.  While air-only campaigns are interesting 
and have received much attention from the media, it is also true that most air campaigns 
also include some sort of ground component.  The next step in this project was thus to 
understand how the presence of ground troops can affect what happens during an aerial 
bombing campaign.  So, for example, how would the aerial campaign in Libya been 
different if NATO had also included ground troops in their intervention?  Would it have 
concluded faster due to the added advantage of combined arms?  Would NATO have lost 
the option of a quick victory? 
I considered how the interaction of ground troops with an aerial campaign would 
affect its duration.  In an era when air power is advocated based in part on its ability to 
achieve quick and easy victories, I was interested in comparing what the durations of 
campaigns that used ground troops were, compared to air only campaigns.  In particular I 
was interested in observing whether different types of aerial campaigns (modern and non-
modern ones) reacted differently to the introduction of ground troops. 
 I made the argument that modern aerial campaigns should have shorter durations 
than non-modern campaigns.  Because modern air campaigns are considered to be riskier 
(S. Biddle 2004), they should lead to either overwhelming victories or overwhelming 
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defeats
53
.  In contrast, the less risky non-modern strategies should lead to victories or 
defeats that are not overwhelming.   I then argued that in the overwhelming victories or 
defeats, as it is obvious that one side will prevail over the other, campaigns should have 
shorter durations.  Thus, my first hypothesis expected the duration of modern aerial 
campaigns to be shorter than the duration of non-modern aerial campaigns. 
 Of course, this did not yet take ground forces into account.  I argued that ground 
forces serve the following three main purposes, when it comes to their interaction with air 
power: 
1. Increased effectiveness of the aerial campaign, due to the combined arms 
approach 
2. Target identification 
3. Post-bombing assessments 
All three of these roles should contribute to shorter campaigns.  In their intelligence 
roles, ground troops allow air power to destroy targets more accurately without having to 
re-bomb areas (which saves time and resources).  In the combined forces role, ground 
troops contribute to increased effectiveness of the campaign, which should lead to shorter 
campaigns.  Thus, I also included a second hypothesis which stated that aerial campaigns 
that involve ground troops should be shorter than those that do not. 
 Up until this point, I had considered only a dichotomous measure of whether 
ground troops were present or not.  Of course, in order to understand the interaction of 
aerial and ground troops, it was also important to consider the strategies of the ground 
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 Note that when I talk about overwhelming defeats I don’t necessarily mean that one side had to incur 
very heavy military casualties and be completely overwhelmed by a stronger opponent (though this would 
certainly fall into the category of an overwhelming defeat), but also refer to cases in which a campaign fails 
in its objective and it becomes obvious to the attacker state that this approach will not serve to achieve its 
aims.  In other words, cases in which the state chooses to “cut its losses” and give up on the aims.   
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troops.  Thus, I also explored whether the military strategy that the ground troops were 
using mattered towards the expected duration of the aerial campaigns.  The first 
possibility that I considered was that modern aerial strategies, when combined with 
modern ground strategies, would lead to shorter aerial campaigns.  This was because 
modern aerial strategies do not necessarily rely on destroying the opponent, but rather on 
opening up windows of opportunity that, if properly taken advantage of, could lead to the 
collapse of the opponent’s forces.  In order for ground troops to be able to take advantage 
of these windows of opportunity, it may be necessary for them to be operating under a 
similar way as the air power.  In other words, their strategy should emphasize momentum 
and surprise, elements that will take full advantage of these opportunities. 
 The other possible explanation would be that ground troops serve mostly an 
informational role (that of gathering intelligence on target locations and post-bombing 
assessment) when it comes to aerial campaigns.  Thus, independently of their military 
strategy, they should lead to shorter aerial campaigns.  I considered the possibility that 
the strategy of ground troops would affect the duration of the conflict as a whole, but that 
when it came to the duration of aerial campaigns, the strategy of the ground troops would 
not affect its duration.   
 I found that modern aerial campaigns did indeed appear to have a shorter average 
duration than non-modern aerial campaigns.  The presence of ground troops also 
appeared to contribute to shorter durations, but what was particularly interesting was the 
interaction of these two variables.   Rather than having a uniform effect across the 
different uses of air power, the effect of ground troops varied depending on how modern 
the aerial strategy at use is.  In cases of non-modern military strategies, adding ground 
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troops contributed to shorter campaigns.  Thus, it appeared that in these cases, as the 
hypothesis predicted, ground troops served to compensate for some of the shortcomings 
of the air power, leading to shorter campaigns. 
In the case of the most modern uses of air power, though, the presence of ground 
troops led to longer campaign durations.  A tentative explanation for this observation may 
be that in these most modern of cases, states were losing the option of coming in quickly, 
bombing a key target, and getting out as soon as possible.  Once ground troops are 
brought in, evacuating them becomes more complicated than simply asking aircraft to 
turn around.  Thus, this may add logistical complication will add to the duration of the 
campaign. 
This relationship held even when I conducted the analysis using a competing risks 
model, distinguishing between cases that ended in success and ones that ended in defeat.  
Ground troops, rather than having a single effect on the duration of aerial campaigns, 
instead seemed to moderate the duration, with mean values being more constant 
throughout the different uses of air power.  This was an interesting finding, as it helps us 
to understand what effect the introduction of ground troops might have on different types 
of aerial campaigns.  In the case of the most modern campaigns, adding ground troops 
increased the duration, whereas in the case of the least modern campaigns, ground troops 
shortened it. 
When it comes to the strategy of the ground troops that were being used in 
conjunction with air power, my results seemed to support the proposition that it is the 
presence of ground troops, rather than the actual strategy that they are using, that affects 
the duration of aerial campaign.  Distinguishing between modern and non-modern uses of 
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ground power does not appear to make a difference in determining the duration of aerial 
campaigns.  Again, here I would like to reiterate that at this point I studied solely the 
duration of air campaigns, not of the conflict as a whole.  It may of course be the case 
that the strategy of the ground troops matters in determining the duration of the conflict 
as a whole, but not of the aerial campaign
54
.   
A further avenue for research is to consider whether there is something unique about 
campaigns that include ground troops that can affect their duration.  It may be the case 
that the air campaigns which also include a ground component are those in which the 
state conducting the aerial attack has more “resolve.”  Of course, the term “resolve” has 
tended to be used generally and vaguely, and the challenge would be to find a measure of 
resolve that is independent of the outcome of the conflict and the presence of ground 
troops.   
The main contribution of this chapter was to explain how different uses of air power 
affect how aerial campaigns will play out, particularly referring to how long they will 
last.  It did so for both cases of success and defeat, as well as taking into account the role 
that ground troops play in determining how the campaign will develop.  
 
The Opponent 
 I did not find much support for the possibility that the characteristics of the 
opponent determine the strategy choice of the state carrying out the aerial campaign.  
That being said, this does not mean that the characteristics of the opponent will not affect 
the outcome of the campaign.  Thus, while earlier I focused on decisions made by the 
                                                             
54 Another issue with this analysis might be the fact that in this case all of the cases of air-only campaigns 
have to be dropped, reducing an already small sample.  This makes it more difficult to conduct “large-N” 
empirical analysis on the data.   
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state carrying out the aerial campaign and how they affect the duration of the campaign, I 
then moved on to focusing on how the characteristics and strategies of the opponent 
affect the outcome of the campaign. 
 In particular, I studied how the effectiveness of different aerial strategies (modern 
and non-modern ones) is affected by both the strategy and the characteristics of the 
opponent.  Because I argued that these characteristics do not determine the strategy 
choice of the state carrying out the aerial campaign, I found it possible to conduct this 
analysis.  If the strategy choice of the state was not determined by the characteristics of 
the particular conflict (or opponent) I could study its effects on the outcomes.  In this 
analysis, the dependent variable was the outcome of the aerial campaign (coded as either 
a success or a defeat, depending on whether the aims of the campaign were achieved). 
 I began by considering the military strategy of the opponent.  Biddle (2004) 
argues that in general, modern ground strategies are less vulnerable to aerial attacks.  I 
thus made the argument that the most effective way to conduct an aerial campaign against 
a modern ground strategy was to use a modern aerial strategy (Biddle also argues that the 
best way to counter modern defenses is through another modern attack).  The first 
hypothesis from this section stated that modern aerial strategies will be more effective 
against modern ground strategies than non-modern aerial strategies. 
 Besides the strategy chosen by the opponent, I also considered the characteristics 
of the opponent, and of the conflict itself.  One possibility that I considered was that 
modern aerial attacks, which rely on the identification and destruction of key targets that 
are expected to have repercussions throughout the system, would be less effective against 
non-state actors.  This would be the case because non-state actors are less likely to have 
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these types of key targets, and if they do not exist then they cannot be bombed.  It is also 
a possibility that opponents that fight like non-state actors, using guerrilla and 
unconventional warfare, may be less vulnerable to these types of attacks, for the same 
reasons as non-state actors would be.  The next two hypotheses thus stated that modern 
aerial attacks would be less effective against non-state actors or actors fighting in 
unconventional ways. 
 Finally, I considered whether the area in which the conflict is being fought affects 
the effectiveness of different aerial strategies.  In particular, I considered whether rough 
terrain may make it more difficult to carry out targeted, modern strategies, as it becomes 
more difficult to identify key targets when they terrain is rough.  Rough terrain will not 
be as large of a problem in the case of more indiscriminate bombing that does not rely as 
heavily on the identification of particular targets.  The final hypothesis thus stated that 
modern aerial attacks would be less effective under rough terrain.   
 I found limited support for most of these hypotheses.  While the signs of the 
coefficients in the analysis were mostly in the expected directions, they lacked statistical 
significance.  This might have to do with the limited number of cases, or with the need 
for more specific data that better operationalizes the variables in question.  I believe that 
to continue studying this question in the future I may need to engage in further data 
collection or use more detailed cases studies. 
 Another avenue for future study may be to distinguish between cases of close-air 
support, interdiction, and strategic attack.  It may be the case that the effect of aerial 
strategies on the outcomes of aerial campaigns (and of conflict) may be different for each 
one of these uses of air power.  For example, there is much evidence that shows that 
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strategic bombing of population centers (which would be considered non-modern) is 
ineffective (Pape [1996], to cite one example).  Yet we can easily imagine cases in which 
non-modern interdiction may be more effective than modern interdiction (for example, 
when fighting guerrilla fighters in rough terrain).  This means that the lack of clear results 
on the effectiveness on different strategies of air power may have resulted from not 
drawing a distinction between these cases.  In the future I would also be interested in 
studying whether strategy changes during a campaign or across multiple campaigns in the 
same war.  This would allow me to consider the possibility that states may adapt to each 
other during a conflict, changing their aerial strategies to best respond to each other. 
  
The Project 
 Overall, this project’s contribution was to provide a deeper understanding of the 
different ways in which air power can be used, and how that will affect aerial campaigns.  
This project challenged us to draw finer distinctions in the use of air power, and to ask 
how they may lead to different outcomes of aerial campaigns.   
This project also took into account ground forces.   There are few pieces in the 
quantitative international relations literature that consider both ground and air strategies 
(of the state carrying out the aerial attack and of its opponent), yet we know that states 
consider both attacks in the air and on the ground when making decisions in war.  I 
believe that this project will help to move the study of air power in a direction that takes 
into account its interaction with ground forces, as well as different ways in which air 
power can be utilized.  By studying military strategies holistically we can move closer to 
an understanding of the actual exchange of information that takes place on the battlefield.     
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Throughout this chapter I have mentioned various questions that have been 
brought up by this project.  Some of them were motivated by unexpected results and 
others are simply the natural extension of the current conclusions. The nature of science 
is often to generate more questions rather than answers, and so these new questions are 
part of the project’s contribution.  These questions, along with the conclusions, will 
hopefully help to motivate further studies on the effectiveness of air power in conflict.    
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Appendix A: Raw Data 
Variabl
e 
Campaig
n name 
Campaign 
number 
War 
name 
COW 
War 
ID Attacker 
Attacker 
COW ID Target 
Allen 
date 
Target 
COW 
ID 
Variabl
e 
Name 
Campaig
n 
CampaignI
D War 
WarI
D Attacker 
AttackerI
D Target date 
TargetI
D 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden  
World 
War II 15 Allies 2 Germany 1945 255 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee  
1982 
Lebanon 
War 37 Israel 666 PLO 
1982-
1985 . 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon    
United 
States 2 Libya 1986 620 
 Blitz  
World 
War II 13 Germany  255 Britain 
Aug. 
1940 200 
   Gulf War 47 Iraq 645 Israel 1991 666 
   
World 
War II 11 USSR 366 Finland 
1939-
1940 375 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg   36 Israel 666 PLO 1985 . 
   
Iran-Iraq 
War 39 Iran 630 Iraq 
1980-
1988 645 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike   45 US 2 Iraq 1996 645 
 
Manchuri
a  
Second 
Sino-
Japanese 
War 7 Japan 740 China 
1937-
1945 710 
   
World 
War II 16 Allies 2 Japan 
Aug. 
1945 740 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m  
World 
War II 12 Germany  255 Netherlands 1940 210 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks  
Nigerian-
Biafran 
War 32 
Biafran 
Rebels . Nigeria 1967 475 
   
World 
War II 8 Germany  255 
Britain/Fran
ce 1939 200 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force  
Kosovo 
War 51 NATO 2 Yugoslavia 1999 345 
   
Soviet-
Afghan 
War 36 USSR 365 Afghanistan 
1979-
1988 700 
   
Korean 
War 25 
United 
States 2 
North 
Korea/Chin
a 
1950-
1951 731 
 
Rolling 
Thunder  
Vietnam 
War 31 
United 
States 2 
North 
Vietnam 
1965-
1968 816 
   
Second 
Italo-
Ethiopian 
War 4 Italy 325 Ethiopia 1936 530 
    2 Britain 200 
Somali 
Rebels 1920 520 
     Israel 666 PLO 
1970-
1979 . 
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Tanker 
War  
Iran-Iraq 
War 41 Iran 630 
Saudi 
Arabia/Kuw
ait 
1984-
1986 670 
   WWI 1 Germany  255 Britain 1917 200 
   WWII 19 Allies 2 Italy 1943 325 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt   3 Britain 200 Turkey 
1922-
1924 640 
   
Spanish 
Civil War  
Spanish 
Nationalists . 
Spanish 
Loyalists 
1936-
1938 . 
 
Polish 
invasion  
World 
War II  Germany  255 Poland 1939 290 
 
Battle of 
Britain  
World 
War II  Germany  255 Britain 
Sept. 
1940 200 
 
Battle of 
Britain  
World 
War II  Britain 200 Germany 1940 255 
   
World 
War II  Britain 200 Germany 
1940-
1942 255 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War  
World 
War II  
United 
States 2 Japan 1942 740 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944  
World 
War II  Allies 2 Germany 
1942-
1944 255 
   
Arab 
Israeli 
War  Egypt 651 Israel 1948 666 
   
Arab 
Israeli 
War  Israel 666 Egypt 1948 651 
   
Korean 
War  
United 
States 2 
North 
Korea/Chin
a 1953 731 
   
French-
Algerian 
War  France 220 Algeria 
1954-
1962 615 
   
Suez 
Crisis  
Britain/Fran
ce 200 Egypt 1956 651 
   
Suez 
Crisis  USSR 365 
Britain/Fran
ce 1956 200 
   
Cuban 
Missile 
Crisis  
United 
States 2 USSR 1962 365 
 
Lineback
er I and II  
Vietnam 
War  
United 
States 2 
North 
Vietnam 1972 816 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt  
The War 
of Attrition  Israel 666 Egypt 
1969-
1970 651 
   
Soviet-
Afghan 
War  USSR 365 Pakistan 
1979-
1986 770 
   
Iran-Iraq 
War  Iraq 645 Iran 
1980-
1988 630 
 
War of 
the Cities  
Iran-Iraq 
War  Iran 630 Iraq 1987 645 
 
War of 
the Cities  
Iran-Iraq 
War  Iraq 645 Iran 
1987-
1988 630 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox  
Operation 
Desert 
Fox  US 2 Iraq 1998 645 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  Russia 365 Chechnya 
1994-
1996 . 
 
2nd 
Russian-  
2nd 
Russian-  Russia  365 Chechnya 1999 . 
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Chechen 
War 
Chechen 
War 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis  
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis  China 710 Taiwan 1996 713 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea)  
Kargil 
War  India 750 Pakistan 1999 770 
 
Desert 
Storm  
First Gulf 
War  Allies 2 Iraq 1991 645 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat
e Force  
Operation 
Deliberate 
Force  NATO 2 Serbia 1995 345 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia  Gulf War  Iraq 645 
Saudi 
Arabia 1991 670 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom  
Afghanist
an War  US 2 Afghanistan 
October 
7, 2001-
Decemb
er 
17,2001 700 
 Iraq War  Iraq War  US 2 Iraq 
March 
20-May 
1, 2003 645 
 
Part 2 
Variab
le 
Campaig
n name 
Campaig
n start 
date 
Campaig
n end 
date 
Use of 
Air 
Power 
Variabl
es 
Use of 
interdicti
on (1,0) 
 Are air 
operation
s being 
conducte
d to 
divert, 
disrupt, 
delay, or 
destroy 
the 
enemy’s 
military 
potential 
before it 
can be 
brought 
to bear 
effectivel
y against 
friendly 
forces or 
otherwis
e 
achieve 
objective
s? 
Is the 
distance 
of the use 
of air 
power far 
enough 
from 
friendly 
forces 
that 
detailed 
integratio
n of the 
air 
mission 
with 
friendly 
forces is 
not 
required? 
Are 
targets 
military 
resource
s that the 
enemy 
could 
have 
used 
against 
the 
nation in 
question? 
Is air 
power 
directed 
against 
targets 
that are 
contributi
ng to 
reinforcin
g the land 
battle? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campaig
n Start End  
Interdictio
n DDD 
NoIntegra
te 
Milresour
ce Reinforce 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden 
2/13/194
5    1 1 1 1 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 1982 1985   1 0 1 1 
 
Operatio
n El 
4/15/198
6    1 . 0 0 
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Dorado 
Canyon 
 Blitz 
8/24/194
0 
9/24/194
0   1 1 0 0 
  
1/18/199
1 
2/28/199
1   0 1 0 0 
  
11/30/19
39 
3/12/194
0   0 . 0 . 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 
10/1/198
5 
10/1/198
5   0 1 0 0 
  
9/22/198
0 
8/20/198
0   1 0 1 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 9/3/1996 9/4/1996   1 1 1 0 
 
Manchuri
a 7/7/1937 9/9/1945   0 1 0 0 
  8/6/1945 8/9/1945   0 1 0 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 
5/13/194
0 
5/14/194
0   1 1 0 0 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks     1 1 1 1 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 
3/24/199
9 
6/10/199
9   0 1 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 
      1 1 1 0 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 
2/24/196
5 
10/31/19
68   1 0 1 1 
  
10/2/193
5 5/5/1936       
      1 1 1 1 
          
 
Tanker 
War 
5/13/198
4 
10/1/198
7   0 1 0 0 
  
5/23/191
7 
10/1/191
7   0 1 0 0 
  
10/1/194
2 8/1/1943   0 1 0 0 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 
10/22/19
22 6/1/1923   0 1 0 0 
  
8/14/193
6 
9/29/193
8   0 0 1 1 
 
Polish 
invasion 9/1/1939 
9/27/193
9   0 1 0 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 
7/10/194
0 
10/31/19
40   1 1 1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 
7/10/194
0 
10/31/19
40   1 1 1 0 
  7/1/1941 6/1/1942   0 1 0 0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 
4/18/194
2 
12/15/19
42   1 1 1 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944 1/1/1942 
12/31/19
44   0 1 0 0 
  
5/15/194
8 
2/24/194
9   0 1 0 0 
  5/31/194    1 1 1 1 
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8 
          
  
11/1/195
4 
3/19/196
2   1 0 1 1 
  
10/31/19
56 
11/6/195
6   1 1 1 0 
          
          
 
Lineback
er I and 
II 
5/10/197
2 
1/27/197
3   1 1 1 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 
20/07/19
69 4/1/1970   0 1 1 1 
  1/1/1979 
12/31/19
86   1 1 1 1 
  
9/22/198
0 6/1/1988 1  1 1 1 0 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 2/6/1987 
4/20/198
7   0 1 0 0 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 2/7/1987 
7/15/198
7   1 1 1 0 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 
12/17/19
98 
12/20/19
98   1 1 1 0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 
12/11/19
94 
8/31/199
6   1 1 1 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 
9/24/199
9 
2/15/200
0   1 1 1 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis 
6/18/190
5 
6/18/190
5   . . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 
5/26/199
9 
7/18/199
9   1 1 1 1 
 
Desert 
Storm 
1/19/199
1 
2/28/199
1   1 1 1 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat
e Force 
8/29/199
5 
9/14/199
5   1 0 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 
1/18/199
1 
2/28/199
1   0 1 0 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom 
10/7/200
1 3/2/2002   1 1 1 1 
 Iraq War 
3/20/200
3 5/1/2003   1 1 1 1 
 
Part 3 
Variab
le 
Campaig
n name 
Is the 
aim of 
the 
attack to 
cut off 
ground 
Are the 
targets lines 
of 
communicati
on whose 
destruction 
Use of 
close 
air 
suppo
rt (1,0) 
Is the 
air 
action 
against 
hostile 
targets 
Is 
detailed 
integrati
on of 
missions 
with 
Is the 
attack 
carried 
out at a 
range 
from the 
Is air 
power 
being 
used in 
preparati
on for 
Is air power 
being used 
as 
reinforceme
nt of 
attacks on 
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forces 
from 
comman
d and 
supply 
lines in 
order to 
make 
them 
more 
vulnerab
le to 
attack? 
would 
impede the 
movement 
of the 
enemy's 
forces (for 
examples, 
bridges or 
highways 
that the 
enemy 
needs to 
cross in 
order to 
conduct an 
attack)? 
that are 
in close 
proximi
ty to 
friendly 
forces? 
friendly 
ground 
forces 
required
? 
battlefield 
within 
which 
terminal 
attack 
control is 
required 
for 
fratricide 
preventio
n? 
battle? the ground? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campaig
n CutOff Movement CAS 
Proximi
ty 
Integrati
on TAC Prep 
ReinforceC
AS 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden 0 1  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 Blitz 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  1 . . 1 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  1 0  . 0 0 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Manchuri
a 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 0 0  0 0 0 1 1 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks 0 0       
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 0 1  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  1 1 1 1 1 
  1 1  1 . . 1 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 0 1  1 1 0 1 1 
     1 0 0 1 1 
  0 0  0 0 0 1 1 
          
 
Tanker 
War 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 0 0  0 0 0 1 1 
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  0 0  1 0 0 1 1 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0  0 0 0 1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  1 1 1 1 1 
  0 0  0 0 0 1 1 
          
  1 0  1 1 1 1 1 
  0 1  0 0 0 1 1 
          
          
 
Lineback
er I and 
II 1 1  0 0 0 1 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 0 1  1 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0  0 0 0 1 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 0 1  1 1 1 1 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 0  1 1 1 1 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . . . . . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
 
Desert 
Storm 1 1  0 0 0 1 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat
e Force 1 1  0 1 1 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 1 0  1 1 1 1 1 
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Freedom 
 Iraq War 0 0  1 1 1 1 1 
 
Part 4 
Variabl
e 
Campaign 
name 
Use of 
strategi
c attack 
(1,0) 
Is the aim 
of the 
attack to 
affect the 
enemy's 
leadership
, conflict-
sustaining 
resources 
and 
strategy? 
Is the use 
of air 
power 
aimed at 
destroyin
g 
resources 
that will 
weaken 
the 
enemy 
and its 
ability to 
prosecute 
the war? 
Is the attack 
carried out at 
a large 
distance 
from the 
battlefield 
Does 
the 
attack 
aim to 
target 
the 
enemy'
s 
sources 
of 
strength 
without 
first 
having 
to 
engage 
military 
forces? 
Is the 
attack 
intended 
to attack 
the enemy 
as a 
system, 
not just on 
the 
battlefield
? 
Dominant use 
interdiction 
(1,0) 
Variabl
e Name Campaign Strategic Leader Weaken 
Longdistanc
e 
Source
s System 
DomInterdictio
n 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden  0 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Operation 
Peace for 
Galilee  0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Operation 
El Dorado 
Canyon  0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Blitz  1 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 0 1 0 0  
   0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operation 
Wooden 
Leg  1 0 1 1 1 0 
   1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Strike  1 0 1 1 0 0 
 Manchuria  1 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterdam  1 1 0 1 1 0 
 
Biafran Air 
Force 
Attacks  0 0 0 1 1 1 
  . . . . . . . 
 
Operation 
Allied 
Force  1 1 1 1 1 0 
   1 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunder  1 1 0 1 1 1 
     0 0 1 0 
   1 1 0 0 0 1 
         
 
Tanker 
War  0 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 0 1 1 1 0 
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   0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt  1 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Polish 
invasion  0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain  1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain  1 1 1 0 1 1 
   0 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War  0 0 1 0 1 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-1944  0 1 1 1 1 0 
   0 0 1 0 1 0 
   0 0 1 1 1 1 
         
   0 1 0 0 0 1 
   0 1 1 1 0 1 
         
         
 
Linebacke
r I and II  1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt  1 1 1 1 1 1 
   0 0 1 0 0 1 
   1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
War of the 
Cities  0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
War of the 
Cities  1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Fox  1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . . . . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea)  1 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Desert 
Storm  1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Operation 
Deliberate 
Force  1 0 1 1 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia  0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
Operation 
Enduring 
Freedom  1 1 1 0 0 1 
 Iraq War  1 0 1 1 1 1 
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Part 5 
Variab
le 
Campai
gn name 
Domina
nt use 
CAS 
(1,0) 
Dominant 
use 
strategic 
(1,0) 
Moder
n Air 
Power 
Variabl
es 
Mode
rn Air 
Powe
r (1,0) 
In the 
case of 
interdicti
on 
Are the 
targets 
non-
military 
(e.g.  
roads, 
warehouse
s)? 
Are lines of 
communicat
ion and 
transportati
on (bridges, 
highways) 
being 
targeted? 
Are 
defenses 
avoided 
(going 
directly to 
center of 
gravity)? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campai
gn 
DomC
AS 
DomStrate
gic   
ModAi
r  NonMilTar Comm 
DefenseAv
oid 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden 0 1    1 1 . 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 1 0    0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 0 1    0 0 1 
 Blitz 0 1    1 0 1 
       1 0 1 
  1 .    0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 0 1    1 0 1 
  0 1    0 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 0 1    0 0 1 
 
Manchur
ia 0 1    1 0 1 
  0 1    1 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 0 1    1 0 1 
 
Biafran 
Air 
Force 
Attacks 0 0    0 0 1 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 0 1    1 1 1 
  1 1    1 0 0 
  1 1    1 0 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 0 0    0 1 0 
  1 0    0 0 0 
  0 0    0 0 1 
          
 
Tanker 
War 0 1    1 0 1 
  0 1    1 0 1 
  0 1    1 0 1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 0 1    1 0 1 
  1 1    0 0 0 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 1    1 1 0 
 Battle of 0 1    1 0 0 
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Britain 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 1    1 0 0 
  0 1    1 0 1 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 1 0    0 0 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
German
y 1942-
1944 0 1    1 0 0 
  0 1    1 0 1 
  1 1    0 0 0 
          
  1 0    0 0 0 
  0 1    0 0 0 
          
          
 
Linebac
ker I and 
II 0 1    1 1 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 0 1    1 1 1 
  0 0    0 0 0 
  0 1    0 0 0 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 1    1 0 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 1    1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 0 1    0 0 1 
 
1st 
Russian-
Cheche
n War 1 0    1 1 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Cheche
n War 1 0    0 0 0 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . .  . . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 0    0 0 0 
 
Desert 
Storm 0 1    1 1 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Delibera
te Force 1 1    1 1 0 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 0 1    1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Endurin
g 
Freedo
m 1 1    0 0 0 
 Iraq War 1 1    0 0 1 
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Part 6 
Variab
le 
Campaig
n name 
Can 
defense
s be 
avoided 
in this 
situatio
n? 
Is the 
support 
infrastruct
ure 
(supply 
lines) 
being 
targeted? 
Is the 
aim of 
the 
attack to 
create a 
temporar
y 
window 
of 
opportun
ity that 
can be 
taken 
advanta
ge of by 
ground 
forces? 
Are non-
combat 
military 
units, such 
as 
headquarte
rs, being 
targeted? 
Is the 
source 
of 
troops 
or 
materiel 
being 
targeted
? 
In the 
case 
of 
strateg
ic 
Are 
centers 
of gravity 
being 
targeted
? 
Does the 
attack 
cause a 
limited 
amount of 
indirect 
collateral 
damage 
and not 
have a long-
term impact 
on the 
civilian 
economy? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campaig
n 
CanAvo
id 
SupplyLin
e Window HQ 
SourceT
ar  
CenGrav
ity 
SmallCollat
eral 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden . 1 0 0 1  . 0 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 1 0 0 1 1  0 0 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 1 0 0 0 1  0 1 
 Blitz 0 0 0 0 1  1 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 1 0 0 1 0  1 1 
  1 1 0 0 1  1 0 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 
 
Manchur
ia 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 1 0 0 0 0  1 0 
 
Biafran 
Air 
Force 
Attacks 1 0 0 0 1  1 1 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 1 1 0 1 1  1 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  1 1 0 0 1  1 0 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 0 1 0 0 1  1 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  1 0 0 0 1  1 1 
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Tanker 
War 1 1 0 0 0  0 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  1 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  1 1 1 0 1  0 0 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0 0 1 1  1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0 0 0 1  1 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
German
y 1942-
1944 0 0 0 0 0  1 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
          
  1 1 1 0 1  0 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
          
          
 
Lineback
er I and 
II 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 1 0 0 0 1  1 1 
  1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
  1 0 0 0 1  1 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 0 1 1  1 0 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 1 0 0 1 1  0 1 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 1 0 0 0  0 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . . . . . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 1 0 1 0  0 1 
 
Desert 
Storm 1 1 0 1 1  1 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat 1 1 0 1 0  0 1 
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e Force 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 1 0 0 0 0  0 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom 1 1 0 1 1  0 1 
 Iraq War 1 0 0 1 1  0 1 
Part 7 
Variabl
e 
Campaig
n name 
Can the 
attack 
be 
carried 
out 
without 
causing 
collateral 
damage 
and 
impactin
g the 
civilian 
econom
y? 
Are targets 
selected to 
impair the 
enemy's 
ability to 
wage war 
but 
continue 
non-
military 
production 
without 
much 
disturbanc
e? 
Can 
targets be 
selected to 
impair the 
enemy's 
ability to 
wage war 
but 
continue 
non-
military 
production 
without 
much 
disturbanc
e? 
If there is 
aerial 
bombing 
used, is it 
on targets 
away from 
the 
enemy's 
homeland? 
In 
the 
cas
e of 
CA
S 
Is CAS 
used 
only at 
decisiv
e 
points 
in a 
battle? 
Is CAS 
massed to 
apply 
concentrat
ed combat 
power and 
saturate 
defenses? 
Is CAS 
used 
against 
targets 
that are 
beyond 
the range 
of troops 
in 
contact? 
Variabl
e 
Name 
Campaig
n  ImpairWar  
NotHomela
nd  
Decisiv
e Massed 
LongRan
ge 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden  0  0  0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
 Blitz 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  1 1 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 1 1 1 1  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  . . . 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
 
Manchuri
a 1 0 1 0  . . . 
  1 0 1 0  . . . 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 0 1 1 0  . . . 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks 1 1 1 0     
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 1 0 0 0  . . . 
  1 0 1 0  0 1 1 
  1 0 1 0  . . . 
232 
 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  0 0 0 
  1 1 1 0  0 1 1 
          
 
Tanker 
War 1 1 1 1  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  0 0 0 
  1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
  1 0 1 0  1 1 1 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 0 1 0  0 1 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 1 0 1 0  . . . 
 
Battle of 
Britain 1 1 1 0  . . . 
  1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 1 1 1 1  . . . 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944 1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
  1 0 0 0  . . 0 
  1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
          
  1 1 1 0  1 1 0 
  1 1 1 0  0 0 1 
          
          
 
Lineback
er I and II 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 1 1 1 0  0 0 1 
  1 1 1 0  0 0 1 
  1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
 
War of 
the Cities 1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
 
War of 
the Cities 1 0 1 0  0 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 0 1 0  1 1 0 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . . .  . . . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 1 1 1  0 0 0 
 
Desert 
Storm 1 1 1 0  . . . 
 
Operatio
n 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 
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Deliberat
e Force 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom 1 1 1 0  1 1 0 
 Iraq War 1 1 1 0  0 1 1 
 
Part 8 
Variab
le 
Campaig
n name 
Does CAS 
provide 
selective 
and 
discriminati
ng 
firepower? 
Can 
selective 
and 
discriminatin
g power be 
applied in 
these 
circumstanc
es? 
Non-
Modern 
Air 
Power 
(1,0) 
In the 
case of 
interdicti
on 
Are 
combat 
forces 
(ie the 
actual 
troops, 
tanks, 
etc) 
NOT 
being 
targete
d? 
Are 
vehicles 
used to 
transport 
troops or 
supplies 
along the 
the 
conduit 
NOT 
being 
targeted? 
Is the 
aim of 
interdicti
on NOT 
the 
attrition 
of 
enemy 
forces 
and 
materiel
? 
Is air 
power 
NOT 
being 
used 
to slow 
down 
and 
enemy 
that is 
pursui
ng 
forces 
in 
retreat
? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campaig
n Selective 
CanSelectiv
e 
NonMod
Air  MilTar 
TroopTra
ns Attrition 
Retrea
t 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden 0    1 0 1 1 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 1 1   0 1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 0 1   0 1 0 1 
 Blitz 0 0   1 1 1 1 
  0 1   1 1 1 1 
  0 1   0 1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 0 0   1 1 1 1 
  . .   0 1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 0 0   0 1 0 1 
 
Manchur
ia . .   1 1 1 1 
  . .   1 1 1 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m . .   1 1 0 1 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks     0 0 0 1 
  . . . . . . . . 
 Operatio . .   1 1 1 1 
234 
 
n Allied 
Force 
  1 1   0 1 0 1 
  . .   0 0 0 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 1 1   0 . 0 1 
  0 0   0 1 0 1 
  0 0   0 0 0 0 
          
 
Tanker 
War 0 0   1 1 1 1 
  0 0   0 1 1 1 
  0 .   1 1 1 1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 0 1   1 1 1 1 
  1 1   0 0 0 1 
 
Polish 
invasion 0 1   0 1 0 1 
 
Battle of 
Britain . .   0 1 0 1 
 
Battle of 
Britain . .   0 0 0 1 
  0 0   1 1 1 1 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War . .   0 0 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
German
y 1942-
1944 1 1   1 1 1 1 
  0 1   1 1 1 1 
  0 0   0 1 0 1 
          
  1 1   0 1 0 1 
  1 1   0 0 0 1 
          
          
 
Lineback
er I and 
II 0 1   0 0 0 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 1 1   0 1 0 1 
  0 1   0 1 0 1 
  0 0   0 1 0 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 0   1 1 1 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 1   0 0 0 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 0 1   0 1 0 1 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 0 1   1 0 0 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 1   0 1 0 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . .   . . . . 
 Safed 0 0   0 1 0 1 
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Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 
 
Desert 
Storm . 1   1 1 0 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat
e Force 1 1   0 1 0 1 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 0 1   1 1 1 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom 1 1   0 0 0 1 
 Iraq War 1 1   0 0 0 1 
 
Part 9 
Variabl
e 
Campaign 
name 
In 
the 
cas
e of 
CAS 
Could 
this 
attack 
NOT 
have 
been 
carried 
out by 
artillery
? 
Was this 
attack NOT 
aerial 
bombardmen
t of the 
enemy line? 
Was the 
attack NOT 
preparatory 
to an 
offensive? 
Does the 
attack 
NOT 
involve air 
strikes on 
troops 
"crossing 
the wire"? 
Is air 
NOT 
being 
used 
to 
hold 
a 
flank
? 
In the 
case of 
strategi
c 
Is the 
enemy’s 
homeland 
NOT 
targeted? 
Variabl
e Name Campaign  Artillery Line 
PrepOffens
e 
WireCros
s Flank  
Homelan
d 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden  1 1 0 1 1  0 
 
Operation 
Peace for 
Galilee  0 0 0 1 1  0 
 
Operation 
El Dorado 
Canyon  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 Blitz  1 1 1 1 1  0 
   1 1 1 1 1  0 
   0 0 0 1 1  0 
 
Operation 
Wooden 
Leg  1 1 1 1 1  1 
   . 0 . 1 .  0 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Strike  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 Manchuria  1 1 1 1 1  0 
   1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterdam  1 1 0 1 1  0 
 
Biafran Air 
Force 
Attacks  1      0 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operation 
Allied 
Force  . . . . .  0 
   1 0 0 1 1  0 
   . 0 0 . .  0 
 Rolling  1 1 1 1 1  0 
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Thunder 
   0 0 0 1 1  0 
   0 0 0 1 1  0 
          
 
Tanker 
War  1 1 1 1 1  1 
   1 1 1 1 1  0 
   1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt  1 1 0 1 1  0 
   1 0 0 1 1  0 
 
Polish 
invasion  0 0 0 1 1  0 
 
Battle of 
Britain  1 1 0 1 1  0 
 
Battle of 
Britain  1 1 1 1 1  0 
   1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War  1 1 1 1 1  1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-1944  1 1 1 1 1  0 
   0 1 0 1 1  0 
   0 1 0 0 1  0 
          
   1 1 0 1 1  0 
   1 1 0 1 1  0 
          
          
 
Linebacke
r I and II  0 1 0 0 1  0 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt  0 0 1 1 1  0 
   0 1 1 1 1  0 
   0 0 0 0 1  0 
 
War of the 
Cities  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
War of the 
Cities  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Fox  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  0 1 0 1 1  0 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War  0 0 0 1 1  0 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis  . . . . .  . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea)  1 0 0 0 1  1 
 
Desert 
Storm  1 1 0 1 1  0 
 
Operation 
Deliberate 
Force  1 1 1 1 1  0 
 Bombing  1 1 1 1 1  0 
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of Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Operation 
Enduring 
Freedom  1 0 0 1 1  0 
 Iraq War  1 0 0 0 1  0 
 
Part 10 
Variab
le 
Campaig
n name 
If fighting 
is not 
occurring 
in the 
enemy’s 
homelan
d, is the 
homelan
d still 
NOT 
being 
targeted? 
Are 
civilians 
NOT 
being 
targeted
? 
Are non-
industrial 
urban 
areas NOT 
being 
targeted? 
Is the 
campaig
n NOT 
punitive 
in 
characte
r? 
Modern 
CAS Total 
Modern 
Interdicti
on Total 
Modern 
Strategic 
Total 
If fighting 
is not 
occurring 
in the 
enemy’s 
homelan
d, is the 
homelan
d still 
NOT 
being 
targeted? 
Variab
le 
Name 
Campaig
n 
Homelan
d1 
CivilianT
ar 
NonIndusT
ar Punitive 
ModCAST
ot 
ModIntT
ot 
ModStrT
ot 
Homelan
d1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 0 
 
Operatio
n Peace 
for 
Galilee 1 0 0 1 4 5 3 1 
 
Operatio
n El 
Dorado 
Canyon 1 1 1 0 6 5 7 1 
 Blitz 0 1 1 1 5 7 8 0 
  0 0 0 0 6 7 2 0 
  1 0 0 0 5 3 4 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Wooden 
Leg 1 0 0 0 5 8 8 1 
  1 0 0 0 1 6 4 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Strike 0 1 1 0 5 7 7 0 
 
Manchuri
a 1 0 0 0 5 8 4 1 
  0 0 0 0 5 7 2 0 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m 1 0 0 0 4 6 4 1 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks 1 1 1 1 1 4 9 1 
  . . . . 0 0 0 . 
 
Operatio
n Allied 
Force 1 1 1 1 0 11 6 1 
  1 0 0 0 7 4 3 1 
  1 1 1 0 0 6 6 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 1 1 1 1 7 4 9 1 
  1 0 1 0 2 3 4 1 
  1 0 0 1 4 3 7 1 
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      0 0 0  
 
Tanker 
War 1 0 1 1 5 8 9 1 
  0 0 0 0 5 6 3 0 
  1 0 0 0 6 7 3 1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 1 0 0 0 6 7 3 1 
  1 0 0 0 8 5 3 1 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 0 0 0 4 5 3 1 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0 0 0 4 5 3 0 
 
Battle of 
Britain 0 0 0 0 5 3 5 0 
  0 0 0 0 6 7 2 0 
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 1 1 1 1 5 1 10 1 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944 0 0 0 0 8 5 3 0 
  1 0 0 0 4 7 2 1 
  0 0 0 0 2 3 4 0 
      0 0 0  
  1 1 1 1 8 6 8 1 
  1 1 1 1 7 2 8 1 
      0 0 0  
      0 0 0  
 
Lineback
er I and 
II 1 1 1 1 3 8 8 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 1 1 1 1 6 7 9 1 
  0 0 0 0 6 3 4 0 
  1 1 1 1 1 4 9 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 0 0 6 7 3 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 1 0 8 6 5 1 
 
Operatio
n Desert 
Fox 0 1 1 1 6 6 7 0 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 1 1 1 4 6 8 1 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 1 0 0 1 6 4 5 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis . . .  0 0 0 . 
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 1 1 1 2 5 10 1 
 
Desert 
Storm 1 1 1 1 5 10 8 1 
 
Operatio
n 
Deliberat 1 1 1 1 10 7 8 1 
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e Force 
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia 0 0 0 0 6 7 3 0 
 
Operatio
n 
Enduring 
Freedom 1 1 1 1 7 5 8 1 
 Iraq War 1 1 1 1 6 5 8 1 
 
Part 11 
Varia
ble 
Campai
gn 
name 
Target 
Use of 
Air 
Does the 
campaig
n have 
limited 
aims? 
Are 
defenses 
avoided? 
Can 
defenses be 
avoided? 
Is the 
aim of a 
campaig
n to 
seize a 
strategic
ally 
importan
t piece of 
terrain? 
Is the 
aim of 
the 
attack to 
exploit 
temporar
y 
advantag
e/ 
windows 
of 
opportuni
ty? 
Is cover 
and 
concealm
ent (NOT 
quasi-
permane
nt trench 
lines, 
irregular, 
camoufla
ged 
locations, 
interlocki
ng fields 
of fire) an 
important 
part of 
the 
strategy? 
Are large 
formations 
broken up 
(dispersio
n)? 
Varia
ble 
Name 
Campai
gn 
Target
Air 
LimAims
GR 
DefAvoid
GR 
CanDefAvoi
dGR 
TerrainG
R TempGR CoverGR 
Dispersion
GR 
 
Bombin
g of 
Dresden 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Operati
on 
Peace 
for 
Galilee 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on El 
Dorado 
Canyon 0 . . . . . . . 
 Blitz 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  . 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Wooden 
Leg 0 . . . . . . . 
  1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Desert 
Strike 0 . . . . . . . 
 
Manchu
ria 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 . 
  1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
 
Bombin
g of 
Rotterd
am 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Biafran 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Air 
Force 
Attacks 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operati
on 
Allied 
Force 1 . . . . . . . 
  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 . 
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 1 0 1 0 0 0  
          
 
Tanker 
War 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
  1 0 0 . 1 1  1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt 0        
  1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Polish 
invasion 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 
 
Battle of 
Britain 1 . . . . . . . 
 
Battle of 
Britain 1 . . . . . . . 
  1        
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Bombin
g of 
German
y 1942-
1944 1        
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
          
  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
  0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
          
          
 
Linebac
ker I 
and II ? 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Israeli 
raids on 
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
  1        
  1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Desert 
Fox 1 . . . . . . . 
 
1st 
Russian
-
Cheche
n War 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
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2nd 
Russian
-
Cheche
n War 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis         
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Desert 
Storm 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Delibera
te Force 0 . . . . . . . 
 
Bombin
g of 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 . . . . . . . 
 
Operati
on 
Endurin
g 
Freedo
m 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
 
Iraq 
War 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
 
Part 12 
Varia
ble 
Campai
gn 
name 
Are 
subunits 
(platoons 
or 
sections, 
not 
battalions 
or 
companies
) allowed 
to move 
independe
ntly? 
Is the 
whole 
operatio
n NOT 
orchestr
ated 
from 
above? 
Does 
terrain 
allow 
subunits to 
move 
independe
ntly? 
Is 
suppress
ive fire 
emphasi
zed over 
destructi
ve fire? 
Is there 
combine
d arms 
integratio
n 
(teaming 
together 
weapon 
types 
with 
contrasti
ng 
strengths 
and 
weaknes
ses like 
infantry 
and 
artillery)? 
Is the 
aim to 
induce 
the 
systemi
c 
collapse 
of a 
defense 
while 
fighting 
through 
only a 
fraction 
of it 
directly? 
Are 
targets 
the 
support 
infrastru
ctre 
(supply 
lines)? 
Are forces 
disproportio
nately 
concentrate
d at a given 
point? 
Varia
ble 
Name 
Campai
gn SmallGR 
AboveG
R 
TerrainInd
epGR 
Suppres
sGR 
Combine
dGR 
Fracrtio
nGR 
Support
GR 
Concentrate
GR 
 
Bombin
g of 
Dresde
n 1 0 1 . 1 . 0 1 
 
Operati
on 
Peace 
for 
Galilee 0 0 1 . 1 0 1 0 
 
Operati
on El 
Dorado . . . . . . . . 
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Canyon 
 Blitz 0 0 1 . 1 1 0 1 
  0 0 1 . . 0 0 0 
  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Operati
on 
Woode
n Leg . . . . . . . . 
  0 0 1 . . 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Desert 
Strike . . . . . . . . 
 
Manch
uria . 0 1 . 1 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Bombin
g of 
Rotterd
am 1 0 1 . . 1 0 1 
 
Biafran 
Air 
Force 
Attacks 1 1 1 . . 1  1 
  . . . . . . . . 
 
Operati
on 
Allied 
Force . . . . . . . . 
  0 0 1 1 1 0 0  
  1 0 0 . 1 0 1 1 
 
Rolling 
Thunde
r 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
  0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 
    1 0 1 0 1 1 
          
 
Tanker 
War 0 0 1 . . 0 0 0 
  1 0 1 1 . 0 0 . 
  1 0 1   1 0 1 
 
Kurdish 
Revolt         
  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Polish 
invasio
n 1 0 1 . 1 1 0 1 
 
Battle 
of 
Britain . . . . . . . . 
 
Battle 
of 
Britain . . . . . . . . 
          
 
Doolittl
e Raid- 
Pacific 
War 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 
Bombin
g of 
Germa
ny 
1942-
1944         
  0 0 1 1 . 0 1 1 
  1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
          
  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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  1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
          
          
 
Lineba
cker I 
and II 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 
Israeli 
raids 
on 
Egypt 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
          
  1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 1 0 1 . 1 1 0 1 
 
War of 
the 
Cities 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Operati
on 
Desert 
Fox . . . . . . . . 
 
1st 
Russia
n-
Cheche
n War 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
 
2nd 
Russia
n-
Cheche
n War 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis         
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Desert 
Storm 1 0 1 . . 0 0 1 
 
Operati
on 
Deliber
ate 
Force . . . . . . . . 
 
Bombin
g of 
Saudi 
Arabia . . . . . . . . 
 
Operati
on 
Endurin
g 
Freedo
m 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
 
Iraq 
War 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
 
Part 13 
Variabl
e 
Campaig
n name 
Is depth 
emphasized 
over density 
when 
establishing Source Source (for ground strategy) 
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defense? 
Variabl
e Name 
Campaig
n DepthGR Source SourceGR 
 
Bombing 
of 
Dresden . 
*Swanston, Alexander & Malcolm 
Swanston. 2009. Atlas of Air 
Warfare: The History of Aerial 
Combat. Fall River Press: New 
York.    *Dear, I.C.B., ed. 2005. 
The Oxford Companion to World 
War II. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford.   **Swanston, Alexander 
& Malcolm Swanston. 2007. The 
Historical Atlas of World War II. 
Chartwell Books: Edison, NJ.                                                         *The Historical Atlas of WWII 
 
Operation 
Peace for 
Galilee . 
*www.globalsecurity.org 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/library/report/1987/SGC.htm) *Allen 2007 
 
Operation 
El Dorado 
Canyon . 
*www.globalsecurity.org 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm)  
 Blitz . *Swanston & Swanston 2009 *Dear 2005 
  0 
*(http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.or
g/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html)   
*(http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/
hi/dates/stories/january/18/newsid
_4588000/4588486.stm) 
* Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/
desert_sabre.htm) 
  . *Swanston & Swanston 2009 *Swanson & Swanson 2009 
 
Operation 
Wooden 
Leg . 
*Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Press Conference on the Attack 
(http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreig
n%20Relations/Israels%20Foreig
n%20Relations%20since%20194
7/1984-
1988/92%20Press%20Conferenc
e%20Following%20Israel%20Air
%20Force%20Att) *Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  . 
*Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/world/war/iran-iraq.htm) 
*Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl
d/war/iran-iraq.htm) 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Strike . 
*Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/ops/desert_strike.htm)      
 
Manchuri
a . *Swanston & Swanston 2009 
*http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/china
_war.htm 
  . *Swanston & Swanston 2007 *Swanson & Swanson 2007 
 
Bombing 
of 
Rotterda
m . *Dear & Foot 2005 *Dear & Foot 2005 
 
Biafran 
Air Force 
Attacks  
*Biafra: How to Build an Instant 
Air Force.  June 6, 1969. Time 
Magazine.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazin
e/article/0,9171,941667-1,00.html 
*http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl
d/war/biafra.htm 
  . Allen 2007 . 
 
Operation 
Allied 
Force . 
www.nato.int (operation allied 
force) 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.
htm . 
  1 
McMichael, Scott. 1991. 
Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military 
Performance in Afghanistan. 
Brassey's, London. *McMichael 1991 
  . 
*Edwards, Paul M. 2005. The A to 
Z of the Korean War.  Scarecrow 
Press, Maryland.  *Swanston & 
Swanston 2009 *Edwards 2005 
 
Rolling 
Thunder 0 
*Swanston & Swanston 2009 
*Global Security 
*Global Security 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/v
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/ops/rolling_thunder.htm 
ietnam2.htm 
   
*http://www.onwar.com/aced/natio
n/ink/italy/fitalyethiopia1935.htm 
*http://www.oneworldmagazine.or
g/focus/etiopia/musso3.html  
  . 
*http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.
mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul
-aug/dean.html#dean 
*http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchr
onicles/aureview/1983/jul-
aug/dean.html#dean 
     
 
Tanker 
War . 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/world/war/iran-iraq.htm 
*Global Security 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl
d/war/iran-iraq.htm) 
  1 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/e
ssay/Air_Power/WWI_Bombing/A
P3.htm 
*http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/
world_war_1.htm 
     
 
Kurdish 
Revolt  
Samuel Hoare. May 17, 1928.The Use 
of Air Power as illustrated by the 
Recent Operations in Arabia.  British 
National Archives. *Memorandum.  
"Air Defence" 1924. 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
documentsonline/download.asp?T=2
320831&S=I/10/02231946D&E=carla
mm%40rice%2Eedu  
  0 
*US Centennial of Flight 
Commission. 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/e
ssay/Air_Power/Spansh_CW/AP1
8.htm *www.guerracivil1936.com 
 
Polish 
invasion . 
www.bbc.co.uk/onthisday (1Sep 
1939)  
 
Battle of 
Britain . 
*Swanston & Swanston 2009, 
*Swanston & Swanston 2007  
 
Battle of 
Britain . 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/battl
eofbritain70thanniversary.cfm  
   *Keegan 2005  
 
Doolittle 
Raid- 
Pacific 
War . *Keegan 2005 *Keegan 2005 
 
Bombing 
of 
Germany 
1942-
1944  
*Swanston & Swanston 2009, 
*Swanston & Swanston 2007  
  . 
*http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.
mil/airchronicles/aureview/1982/s
ep-oct/gurion.html 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro
nicles/aureview/1982/sep-oct/gurion.html 
  0 
*http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.
mil/airchronicles/cc/rodman.html  
     
  0 
Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in 
Algeria, 1954-1960. March 1965. 
Concepts Division, Aerospace 
Studies Institute.  Air University, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama. 
Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Algeria, 
1954-1960. March 1965. Concepts 
Division, Aerospace Studies Institute.  Air 
University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama. 
  0 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/library/report/1984/RRW.htm 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/librar
y/report/1984/RRW.htm 
     
     
 
Lineback
er I and II 0 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/ops/linebacker-2.htm 
Mrozek, Donald J. 1989. Air Power and 
the Ground War in Vietnam. Pergamon-
Brassey's. Washington, DC 
 
Israeli 
raids on . www.idf.il www.idf.il 
246 
 
Egypt 
   
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/
02/world/afghans-down-a-
pakistani-f-16-saying-fighter-jet-
crossed-border.html  
  0 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/world/war/iran-iraq.htm 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world
/war/iran-iraq.htm 
 
War of 
the Cities 0 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/world/war/iran-iraq.htm 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world
/war/iran-iraq.htm 
 
War of 
the Cities 0 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milit
ary/world/war/iran-iraq.htm 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world
/war/iran-iraq.htm 
 
Operation 
Desert 
Fox . 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita
ry/ops/desert_fox.html, 
http://www.navyleague.org/seapow
er/operation_desert_fox.htm 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/d
esert_fox.htm 
 
1st 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 0 
Oliker, Olga. 2001. Russia's 
Chechen Wars 1994-2000: 
Lessons from Urban Combat. 
Rand: Santa Monica, CA 
Oliker, Olga. 2001. Russia's Chechen 
Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban 
Combat. Rand: Santa Monica, CA 
 
2nd 
Russian-
Chechen 
War 0 
Oliker, Olga. 2001. Russia's 
Chechen Wars 1994-2000: 
Lessons from Urban Combat. 
Rand: Santa Monica, CA 
Oliker, Olga. 2001. Russia's Chechen 
Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban 
Combat. Rand: Santa Monica, CA 
 
Taiwan 
Strait 
Crisis    
 
Safed 
Sagar 
(White 
Sea) 0 
Lavoy, Peter R., ed. 2009. 
Asymmetric Warfare in South 
Asia: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Kargil 
Conflict.  Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  Chapter: 
"Military Operations in the Kargil 
Conflict" John H. Gill. 
Lavoy, Peter R., ed. 2009. Asymmetric 
Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Kargil Conflict.  
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Chapter: "Military Operations in the Kargil 
Conflict" John H. Gill. 
 
Desert 
Storm . 
Summers, Harry G. 1992. A 
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. 
Dell, New York 
Mazarr, Michael J. Don M. Snider, and 
James A. Blackwell Jr. 1993. Desert 
Storm: The Gulf War and What We 
Learned.  Westview Press, Boulder, CO.  
 
Operation 
Deliberat
e Force . 
Operation Deliberate Force. 
NATO Fact Sheet. 16 Dec. 2002. 
<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/facts
heets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.h
tm>, Deliberate force [electronic 
resource] : a case study in 
effective air campaigning : final 
report of the Air University 
Balkans air campaign study 
AuthorOwen, Robert C., 1951- 
Call NumberD 
301.26/6:2002020504 
PublisherEditionPublishing 
Date2000, 
<http://permanent.access.gpo.gov
/websites/dodandmilitaryejournals
/www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupre
ss/books/owen/owen.pdf>  
 
Bombing 
of Saudi 
Arabia . Pape 1996 Pape 1996 
 
Operation 
Enduring 
Freedom . 
Lambeth, Benjamin S. 2005. Air 
Power Against Terror: America's 
Conduct of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Rand Corporation.  Lambeth 2005 
 Iraq War . 
Murray, Williamson & Robert H. 
Scales Jr. 2003. The Iraq War. 
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 
Press. Cambridge, Mass.  Murray & Scales 2003. 
 
